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PREFACE

Poetry was a field of which I had little knowledge, and with which I had only a cursory
familiarity, until I was 29 years old—perhaps somewhat later in life than an interest in poetry arises
in most people. Before then, I had read and written poetry only when required of me in school.
My grandmother had given me a copy of Wallace Stevens’ The Palm at the End of the Mind for
my nineteenth birthday, but I had only casually flipped through it.
In the fall of 2009, having enrolled in a Creative Writing MA program at the University of
Essex with the ridiculous but probably common thought for someone in that position that I could
in that year produce the next great American novel, I sat in on Dr. Phil Terry’s “Poetic Practice”
course before making it to the first session of my novel writing seminar. In the first meeting of
that poetry seminar, Dr. Terry played tapes of Robert Lowell reading poetry at Essex. I don’t
remember the poems Lowell was reading, and I don’t know what I expected his reading to sound
like, but I do remember being surprised at how taken I was by the sounds coming from those
cassettes. I had no idea poetry could sound like that. Lowell spoke about such seemingly quotidian
things in a way that emanated a depth and poignancy which required a focused listening. His
poetry seemed honest, sometimes dark, but very human and real. By the end of the first month of
classes I had decided to officially concentrate in poetry. I read as much as I could process, slowly
worked my way back from contemporary British poetry to much earlier verse. I wrote and
performed poetry with a kindred group of students and faculty.
It was in the spring that a colleague—knowing my interest in place, memory, and the sights
and sounds that are formative to our identity-formation—suggested that I read Charles Olson’s
The Maximus Poems. I immediately went to the library, checked it out, took the rather large book
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to a nearby café, ordered a latte, sat down at a wind-pestered table in the sun, and read the first 80
pages or so. I’m sure more capable, patient, and/or faster readers could have read much more in
the time it took me to sip that burnt latte. For me, however, this was a good chunk of reading to
put away without wanting to put the book down and go off to think my own thoughts—which
typically I find more appealing. But Olson was making me want to keep reading as much as he
was making me want to think.
The more I learned about Charles Olson, the more I felt compelled to dedicate my
scholarship to his work. I felt a connection to his poetry from the start, though I found it very
challenging. I also felt a connection to him. In some instances we had biographical similarities.
We were both born in December, between Christmas and New Year’s Eve. Olson’s family was
also middle class, and both of our families were Catholic (to one degree or another). When I
learned that Olson’s father, like mine, was a mailman, I started crying—though I’ve never really
explored why. In other ways the connection I felt was more intellectual. Olson also was in his
30s before he began writing poetry full time. He would eventually write The Maximus Poems
about Gloucester, Massachusetts, the town in which he spent much of his life, as I had been writing
most of my assignments that year about South Bend, IN, the town in which I was born and raised
and had lived as an adult. We both wrote about the ways those places had changed. Olson’s work
also explores his philosophical vision for how Gloucester could change for the better in the future.
Ultimately, both my fascination with Olson’s project and the connections I felt with him have
compelled me to write this dissertation
What I hope to elucidate in the coming pages, beyond what the title may suggest, is some
of the energy that I, like many readers of Olson’s work, find so compelling and original. Olson
can be intimately personal though he often writes in a mode outside that of the lyrical subject. He
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incorporates and reinvigorates archaic poetries to write a modern mythos—one, much like those
of the ancients, rooted in and inspired by a particular locale. He tells stories of his time and of
days long since passed. He connects old stories to modern thought and modern stories to old ways
of thinking. His poetry seems to point to something equally forgotten, fresh sounding, new feeling,
and somehow yet to come. It is pre-Socratic and postmodern, posthuman even. It comes in many
forms: his well anthologized publications; unpublished archival material ranging from typed
manuscripts to illegible handwriting on scrap paper; digressive or rambling oratorical
performances, some recorded and transcribed. Olson’s poetry, like himself, is commanding yet
vulnerable. Its aim, if we can condense his project to a single objective, is to develop a poetry that
approaches (paraphrasing the title of one of his essays) “the real itself.” Or so I think.
This dissertation stems from my appreciation for post-World War II American poetry,
which has a certain dynamic to which I find myself drawn. This poetry often sounds like an
everyday conversation, yet one that is much more than either the things people usually say or how
we typically say them. Olson’s poetry is, in my view, superlative in this quality. I think Olson’s
work occupies a space informed by the simultaneity and interpenetration of these two ideas: that
the best poetry should sound like plain talk, and the best talk will be pure poetry. My hope is that
in what follows I can share with readers a small portion of the energy of Olson’s thought and
writing which I have found so challenging and inspiring.
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Olson
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American poet Charles Olson (1910-1970) spent the last two decades of his life composing
his magnum opus, the three-volume modern verse epic The Maximus Poems (Maximus). He began
composing Maximus in 1950, the same year he published his poetics manifesto “Projective Verse.”
Taken together, these two moments in Olson’s career can be read as marking the beginning of his
mature poetics and poetry. However, the concepts he develops and the projective verse style he
proclaims in the first half of the 1950s can already be seen emerging in his earlier publications.
Beginning with two of his most significant publications of the late 1940s, this dissertation
examines the development of three major concepts in Olson’s thinking (myth, history, and orality)
during roughly the first decade of his career (1946-1956). Working in a chronological manner, I
analyze the intellectual sources which informed these concepts and demonstrate how they are
interrelated in Olson’s thinking. Considering Olson’s insistence that the breath of the poet should
guide the composition of his or her poetic lines, I will argue that projective verse is an oral poetics
in more than just a rhetorical sense. As Olson’s concept of orality is grounded in philological and
historical research, projective verse operates on an archaic conception of orality—one which,
importantly, does not contradict the fact that Olson published his work in text and emphasized the
importance of the typewriter for properly conveying projective verse. I conclude with a reading
of “Letter 23” from Maximus, which manifests the deeply intertwined nature of these three
concepts in Olson’s thinking and poetry.
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“It is assumed throughout this book as a cardinal rule of criticism that the
critic must put himself as nearly as he can in the position of his author. If
he does not do that, if he proceeds on merely general principles, or gives us
no more than his personal impressions, he is presenting us with a criticism
of himself rather than of his author—and we may not be interested in
himself. It should be obvious that a man cannot judge well what he will not
take the trouble to understand.”
J.A.K. Thomson, The Art of the Logos

“Engage yrself at yr deepest interest. (No one will know thus but yrself.)
It won’t work every day, in fact how many. Damned few. But that is true
of anything. The point is, to keep on it…”
Charles Olson, “HOW TO WORK EVERY DAY” (unpublished)
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: THE MANY CHALLENGES OF
CHARLES OLSON

1.1

Charles Olson, the Person and the Poet
American poet Charles Olson’s personality could be captivating, charming, confounding,

contentious or cloying, depending on whom you ask. The same could be said of his poetry.
Though it has been nearly half a century since his death, Olson’s poetry still has these effects on
many readers. It also has for many readers, myself included, a timelessness and relevance which
adds to its capacity to captivate. Olson’s thinking—expressed in his lectures, letters, prose and
poetry—is relevant to many contemporary discussions, both in and outside of the classroom. We
could refer to Olson when discussing art, culture, education, ethics, history, poetry, or politics and
make a valuable contribution to the discussion. Yet we should not invoke Olson only in the
positive sense, applying his concepts and commentary wherever we deem relevant. Olson’s
thinking can at times be problematic, to say the least. The bulk of the present dissertation examines
certain concepts of Olson’s, the sources which inspired these concepts, and how Olson developed
and employed them in his poetics and poetry while also considering some limitations of those
concepts and the ways in which he executed them. Olson is a particularly compelling subject, in
my opinion, because he presents us with a series of challenges: the challenges his style poses to
readers, the challenges he poses to critics attempting to categorize or explain his work, the
challenges he posed to his students and his contemporaries, the ways he challenges traditions and
paradigms of poetry or what he deemed conventional ways of thinking. To orient readers to the
poet posing these challenges, I begin by offering a glimpse into Charles Olson the person first.
Charles Olson was born in Worcester, Massachusetts, on December 27, 1910, and spent
his childhood between the town in which he was born and the town he would eventually adopt as
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his home, Gloucester, Massachusetts.1 His Swedish father, Karl, who emigrated with his parents
to the United States when he was less than a year old (Clark 4), was tall, stubborn, and intense.
Karl worked as a mailman during Olson’s youth. Olson’s mother, Mary née Hines, was first
generation Irish American, short, loving, and superstitious. A devout Catholic, she raised her only
child accordingly. Olson eventually attended the Worcester Classical High School (ibid. 11), and
as a budding young orator would eventually finish third in the national oratory competition,
earning a trip to continental Europe for his efforts. He would later attend Wesleyan University in
Connecticut for both his bachelor’s and master’s degrees, and then Harvard University for doctoral
studies (all in the humanities), which he did not complete. While a doctoral candidate in the fall
of 1938, disillusioned with and exhausted by academia, Olson applied for a Guggenheim grant to
facilitate his writing a book on Herman Melville, whom Olson had researched and written on
extensively during his graduate studies. Upon being awarded the grant the following March, he
abruptly left Harvard and his candidacy behind.
Olson spent a couple of years working on his Melville book, occasionally looking for a
more regular source of income. By this time he had reached his full height of 6’7”, cutting a large,
brooding figure searching for some direction and a vocation. Though writing his Melville book
was a struggle, he was not without passion for the research. Nor did he lack other interests. For a
few months he even earned free housing as a walk-on member of a ballet company. Imagine
Olson—tall, intense, anxious, emotional—learning dance technique and narrative ballet practices
performing minor roles under Léonide Massine! After struggling between Boston, Gloucester,
and New York City in this manner, and before he would become a full-time poet and teacher,
Olson did settle into consistent employment. He spent a few years, roughly coinciding with the

“Olson” refers to Charles Olson throughout this introduction. I will refer to his parents by their first names when
necessary.
1
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United States’ involvement in World War II (1941-1945), building a promising career in political
administration, culminating in his role as the director of the Foreign Nationalities Division of the
Democratic National Committee (Clark 85). Olson, however, would walk away from this career
path to pursue a life of writing. There were many factors behind Olson’s decision to move in this
direction, some details of which we will return to when examining some of his earliest
publications. For now, a particular aspect of Olson’s childhood that would eventually have a great
effect on his poetry bears mention.
In the summer when Olson was four years old, his father took the family for the first time
to the seaside town of Gloucester, MA, roughly forty miles north of Boston on Cape Ann.
Gloucester was built on a maritime economy and was still primarily a fishing town during Olson’s
lifetime. The town also played a central role in the development of the colonial United States. It
was at Stage Fort Park in what is now west Gloucester that in 1623 the Reverend John White
directed the founding of a fishing company, the Dorchester Company, which eventually became
the Massachusetts Bay Colony. 2 After the Olsons’ first visit, Gloucester soon became their
summer residence, mother and son staying the season while Karl worked in Worcester and joined
them on weekends and for his annual summer holiday. As an undergraduate and graduate student,
Olson continued to spend holidays and summers in Gloucester with his mother, who had settled
there following Karl’s death in 1935. Olson would also stay there intermittently following his
departure from Harvard, until he moved to Washington, D.C., for work in 1941. In the late 1950s,
Olson would himself settle in Gloucester more or less permanently, save time spent in various
places holding teaching appointments, researching or travelling, often to give readings and conduct

2

There is a curious discrepancy in the facts worth noting here. A plaque on a prominent rock at Stage Fort Park
claims that Rev. White et al. founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony there in 1623. However, more official histories
state that the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not officially founded until several years later.
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seminars. Over the last twenty years or so of his life, up until his death on January 10, 1970, Olson
composed The Maximus Poems (Maximus), a three-volume modern epic poem written chiefly to,
for, and about Gloucester. To understand better why this multivolume work would consume much
of the last two decades of his life, it is helpful to have a sense of Olson’s personality and his poetics.
As mentioned, Olson’s personality had, and his poetry still does have for many readers, a
captivating yet challenging energy about it. He was not only large in stature, but he had big ideas,
and never tired of discussing them. Olson biographer Tom Clark describes him as “a complicated
man whose poetry, teaching and human presence projected a magisterial amplitude sensed by
nearly everyone who came in contact with his person and his work” (xiii). While Clark’s
biography certainly takes some poetic liberty with its presentation of its subject’s life, the latter
description of Olson seems to be universally assented to among those who knew him, especially
during the last two decades of his life when he was producing most of his poetry and gaining some
notoriety for it. When considering Olson’s poetry, this “amplitude” can turn readers away as easily
as it can attract them. In his essay “Olson’s Poetics and the Tradition,” Charles Altieri points out
this divisive capacity of Olson’s poetry, asserting that
“[f]or most readers and academics Charles Olson is, if read at all, a turgid,
irrational bore. Yet to many others he has become a kind of guru, the one
thinker capable of suggesting poetic and philosophical strategies for
breaking beyond modernism to a post-modern vision of reality and a
redeemed human consciousness sustained by that reality. However, the
latter often act like religious initiates, offering only gnomic phrases or
mysterious formulae to those they see locked into ordinary rational
discourse.” (173)
I will try to limit my gnomic phrases here. Altieri’s analysis, however, is an astute one. Olson
can be didactic, contentious, and pompous. Yet he can offer lines of poetry or speech, often
aphoristic, in a succinct, characteristic rhythm, which evince both a very current yet seemingly
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timeless knowledge. If nothing else, Olson is an intriguing figure in part because the very energy
his poetry exhibits often seems to be evading the grasp of the poet himself.
Olson’s characteristic energy took many forms beyond writing poetry. He wrote literary
criticism and prose on a variety of topics, taught for many years, gave numerous lectures, and was
constantly researching. Though to my knowledge Olson never described himself in this way, he
was a true polyhistor. The etymology of the word is one which Olson likely would appreciate
given his inclination to etymological research. The Greek term means, essentially, ‘many’ +
‘learned’.3 Thus, a polyhistor is a well-learned person. The prefix implies that this person is
learned in a multiplicity of things. We can assume then that the range of topics about which this
person is learned is varied to some degree. What are the many things about which this person is
learned? Etymologically speaking, histor (ιστορ) is an adjective which assumes the role of a noun
when combined with the prefix poly-, as in the Latinized and modern English forms. The adjective
is derivate of the verb historia (ιστορία). A person performing this activity is acquiring knowledge
through inquiry and investigation. Whether this knowledge is acquired on one subject or many is
not explicit in its Greek form, but I think we can fairly infer a depth of knowledge has been
acquired. What we can be sure of where the archaic Greek usage of the term is concerned is that
the inquiry involved is oral to a significant degree, if not primarily or solely. Personal experience,
such as travelling, and experimentation certainly would have led to the acquiring of knowledge for
some archaic Greeks. But undoubtedly a large amount of knowledge would have come from
conversation (asking questions, receiving spoken answers) and listening to orators presenting local
myths and history (often one and the same), laws and customs. In the early 1950s Olson would
adopt the word ‘istorin (ιστορίν), which he defines “to find out for yourself” to describe the self-

3

See “polyhistor” and “history,” Webster’s New World College Dictionary.
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directed activity he believed was necessary for knowledge acquisition (SVH 20; MP 249; cf. MP
104-105). Indeed Olson considered himself a historian as much as a poet, one who was always
searching for answers to his many questions through various disciplines.
Olson was an insatiable reader, much of his own investigations materializing as reading.
His library was extensive, curated currently at the Charles Olson Research Collection at the
University of Connecticut Libraries.4 There, researchers can discover copious marginalia which
further suggest a reader who was deeply engaged with the text in front of him. I offer two examples
here. First, researchers will open Olson’s Modern Library Edition of The Complete Works of
Homer to find a rather impressive freehand map of Greece which he drew in pencil; and on the
first page of Book IX of the Odyssey, Olson drew a map of the west coast of Italy and the
Tyrrhenian Sea through the type (CORC, c710, 126). In this example, Olson was apparently
orienting himself geographically to his reading. 5 A second example would be the extensive
running notes which fill most of the available margin space on pages 172-177 in Olson’s copy of
Eric A. Havelock’s Preface to Plato, where Olson is engaging with the author’s expounding of the
necessity of “a language of act and event…to the rhythmic-mnemonic process” of oral poetry
(CORC, c180; Havelock 173). Olson is not just making notes; he is also responding to Havelock.
These kinds of interactions with his books are apparent throughout his library, as if Olson were
responding to the text in his own hand in live time, creating a sort of interactive textual dialogue
with whatever he was reading. Add to this the multitude of unpublished manuscripts, notebooks,
and random scraps of paper covered with Olson’s handwriting available in the archive and his

4

When referring to material from this collection, I will employ in-line citations. Original Olson material will be
cited as: (CORC, Box#.Folder#), with no reference to page numbers. Books in Olson’s library have a unique call
number. I will cite them in-line as: (CORC, call #, page # where relevant). Full bibliographical details for these
books appear in the Works Cited.
5
For more on this idea of spatial and geographical orientation in Olson’s writing, see my blogpost of 25 January
2016 for the UConn Libraries Archives and Special Collections Blog (full details in bibliography).
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comments on the importance of the typewriter for projective verse (a topic we will return to in
Chapter 4) and we may be inclined to think of Olson as a poet who championed the printed word.6
However, Olson had also an insatiable hunger for talking. He had many things to say about
many topics, unilaterally dominating conversations with, and the time of, his interlocutors. There
are many anecdotes about Olson keeping his friends up until dawn talking, or making phone calls
to friends or editors in the wee hours of the morning. In print, the most readily available examples
of Olson’s penchant for talking can be found in the anthology Muthologos (2010) which collects
some of Olson’s transcribed interviews, lectures and readings.7 In his introduction, editor Ralph
Maud concisely describes what this collection provides to readers: “It is in this compilation of
transcribed tapes that we get what is preserved of Olson’s life of talk” (Olson 2010, 10, my italics).
Consider, for example, Olson’s “Reading at Berkeley” from 23 July 1965.8 In what was scheduled
to be a poetry reading, an inebriated Olson does much more extemporaneous talking than actual
reading of his poems. The crowd, including poets Allen Ginsberg and Lew Welch among others,
grew restless, interrupting Olson, urging him to simply read his poetry. Olson’s response:
“No, I wanna talk. I mean, you want to listen to a poet? You know, a poet,
when he’s alive, whether he talks or reads you his poems is the same thing.
Dig that! [APPLAUSE] And when he is made of three parts—his life, his
mouth, and his poems, then, by god, the earth belongs to us!” (ibid. 150).
Olson’s union of a poet’s life (understood here in both the biographical and biological sense),
poetry and speech implies that a poet is necessarily being poetic simply by communicating orally.
In addition, Olson may also by implying that the very act of talking is inherently poetic. Both

Henceforth, the term ‘projective verse’ (when not capitalized) will refer to Olson’s poetics generally. Analysis of
Olson’s essay “Projective Verse” constitutes the basis of Chs. 3 and 4.
7
Throughout the dissertation I will parenthetically include the date of publication following titles of Olson’s prose.
For his poetry, I will parenthetically note the date of composition (c.) following the titles.
8
The complete recording of “Reading at Berkeley,” as well as dozens of other audio and a few video files of Olson
reading poetry and giving lectures is available at the University of Pennsylvania’s PennSound website. See
bibliography for full details.
6
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implications would seem to give the speech of the poet a certain social force. Indeed, Olson
decreed an important and transformative social role for poetry from the early stages of his career.
As his own poetics developed so too did the role Olson would ascribe to the poet as a special,
necessarily oral, voice within and for a community.
Albeit abridged, I hope the above sketch of Olson’s life and personality will give readers a
sense of what made him, and what still makes his writing, so captivating. The energy he had for
research, writing, and talking, however, contribute directly to the challenges his work presents.
The range of subjects Olson researched, and about which he wrote and talked, is daunting. The
same can be said of the scope of his writing, particularly when taking into account the unpublished
work available in his archive. Yet it is these aspects of Olson’s work which also make it so relevant
to many contemporary conversations, both academic and cultural. Before considering the ways in
which Olson can be relevant to the contemporary classroom, in particular, it would be beneficial
to see how his poetry has been received in criticism.

1.2

Olson in Context, Olson in Criticism
In a chapter on Olson in his 1980 book Destructive Poetics, Paul Bové commented that at

the time Olson “ha[d] been consistently omitted from critical analysis of the ‘tradition’” of modern
American poetry (217). Bové further asserts that until then, criticism and academic discussion in
the field displayed “almost total silence surrounding Olson’s work” (ibid.). There are several
reasons for this, some of which can be surmised from Olson’s relationship to the academy and
major poetry publishers during his career, and some of which have to do with the difficulty of
critically categorizing Olson’s work.
In regard to the former, Olson maintained a contentious relationship with the academy,
despite eventually taking jobs at SUNY Buffalo and the University of Connecticut in the later

9
years of his life. Clark reads the poem “Diaries of Death” (c. 1950) as Olson’s “subjective
analysis” of his never completing his Ph.D. (51).9 According to Clark, the poem expresses Olson’s
relief at “his own escape from a Puritan education system he’d come to regard as lethal” (52).
While there is some truth to Clark’s assessment, the event which inspired the poem’s composition,
and which is referenced in the poem, was Olson’s learning of his former Harvard professor F.O.
Matthiessen’s suicide. The poem claims that an institution such as Harvard is a “killer-place,”
responsible for the demise of the freer intellectual spirits among its ranks, acting instead as a
“factory of wills for wheels” from which the Matthiessens (and Olsons) of the world must
go off, go off, go free
from places where the strictures are too much, too much
for you and me to bear!
Though Clark’s portrayal of why Olson ultimately did not earn the doctorate is inaccurate, his use
of this particular poem as a gloss on Olson’s feelings toward the academy is fair.10 Aside from
Olson’s distaste for the academy he left behind, his publications were often harshly criticized by
academics. For example, his first published book of prose, Call Me Ishmael (1947), a monograph
on Herman Melville, received quite a few negative reviews from Melville scholars, some of which
Olson knew and studied with at Harvard.11 As a result, Olson had few nice things to say about the
academy and what he saw as its preferred model of scholarship, its taste in poetry, and its
celebration of some of his contemporary poets.

See “Diaries of Death,” CP 143-44.
See Maud 2008, 46-47. According to Maud, Clark’s misinterpretation of Olson’s own assessment of his not
receiving a Ph.D. includes a “misread[ing] of a questionnaire that Olson filled in for a sociology researcher at
[SUNY] Buffalo” (46). Maud reveals that Olson in fact would have been given the degree years after he left
Harvard, but that Olson refused to submit Call Me Ishmael as his dissertation.
11
See Clark 2000, 120-21, where he also mentions some favorable reviews of Ishmael. Olson typically paid more
attention to, and was greater affected by, the negative reviews. Charters 1968 notes that Ishmael was initially
rejected by the former Harcourt, Brace, & Co., “on the advice of their academic readers,” including Matthiessen
(10). On this latter point, see also Clark 2000, 111.
9

10
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Olson further did himself few favors by being an unbearable hyper-editor of his own work.
He typically missed deadlines and delayed publication of his work, agonizing over his own edits
and arguing against his editors’ suggestions. Reynal & Hitchcock, publishers of Ishmael, were so
put off by Olson’s “last-minute nervous fiddling over the final proofs” that they “failed to exercise
their option on [his] new project” (Clark 120).12 Further, in his communication with editors, Olson
could be demanding, overbearing, and often condescending. Letters for Origin (1969), a volume
of Olson’s correspondence with Cid Corman, the publisher and editor of the poetry magazine
Origin which featured many Black Mountain poets, captures some of the tension Olson could
create with his communication. When Corman asked Olson to be a contributing editor for Origin,
Olson quickly tried to establish his authority over him. The result was what one commentator has
described as “an enormous battle of creative energy” (Carlson 2004). Despite Olson’s pedantic,
patronizing letters, Corman published many of Olson’s poems, and the two developed both a
professional relationship and a friendship. 13 Poet to Publisher (2003), a collection of Olson’s
letters to Donald Allen, the influential publisher of postwar and contemporary American poetry,
tells a slightly different story. Olson’s earliest letters to Allen were written only a couple of years
after the last of the Origin letters to Corman. The condescension is gone from Olson’s voice in
this latter volume, however, perhaps because Olson knew what Allen could mean for his career.
What these letters to Allen demonstrate is the meticulous nature of how Olson thought through the
visual presentation of his poetry, a topic we will revisit in Chapter 4, and the almost manic

This new project was the proposed “Operation Red, White & Black,” which Olson intended to be a long poem
about Native Americans, Spanish conquistadors, “and gold…bringing in as principals Ulysses, Columbus, Faust,
Montezuma, Cabeza de Vaca, Cavelier de La Salle, and Paul Bunyan” (Clark 120). Though Olson never published
this long poem, this idea was in part the genesis for Maximus, insofar as Olson was dedicated to producing a long
poem incorporating seemingly disparate historical figures and eras, and myths both local and global.
13
For an interesting reading of Olson’s treatment of Corman from the perspective of sex-gender theory, see
DuPlessis 2012, 149, where DuPlessis cites Olson’s correspondence with Robert Creeley as evidence of Olson’s
tensions with Corman.
12
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frequency with which he would contact his editors before approving a final typescript. These
aspects of Olson’s personality and approach to the academic and publishing mainstream are major
factors behind the long periods of general silence on his work, both during his lifetime and since
the time of his death.
Yet there have also been critics who have lauded the merits and originality of Olson’s work,
as well as poets who have cited Olson as an influence on their own poetry. Certain moments of
Olson criticism bear mention, though to be sure the following is only a partial summary of the
field. In 1973, not long after Olson’s death, the journal boundary 2 dedicated a double issue, titled
“Charles Olson: Essays, Reminiscences, Reviews,” to Olson’s poetry and poetics.14 This issue
included several critical essays which would become formative to later Olson scholarship, and two
of Olson’s own essays. The end of the 1970s then saw something of a heyday in Olson scholarship
which would last for a few years. Between 1978 and 1982, several important monographs on
Olson were published. 15 This timeframe was bookended by two publications by George F.
Butterick, a driving force behind the creation of, and the first curator of, the Charles Olson
Research Collection. Butterick’s indispensable A Guide to the Maximus Poems of Charles Olson,
published in 1978, is a detailed annotation of many of the sources for, and the allusions and
references made within, Maximus. This surge in Olson scholarship culminated in the publication
of the complete edition of Maximus (1983), edited by Butterick. There were of course important
scholarly publications on Olson in the two decades following the publication of the complete
Maximus. One noteworthy example is Clark’s lively but contentious biography of Olson, Charles

14

Among the essays in this issue which have influenced, or are cited in, this dissertation are: Altieri 1973b; Byrd
1973; Doria 1973; and von Hallberg 1973.
15
See for example: Paul 1978; von Hallberg 1978; Christensen 1979; Byrd 1980; Merrill 1982.
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Olson: The Allegory of a Poet's Life.16 In the interest of space, I will limit this discussion to
mentioning two more recent moments in Olson criticism.
The mid-2000s saw something of a revival in Olson criticism. This was, I believe, due
largely to the publication of both Olson’s Collected Poems (1997) and his Collected Prose (1997)
toward the end of the previous decade. Along with the complete Maximus, these collections gave
readers the opportunity to peruse Olson’s published, and some previously unpublished, work in
three convenient volumes. Further, a new edition of Ishmael featuring an afterword by Melville
scholar Merton M. Sealts, Jr., was also published in 1997. Finally, the second edition of Clark’s
biography, which included a preface by Olson’s friend and one-time fellow Black Mountain
College faculty member, American poet Robert Creeley, was published in 2000. This wave of
Olson scholarship which followed a few years later included several monographs exploring his
life and work, as well as explorations of the broader Black Mountain aesthetic and cultural milieu. 17
One topic of frequent examination in these works is the influence of English mathematician and
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead on Olson and Black Mountain. 18 The last few years then
have seen important feminist and sex-gender criticism of Olson, examining the role of women both
in Olson’s life and in his poetry.19 Beyond these critical texts, there are numerous poetic works
that have been inspired by Olson, including those which have been directed against his poetics.

16

Originally published in 1991 (W.W. Norton). A second edition was then published in 2000 (North Atlantic
Books).
17
See for example: Bram 2004 which explores Olson and Whitehead; Dewey 2007, which examines Black
Mountain poetry and Olson's place within it; Maud 2008, a rather pointed response to Clark’s biography of Olson;
and Hoeynck 2011 (2008), a dissertation exploring Whitehead’s influence on Black Mountain poetry, and the
epistolary relationship of Black Mountain’s poets. Interestingly, at the end of the 2000s, a second edition of Martin
Duberman’s important study of Black Mountain College was published (see Duberman 2009).
18
Whitehead’s influence on Olson was not absent from previous Olson criticism, but it is often central to some of
the books published in the mid-2000s mentioned in the previous footnote. Robert von Hallberg was one of the first
critics to explore this connection (see von Hallberg 1973; and 1978, Ch. 3).
19
For a critical perspective see DuPlessis 2015, esp. Chs. 5-6; and respective essays by DuPlessis, Hampson and
Montgomery in Herd 2015 (ed.). Montgomery examines poets Susan Howe’s and Redell Olsen’s responses to
Olson, and includes bibliographic entries for multiple Howe texts which respond to Olson’s poetry and poetics.

13
There are too many to list, but to reiterate the importance of critical feminist readings of Olson, I
note here that many of these poetic responses are by women poets navigating the exclusive male
spaces established by the predominantly male Black Mountain faculty and students.20
Perhaps the best indicator of Olson’s position in twentieth century American poetry is the
pride of place he has earned in several key anthologies of postwar and contemporary poetry.
Allen’s epoch defining The New American Poetry, 1945-1960 opens with Olson’s poetry.
Likewise two Norton anthologies: Postmodern American Poetry, and the contemporary poetry
volume of Modern and Contemporary Poetry. Further, and crucially for the present discussion,
the prose section at the end of all three anthologies begins with Olson’s seminal poetics manifesto
“Projective Verse” (1950).21 Though superficially it may seem a minor accolade to have bestowed
upon one’s work, I think Olson’s appearing as both the first poet and the first author of a poetics
essay in these anthologies is actually one of the most telling assessments of his career. Published
in three different decades with 43 years between them, these anthologies represent different
cultural moments, not to mention different critical sensibilities and objectives. Olson’s primacy
in them also demonstrates that despite the ebbs and flows of the critical discussion of his work,
including the debate around his rank among the great and most influential poets of the twentieth
century, his poetry is consistently situated in such a way that exhibits its importance.
The professed rationale behind Olson’s primary placement in both Norton anthologies is
chronological. Born in 1910, decades after major American Modernists such as Ezra Pound and

For poetic responses to Olson see Howe 1985 and 1989; and Olsen 2004 which contains a series titled “The
Minimaus Poems,” an allusion to Olson’s Maximus in which “Olsen reproduces the map of Gloucester,
Massachusetts used by Olson on the cover of the first volume of Maximus” (Montgomery 171).
21
See Allen 1960; Hoover 1994, 2013; and Ramazani et al. 2003, vol. 2. Ramazani et al. 2003 is the third edition of
this anthology. When originally published in 1973 (eds. Richard Ellman and Robert O’Clair), with a second edition
in 1994, the anthology was a single volume. For this reason, the decision by Ramazani to separate the anthology
into two volumes (Modern and Contemporary) is important in this context as it was with this separation into two
volumes that Olson became the first poet featured in both the poetry and poetics sections of the latter volume.
20
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T.S. Eliot, for example, Olson had yet to enter high school by the time they were established poets.
Further, the height of Modernist poetry in the years either side of World War I had long since
passed by the time Olson would dedicate his life to writing poetry in the final year of World War
II. Allen’s rationale in placing Olson first is slightly different. He starts The New American Poetry
with the Black Mountain poets, most of who taught or studied at Black Mountain College. This
group includes Creeley, Ed Dorn, Robert Duncan, and Denise Levertov, among others. Their
poetry was also the basis of the Black Mountain Review, created in 1954 when Olson, who at the
time was rector of the college, “apportioned $500 for starting up a literary magazine to be edited
by Creeley” (Clark 240). Olson was not only responsible for the inception and financing of the
magazine but was also a vocal, even proselytizing proponent of the Black Mountain aesthetic he
decreed in “Projective Verse.” The primary effect of Allen’s anthology was to establish Olson
and the many other poets in the collection as something new, and clearly distinct from their
Modernist predecessors. Editorial rationales of these anthologies aside, each asserts, explicitly or
implicitly, that Olson’s poetry and his essay “Projective Verse” demarcate a new era, a palpably
different kind of American poetry.
The degree to which Olson’s poetics and poetry actually mark a break from Modernism is
a common thread in my analysis of his poetics. Leaving this thread to emerge where relevant in
the chapters to come, I reiterate here the central role Olson played in the development of American
poetry in the second half of the twentieth century. This role, however, was not always critically
recognized or appreciated by general readers of American poetry. Another recent trend in Olson
criticism highlights his pedagogy, an aspect of his thinking which I believe makes him a relevant
topic of research and subject of teaching poetry today.
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1.3

Olson, Interdisciplinarity and the Classroom, Then and Now
In the first three paragraphs of “Equal, That Is, to the Real Itself” (1958),22 ostensibly a

review of Milton R. Stern’s The Fine Hammered Steel of Herman Melville originally published in
the Chicago Review, Olson makes reference to and/or conceptually engages the following thinkers,
broadly speaking: Melville, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Georg W.F. Hegel, János Bolyai and
Nikolai Lobachevsky (which, incidentally, Olson misspells ‘Lobatschewsky’), Euclid, Bernhard
Riemann, Socrates and Arthur Rimbaud. He is also particularly engaged with John Keats’ notion
of Negative Capability. By the end of the roughly six page essay readers encounter also Albert
Einstein, Homer, Immanuel Kant, Geoffrey Chaucer, Sir Isaac Newton, Aristotle, Walt Whitman
and Felix Klein—a list which is not exhaustive. To be sure, he mentions many of these thinkers
and writers of various fields and genres only in passing. However, the reader gets the sense that
Olson has read their work closely and is following a rapid logic when spelling out his thoughts,
obscure to the reader though this logic may be. For the Olson scholar, the task of following his
penetrating logic, explicating his quickly shifting syntax, and sourcing his references and allusions
can cause anxiety. It can also be inspiring.
Olson’s inquisitiveness and myriad interests ground his poetry in, and informs it with, an
interdisciplinarity as impressive as his loquaciousness. Here, I mean by ‘interdisciplinarity’ a
methodology which employs two or more disciplines toward researching a subject or topic,
articulating and/or attempting to find a solution to a problematic, or creating a work of art, broadly
speaking. Hence in the context of Olson, a discipline could be an academic field, a theoretical
framework, or an artistic practice. It is this interdisciplinarity which frames the discussions in
Contemporary Olson, a recent anthology of twenty-three essays exploring different aspects of

22

See CPr 120-25.
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Olson’s life, poetry and poetics. As a whole, the essays demonstrate both how Olson related to
his own contemporary historical and cultural moment and how he can be brought into our own
contemporary discussions. Editor David Herd states at the outset that “Olson’s thinking about
poetry had crossed and been informed by various intersecting practices and disciplines” (1).
Exploring Olson’s relationship with archival research, dance, Modernist poetry, mythology,
politics, and with pop culture and science of the mid-twentieth century, to name but a few, the
anthology places “the question of dialogue at its heart” (ibid. 13). This is apropos to the present
purpose given Olson’s aforementioned “life of talk” and the dialogues through which he interacted
with so many of the texts he was reading, as evidenced above by a brief glimpse at some of his
marginalia.
Olson’s relationship to his own contemporaries, colleagues and students is the subject of
Karlien van den Beukel’s contribution to the anthology, “Why Olson did ballet: the pedagogical
avant-gardism of Massine.” Therein, she explores a fascinating yet overlooked aspect of Olson’s
life and poetics: his affinity for, and education in, dance. As alluded to above, Olson had learned
dance technique and narrative ballet practices as a company member under Massine in the late
1930s and early 1940s (288). Van den Beukel’s essay explores the intersection of Olson’s poetics
and the dance curriculum at Black Mountain College, NC, in the early 1950s shortly after Olson
had officially joined the faculty. At that time the college’s dance instructor, Katherine Litz, taught
modern dance as a form “based in improvised practice” (287). Van den Beukel demonstrates how,
in this environment, Olson “look[ed] more widely to dance collaborative practice as a pedagogic
method” (ibid.).

Composing his own dance plays for students to perform “Olson’s

teaching…bec[ame] projected into a collaborative practice where the interpretative study of the
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plays would generate poetic knowledges even as the dance performance would be creatively
engendered by the body of Black Mountain students” (288).
Van den Beukel’s essay sheds light on the importance of physiology, performance, and
kinesis to Olson’s projective verse. Olson understood poetry as a kinetic process, a transferring of
energy from the poet to the audience (a topic we will address in detail in Chapter 3). Modern
dance at Black Mountain was being taught as “dance kinesis” through which “the dance poetics of
modernism [were] radically reinterpreted” (294). The physical performance of such a kinetic
dance method formed a spatial nexus of bodily movement and the setting—both the physical
setting of the dance performance and the narrative setting in the dance itself (ibid.). This was
partly inspired by Massine, whose lessons “began by drawing out habitus – environment, history,
literature and everyday social practice – in [his] students” (289). For Olson, the kinetic dance
would become an “ecological meditation” (294). Van den Beukel argues finally that the “fluid
conversational exchange,” whether between Massine and his students or a dancer and his/her
habitus (‘place,’ in Olson’s terminology), “informs the primacy of the local in Olson’s later
poetics” (290). In this sense, Maximus can be read as an extended meditation on place and the
local.
That poetry is kinetic is but one aspect of Olson’s poetics, but van den Beukel’s essay
illuminates how he incorporated other arts into his own poetic practice and his teaching. Hence,
another key element in understanding the complexity and passion that defined Olson both as a
person and as a poet is his pedagogy. Writer Francine du Plessix Gray, who participated in Olson’s
writing workshops during Black Mountain’s summer sessions of 1951 and 1952, offers us a
personal account of Olson the teacher. In her essay “Black Mountain: The Breaking (Making) of
a Writer” she describes Olson as Black Mountain’s “most iconoclastic and dictatorial” faculty
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member during her time on campus—one “equally capable of abysmal rudeness and of
ambassadorial courtesy” (301, 305). Her ambivalence toward, and criticism of, Olson in the essay
are indicative of his personality and his presence in the classroom. Yet Gray also expresses her
gratitude to Olson for the crucial role he played in her growth as a writer. She recalls, for example,
Olson telling her once during an individual tutorial that some of her short stories were, to
paraphrase, “pure” excrement, noting, however, being “grateful” that he did not make such
stinging comments publicly (305). In regard to this latter reminiscence, she may have simply
caught Olson in a generous mood. Many students were not so lucky to avoid his public rebuke.
Nevertheless, her account is worthy of consideration as it sheds light on two aspects of Olson’s
pedagogy. First is the range and kind of texts which Olson taught. Second, Gray offers direct
insight to one of Olson’ fundamental charges to his students, namely, that to improve their own
writing they must cultivate a self-guided and self-motivated process of discovery and composition,
the latter grounded largely in their own sense of place.
Gray recalls being immediately affected by Olson’s “rebellion against all traditional
literary forms, his militant insistence on subjectivity, self-expression, self-exposure,” noting “these
were the first aspects of his teaching that struck me as revolutionary” (301–02). Gray goes on to
describe Olson’s lectures as “antilinear, random shards of culture as purged of any historical
coherence as the elements of John Cage’s Happenings” (303)—Cage, incidentally, being an
occasional faculty member of Black Mountain who would also have been there during the summer
of 1952. Gray recounts that a single class session with Olson could include “snatches of Sumerian
history, of Fenellosa’s [sic] theories on Japanese art, of Heisenberg’s Principle of Indeterminacy,”
as well as passages from “Leo Frobenius’s books on African rock painting,” Blake, Cavalcanti,
Dostoyevsky, Melville, Pausanias and Modernists such as D.H. Lawrence, Pound and William
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Carlos Williams (ibid.). Of the latter Modernists, interestingly, Olson often preferred to focus on
their less acclaimed prose then the poetry which may have been more standard in a poetry
classroom. Gray, however, also criticizes “Olson’s collagist approach to culture, his stress on the
spontaneous and instinctual,” noting that it often created “a mayhem of narcissistic mumblings
among his students…and more self-expression than there were selves to express” (303). 23
Nonetheless, she credits Olson with “transferr[ing] to [his students] the momentum of his gigantic,
archaeological curiosity for all forms of ‘immediate’ discourse, past and present” (304). Gray’s
interpretation of Olson’s rejection and criticism of canonical texts and the work of certain of his
Modernist predecessors is particularly interesting. Indeed Olson’s assigned reading stemmed in
part from his general distaste for the acknowledged masters and accepted canon taught in the kind
of literature classes in which he had learned. However, Olson also built his lectures and syllabi
largely based on his own interests and a need he felt to teach his students material they would not
otherwise be exposed to in most literature classes and writing workshops. Despite his candid
criticism of certain Modernists, Gray remembers Olson’s classroom presence as “magically
fructifying because he did not so much engage in Oedipal rebellion against contemporary
fathers…as in a reappraisal of revolutionary great-grandfathers” (303-04).
Such a reappraisal is foundational for Olson’s own poetics. To be sure, this is something
we see also in Olson’s Modernist influences, Pound in particular. Critic Alan Golding, for
instance, has referred to Olson as an “experimental poet-pedagogue and maker of reading lists
heavily influenced by Pound” (“From Pound to Olson” 98). Nonetheless, it is telling that Olson
In The Dance of the Intellect, Marjorie Perloff places Olson’s “Projective Verse” in a lineage she traces back to
Pound’s “collage manifesto” Gaudier-Brzeska (60-61). While I understand the application of the term by both Gray
and Perloff, among others, I remain unconvinced that the term “collagist” appropriately applies to Olson. I think
that any element of collage a reader may find in Olson’s poetry is an effect of his projective verse, rather than a
technique he intentionally employed. Olson’s insistence that poetry is a kinetic process, a poem being both a
construct and a discharge of energy, would seem to imply that the results will often be in collage or mosaic form.
This aspect of Olson’s poetics, and the degree to which it is “spontaneous” is discussed in detail in Ch. 3.
23
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brings what we may think of today as standard authors for college courses on Modernism into
contact with obscure texts or those from vastly different fields (e.g., ancient geography, theoretical
physics). This opens space for an interdisciplinary dialogue about the accepted canon, what
constitutes it, how we determine it, and how we can be critical of a certain literary paradigm while
also respecting established and celebrated writers, whatever the genre. It should also be pointed
out, however, that Olson’s preferred authors, non-canonical or non-standard though they may have
been to him, represent a limited demographic range. Olson’s syllabi tend to include predominantly
European and American white male authors, though to be sure the range of historical periods,
geographical regions, and languages these authors represent is impressive.
Despite this limitation, the texts Olson employed and from which he drew his lessons were
meant in part to encourage students to develop their own iconoclastic paths of study. By inciting
students to create their own literary lineage and to pursue self-discovery, and urging them toward
the self-motivated discovery of historical facts, Olson encouraged what Black Mountain founder
John Andrew Rice considered to be one of the college’s foundational principles: “complete
democratic self-rule” (Rice 10). As Gray documented in a journal Olson encouraged her to keep
to improve her writing, he insisted that “each aspiring writer in his workshop must realize ‘what
is his or her ground, get to that, citizen, go back there, stand on it, make yrself yr own place, and
move from that’” (302, italics in original). Starting from a self-determined ground is a running
theme throughout Olson’s pedagogy. Further, it is fundamental to his own writing process. Gray
ultimately summarizes her feelings toward Olson as ambivalent, but deeply appreciative. She
writes,
“I do not adulate Olson or Black Mountain the way most of its members
have, feeling ambivalent about the sham and the magnificence of the man,
the dangers and the vision of the place. But I thank him every week of my
life for his prophetic emphasis on the valor of subjectivity and candor, of
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disobedience against form and state; and also for that fatherly rigor which
eventually enabled me to write at all.” (310-11)
To be sure, Gray’s ambivalence toward Olson is not as rare a position as she claims it to be. 24
Nevertheless, her account offers direct evidence of Olson’s personality and his style as a poetpedagogue who would become a, if not the, symbol of Black Mountain poetry.
Black Mountain, under Olson’s influence and eventual leadership, would itself become a
symbol for the intersection of avant-garde poetry and pedagogy. In his article, “From Pound to
Olson: The Avant-Garde Poet as Pedagogue,” Alan Golding explores this very intersection.
Reading Olson’s pedagogy as descending from Pound’s while developing it in different directions,
Golding points out the importance of Olson’s “locating that pedagogy within an experimental
academic institution,” though the space Black Mountain occupied within the larger landscape of
the academy was indeed “marginal” (98). By providing avant-garde poetry with an actual physical
campus where he could pursue his pedagogical mission, Olson “transformed a Poundian tradition
of pedagogical avant-gardism…opening his poetry, in a way that Pound never did, to academic
tropes; and foregrounding pedagogy as a constitutive feature of postmodern poetics” (ibid.).
Golding highlights a striking aspect of Olson’s poetry of this Black Mountain period, during which
he began composing Maximus. At this time, Olson’s academic responsibilities seeped into his
poetry, creating an often obtrusively didactic tone in many of the early Maximus letters. Golding’s
reading of the non-Maximus poem “The Praises” is particularly insightful here.25 Perhaps more
interesting, though not surprising given what we have seen of Olson’s personality and style thus
far, is how many of the “mundane writing tasks of the working academic,” including “course
descriptions, syllabi, reading lists, catalogue copy, memos to colleagues, [and] letters to potential
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For similarly ambivalent opinions of Olson as a teacher, not to mention as a person see: Lane 1990; Clark 2000;
and Duberman 2009 (1972).
25
See, “The Praises,” CP 96-101.
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benefactors and visiting scholars” were infused with Olson’s “visionary pedagogical fervor” (100).
Golding’s final assessment of Olson the poet-pedagogue is that by “teaching his Black Mountain
audience how to be, how to behave as, an avant-garde,” Olson was “defending the principles on
which Black Mountain could be seen to rest and projecting his hopes for an improbable cultural
influence” (102). Improbable though it may have been, Olson’s pedagogy did have significant
influence in the culture of postwar and postmodern poetry considering the place Black Mountain
poetry holds. Though it is worth reminding ourselves that not all of Olson’s students necessarily
embraced his vision, as Gray’s essay reveals, Golding’s article and other analyses of Olson’s
poetry and pedagogy indicate that his influence continues to the present day.
To punctuate this latter point, I will return briefly to Gray’s first-hand account. One of its
greatest benefits is that it provides us with a record of the kinds of texts Olson was reading, and
the ideas he was pursuing and encouraging his students to pursue. Even from this brief account of
Olson’s lectures we get a sense for certain themes which run through not only his pedagogy, but
also his poetry. Examples include: the use of histories of ancient peoples and places, and
importantly that history as presented by ancient writers themselves; literature which represents
various languages, cultural milieus and historical periods; ancient myth; poetry of various periods,
and also the prose writings of many poets; and published scientific research. Miriam Nichols’
assessment that Olson’s poetry makes him continuously relevant to various cultural and political
discussions can, I think, be equally applied to the aspects of his pedagogy we have been
considering. In her chapter in Contemporary Olson on myth and the use of documents in Maximus,
Nichols argues that it is through Olson’s inclusion of “shareable cultural paradigms and
geohistories,” and his constant “reaching for ways to articulate common ground and honour
individual agency,” that he “remains our contemporary” (26, italics in original).
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It is Olson’s capacity to remain contemporary and his potential to be useful in the
contemporary classroom which, in my opinion, makes his work further an important and relevant
subject of research today. The contemporary classroom is, and should be, a space for cross-cultural
dialogue as well as personal identity formation. Thus, the need for recognized commonality and
mutual respect of one another’s individual agency, to borrow Nichols’ language, is vital to making
the contemporary classroom a space of inclusion, as much as a space which is conducive to
education. As many academic institutions emphasize these values more explicitly as part of their
core mission, so too do they emphasize the role of interdisciplinarity in this mission. Whether
Olson, problematic though he himself could be and many of his ideas are, can be a model for
contemporary pedagogy, practically speaking, makes for an interesting discussion in itself. 26 I
believe that he can be, to a degree, and hope that readers will be sympathetic to this belief.

1.4

“muthologos has lost such ground”: An Outline
In the spirit of engaging Olson in dialogue, this dissertation is largely an analysis of the

various sources, influences, and discoveries which shaped Olson’s poetics through roughly the
first decade of his poetic career, from 1946-1956. I will concentrate mainly on Olson’s concepts
which have been significantly shaped by ancient Greek thought, namely: mythology, orality, and
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For more on avant-garde poetry and pedagogy, see Golding 2002. Golding 2005 broadens this conversation to the
relationship between American “poet-teachers” and the academy more generally. For discussions of contemporary
poetry and pedagogy generally, see Retallack and Spahr, eds., 2006. Michael Kindellan is currently working on a
project tentatively titled Present Knowledge: Charles Olson and the Poetics of Pedagogy. For his preliminary ideas,
see Kindellan 2017.
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history.27 All of these concepts inform his poetics, while his own methodology and style allow
him to develop idiosyncratic versions of these concepts.
Chapter 2 explores key concepts in Olson’s poetics which emerge at the outset of his
writing career during the latter half of the 1940s. My reading will focus on two texts from this
period: Olson’s aforementioned prose monograph on Melville, Call Me Ishmael; and one of his
best early poems, “La Préface” (c. 1946). In Ishmael, Olson’s reading of Melville grounds the
development of his own concepts of space, history, and myth. Olson asserts that Homer, and the
Odyssey in particular, mark a major shift in human history and psychology. Melville is then a
counter to this “Western” era ushered in by Homer. As such, Olson reads Melville as both the
creator of a new myth and a prophet of a new understanding of space, especially, and history. “La
Préface” employs these developing concepts in an attempt to cope with the horrors of World War
II. It is also a call to a new mode of thinking, which as a result would mark a new era of human
history. Beyond the conceptual parallels in these texts, we can also begin to see therein certain
stylistic traits which would become trademarks of Olson’s mature style.
That style is officially declared in Olson’s aforementioned essay “Projective Verse.” This
essay is significant both for its importance to postwar American poetry and Black Mountain
poetics, but also because it is the prose publication of Olson’s against which his subsequent poetry
will be judged. To give this dense and provocative essay the treatment it deserves, I have dedicated
two chapters to examining it. Chapter 3 concentrates on the three guiding principles of projective
verse, which Olson presents in the first two pages of the essay. These principles are formulated

I am using the term ‘ancient Greek’ in this dissertation to indicate the long historical period from roughly the
eighth to the fourth centuries BCE. As such, this period is bookended, generally speaking, by the collation and
transcription of the Homeric epics on the one end, and by Aristotle on the other end. I use ‘archaic’ to refer to the
Greeks, or other peoples, of the Homeric era (roughly the eighth century BCE and prior). I also use the term
‘classical Greeks,’ which will be explained in the appropriate context in Ch. 2.
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from a diverse set of intellectual sources, inspirations, and historical antecedents. Whether Olson
gives proper credit to these sources has been the subject of often heated debate. My aim is to
clarify some of Olson’s sources while also highlighting the more original aspects of projective
verse. I am indebted to previous scholarship which has uncovered the conceptual lineage of Olson
poetics, here. However, some of the sources critics ascribe to projective verse do not properly
reflect Olson’s own reading or familiarity with them at this stage of his career. In general, I want
to demonstrate throughout this dissertation where certain analyses of Olson’s poetics are
misleading, based on what we know of his own library and intellectual progression. I note here
that Chapter 3 breaks from the general track of this dissertation in that it does not connect the
principles of projective verse to any specific ancient Greek figure or terminology.
We pick up that track again in the second half of my analysis of “Projective Verse.”
Chapter 4 considers two ideas developed in the remainder of the essay. The first is ‘objectism,’
Olson’s philosophy which underlies projective verse. For Olson, it is necessary for poets to adopt
this philosophy in order to produce properly projective poetry. Despite the importance he places
on objectism, his explanation of it in the essay is rather brief. To bolster our understanding of it,
then, we have to look ahead to Olson’s essay “Human Universe” (1951), where objectism takes
form as a response to traditional humanism. It is also in this latter essay that Olson takes issue
with what he thinks of as a pervasive humanism which was invented, as he puts it, by the classical
Greeks (namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle). Hence Olson’s new human universe is a response
to what he views as modern humanism, which in fact extends all the way back to the ancient
Greece. The second idea with which this chapter is concerned is the oral-audial nature of
projective verse. This, I believe, is the most provocative contribution of Olson’s essay. Olson
consistently emphasizes the importance of the ear and the breath for projective verse. However,
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he also stresses the importance of the typewriter for such a poetics. Though the typewriter may be
for us an antiquated machine, at the time Olson was composing “Projective Verse” it was an
advanced, effective, widely available and relatively affordable technology. After examining
objectism and Olson’s proposed ‘breath poetics,’ I explore what constitutes for some critics an
insurmountable tension in the essay: how to reconcile projective verse as an oral-audial poetics
which is produced in print.
This discussion then extends into chapter 5, where it becomes the primary focus of the
chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on “Projective Verse,” more or less exclusively, to highlight the
various sources of its ideas and how the essay itself works as Olson’s poetic manifesto. To be
sure, the previous two chapters also give considerations to general tensions and potential
problematics to which the essay gives rise. Here, I focus specifically on the potentially problematic
relationship between Olson’s breath poetics and his emphasis on the typewriter as a tool for
properly presenting projective verse. First, we will consider some of Olson’s correspondence to
Donald Allen, who published many of Olson’s poems and books, to understand how Olson felt his
poetry could be effected by the typography and dimensions of the page his publishers intended to
use. Next, we look at some criticism of the practicality of Olson’s breath poetics. As we will see,
many critics reject Olson’s theory that the printed version of a poem can guide the readers’ voicing
of it as the poet intends it to be read, or ‘breathed,’ as it were. To show that the perceived failure
of Olson’s poetics involves too literal a reading of “Projective Verse,” I will turn to Marcia R. and
Philip Lieberman’s sonic analysis of Olson’s poems being read by both himself and another
subject, the conclusion of which supports the veracity of Olson’s breath poetics. I will also
consider classical scholarship, particularly in the field of Homeric and orality studies, to
demonstrate that Olson can indeed support his oral poetics with writing techniques.
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Olson implements three terms to define projective verse at the beginning of the essay:
‘projectile,’ ‘percussive,’ ‘prospective.’ In a sense, Chapter 3 can be read as analyzing the
‘projectile’ aspect of projective verse, while much of chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analyze its
‘percussive’ aspect. Our discussion of orality then leads us into Chapter 6, which analyzes the
‘prospective’ aspect of projective verse. Here, the focus turns to the sources which informed
Olson’s developing, more historical concept of orality. In the early 1950s, notably after Olson had
published “Projective Verse,” he was researching classical scholarship in preparation for teaching.
The work of J.A.K. Thomson and Jane Ellen Harrison deepened Olson’s understanding of myth
as an oral practice. It was in Thomson that Olson came across the term ‘istorin specifically, a term
used by Herodotus which Thomson defines as “finding out for yourself” (237n13).28 Thomson
thus became crucial to Olson’s understanding of Herodotus, perhaps the central ancient Greek
figure in both Olson’s mature poetics and his concept of history. In a lecture series given three
years later at Black Mountain, published as The Special View of History (1956), Olson discusses
the concept at length. He urges students in attendance to be both self-directed historians and
experimental in their poetic composition. For Olson, ‘istorin, which often stands in for his larger
concept of history, entails that history is not a mere recording of events but is rather activity per
se. That is, for Olson history is something we are constantly creating in the present. Each present
moment is thus saturated with history. A reading of “Letter 23,” which references Herodotus,
demonstrates how Olson’s concepts of orality and history are intertwined in Maximus, and how
this epic is a new mythologizing of the history of Gloucester, MA.
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As mentioned, Olson (via Thomson) defines ‘istorin, “to find out for yourself.” See pp. 5-6 above.

28

CHAPTER 2. CHARLES OLSON, THE END OF MYTH, AND A NEW
HISTORY

2.1

Introduction
To understand how Charles Olson became the poet of The Maximus Poems, I will begin

by considering his own transition from student of American history and literature to independent
scholar and poet. By focusing on the Olson of the mid to late 1940s, we may gain a better sense
of Olson the emerging poet of the 1950s. I will highlight in the main how Olson’s own developing
concepts of ‘space,’ ‘mythology,’ and ‘history’ inform two of his early publications: his study of
Melville, Call Me Ishmael (1947, henceforth Ishmael); and the poem, “La Préface” (c. 1946).
From this starting point we can begin to trace how these concepts evolve in Olson’s later essays
and Maximus, though they are not necessarily more clearly defined. Their genesis in Olson’s early
publications is, I think, largely overlooked or mistakenly conflated with their more mature
versions.
This chapter examines in part the early formulations of what would become a prominent
concern in Olson’s thought: his equating of the loss of myth and the rise of individualism. Olson
thought the repercussions of this development had negatively effected subsequent Western, hence
American, history—but not irrevocably. From his early texts Olson continually probes the shift
from the communal identity of myth cultures to egocentric individualism, and indeed this is one
of Olson’s main targets in criticizing the classical Greeks. 1 This criticism begins in Ishmael.
Therein he argues that the rise of individualism begins with Homer, though Homer is not

By ‘classical Greeks’ I mean the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Olson does not use the term
‘classical’ per se, but it is clear that modernity, as he understands it, was the result of an epistemological shift which
reached its culmination with the major Greek philosophical figures of the classical period. Olson’s notion of
modernity and his criticism of the classical Greeks are discussed later in this chapter. We will return to these themes
again in Chapter 4.
1
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necessarily the main culprit in this cultural shift. Homer rather marks for Olson the beginning of
an era of individualism which he sees as still plaguing his own time. Olson’s energetic but often
tenuous reading of Melville does not argue for the rejection of mythology, but rather a
revitalization of it, in a sense. With a new mythology in tow, in Olson’s view manifested by
Melville’s novel Moby-Dick, comes the potential for what Olson calls a “new history.” The
importance of a new history, a history working outside the inherited epistemology of modern
Europe (which in turn inherited its epistemology from the classical Greeks), was intensified for
Olson by the atrocities of World War II. If Ishmael is a kind of speculative literary criticism, “La
Préface” is to an extent a poetic recapitulation of the concepts he was developing therein, redirected
through the events of the war. If Ishmael diagnoses the problem and offers a model (Melville) for
a new mode, “La Préface” is an early attempt to create poetry in this mode—though it has the
somewhat ineffectual rhetoric of a proclamation, rather than being an exercise itself in open verse.
I believe, however, these two texts were important precursors to Olson’s mature poetics and poetry.
By examining them, we begin to see why myth came to inhabit such a central role in Maximus,
and Olson’s thought generally.

2.2

The Poetics of Ishmael
An avid student of history throughout his life, Olson was constantly seeking knowledge of

both the past and the present. His was always an active interest. He served as his 1932 senior
class historian at Wesleyan University (Clark 17); was fascinated with archival material; tracked
down rare books; and spent time on-site, looking for facts and artefacts, or to paraphrase his poem
“The Kingfishers,” “hunt[ing] among stones” (CP 93). As a researcher, Olson was visiting
archives in the late 1940s when he first conceived of a long poem about American history. His
later archival research in Gloucester, MA, and the northeastern United States on the early
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American colonial settlers would appear throughout Maximus. And as late as 1967, he would
spend time researching port records in Dorchester, England (Selerie 115). Olson the poet and
pedagogue would lecture widely on history and teach the subject at Black Mountain College,
where he developed a routine of reading encyclopedias and newspapers to start his day and to use
as classroom materials. He of course would also teach and write poetry in his various teaching
appointments. Though Olson wanted all of his students, and all people generally, to approach
history with his enthusiasm, he especially thought it an important subject for poets. While
Christopher Beach misstates his case when claiming Olson was “[t]rained primarily as a historian
rather than as a literary scholar,” it is true that Olson began his poetic career “with no formal
training as a poet” (85).
After studying history and literature as an undergraduate, Olson would remain at Wesleyan
and earn his MA in English with the thesis “The Growth of Herman Melville, Prose Writer and
Poetic Thinker.” This would propel him toward an ambitious and previously unattempted project
of reconstructing Melville’s personal library (Clark 24). Olson approached the task with his typical
vigor, assembling dozens of Melville’s books. It was Melville’s annotations in his complete works
of Shakespeare, in particular King Lear, which Olson biographer Tom Clark argues “provided
clinching evidence for [Olson’s] view of Melville as creatively engaged with a ‘usable past’”
(25)2—a view we may apply to Olson himself. Olson would continue his Melville research at
Harvard, where he enrolled as a Ph.D. student in the American Civilization program in 1936. This
allowed Olson the opportunity to read in many fields, including literature, in a curriculum heavy
in history. It was his participation there in the “Sciences of Man” program which “introduced him
to other technical disciplines, such as geography and archaeology, and showed him the

2

Internal quotation is from Olson’s essay, “Lear and Moby-Dick” (172).
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applicability of scientific methods to research in the humanities” (Christensen 12). Though Olson
did not complete the doctoral degree, an interdisciplinary methodology would become hallmarks
of both his writing and his teaching. Some of this interdisciplinarity is on display in Ishmael, his
first major literary publication, built from his Melville research.
Ishmael deserves the attention it has garnered from critics for its place in Olson’s career. 3
At 119 pages the book remains singular in its kind among Olson’s prose as the only monograph
he wrote. The manuscript itself was produced as “one piece…written at a clip” between April and
August 1945, a complete rewrite of the sprawling 400-page manuscript Olson had originally
finished in 1940 (Charters 9).4 Inspired by the literary-historical works of Ralph Waldo Emerson
and Modernists such as Edward Dahlberg, D.H. Lawrence, and William Carlos Williams, his own
unique voice is clearly developing within Ishmael. Olson intersperses five chapters of his theory
of Melville’s literature and Moby-Dick’s composition, which he calls “parts,” with chapters called
“Facts” containing biographical details of Melville’s life, excerpts from Melville’s notebooks, and
tales of shipwrecked whaling vessels and murder on the high seas. Olson’s prose in the book
moves quickly. He never develops continuous, progressive arguments in it. Ishmael is an
unfurling of his conviction that Melville uniquely captures the American cultural experience while
overturning nearly 3000 years of Western ideology. This pace anticipates Olson’s projective
principle #3, which he credits to Dahlberg: that “ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY
AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A FURTHER PERCEPTION” (CPr 240). 5 At this stage of his
career, the results include clunky tonal shifts from one sentence or paragraph to the next, and
elision in his argument’s rationale. This earned the book harsh criticism and little acceptance from

For more on Olson’s Melville research, the history of Ishmael, and the role this publication played in Olson’s life
and career, see: Charters 1968; Christensen 1979, esp. Ch. 2; and Clark 2000, esp. Chs. 4, 8–10.
4
The quotation is from a letter Olson wrote to Ann Charters on 14 February 1968 to aid her research.
5
The principles of “Projective Verse” will be discussed in detail in Ch. 3 below.
3
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the scholarly community. Ishmael does require patience, even multiple readings. Nonetheless, it
is a seminal work in Olson’s career. His formatting, structure, and at times his syntax show his
desire to push his writing in an experimental direction, though less so than his later poetry. The
book also shows his interdisciplinary capacity to think across texts, eras, and cultures, as well as
his ability to compose in an organized, even systematic fashion. All of these aspects of Ishmael
contribute to Olson’s later poetics, and as such develop further in Maximus.

To put it

metaphorically, Olson wrote Ishmael with a clear map of the seas he wanted the book to traverse,
but the waters get choppy at times, at least for the reader. To help us navigate our way through
some key themes in the book, I turn now to two influential moments in Olson scholarship: Ann
Charters’ Olson/Melville: A Study in Affinity, and Paul Christensen’s Charles Olson: Call Him
Ishmael.
Charters’ study examines what she calls Olson’s topology, his “underlying philosophic
concern with continuous space” (30), in both Ishmael and his later essays on Melville. As such
she reads Ishmael as a study of Moby-Dick’s author, not the novel per se, though she foregrounds
the latter for much of her discussion. Charters acknowledges Olson’s veering from standard
literary criticism but also defends the organization of the book. For her Ishmael is a “dramatic
enactment,” one which becomes “as extended a prose poem as Moby-Dick” (23, 24). If we suspend
our expectations of it as criticism, the reward is an involved Olson “writing as a social philosopher,
not as a literary critic” (55). She rejects an unspecified London Times review which called the
book a “mishmash” arguing rather that in Ishmael “Olson has not jumbled his thoughts about
Melville; they are as systematically sorted as the whaling gear aboard the Pequod” (13)—the
whaling vessel central to Moby-Dick. She concedes patience is required of the reader, however,
as “[t]he organization of Ishmael is perceivable, but only to the inquiring, intuitive eye” (21).
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Charters makes the further claim that Olson is writing as Ishmael, the narrator of Melville’s novel.
That is, rather than describing the novel through a particular critical lens, Olson tries to understand
Moby-Dick from within its author’s writing, as a new projection of the novel’s narrative voice.
This does not mean there is no interpretive lens, but it is that of an artist—not a critic—writing
about a perceived master. Charters argues Olson’s topology “leads him to history, geography,
economics” in Melville’s work and era, “facts rather than imagination” (30). Olson’s adopted
persona as Ishmael then “animates” those facts “for his interpretation of Melville” (ibid.). Thus to
read Ishmael is to read a scholar enacting his unique reading, his “personal vision of what Melville
is” (38, italics in original). What does Olson think Melville is? According to Charters, the answer
is that Olson sees Melville as a prophet, “the first American writer to realize the principle of
projective space” (22). She also reads the Olson of Ishmael as himself an emerging prophetic
voice. Thus, Olson is a prophet speaking on a previous prophecy, exalting his predecessor’s
profound conceptual engagement with space and the applicability of that understanding to his own
present and the future. Yet with little in the way of concrete evidence to objectively support how
Melville commands ‘space’ in his writing, Olson’s argument must be “taken on faith alone, as a
religious belief,” giving Olson’s own prophecy on Melville “the power of myth” (50).
What Olson means by ‘space’ in Ishmael remains to be clarified, but to move in that
direction I want to briefly consider Christensen’s psychological and cultural reading of the book. 6
He acknowledges Charters’ study and admits a similar reading of Olson as a “philosopher-poet”
for whom “Melville’s work is only a means of making his own visionary pronouncements…a basis

Christensen frames his own reading of Ishmael and Olson’s essays more broadly through Max Horkheimer’s
Eclipse of Reason and Paul Goodman’s “cheerfully militant program for self-preservation” in Gestalt Therapy. See
Christensen, esp. 26-30, 41-46.
6
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from which to project all of his own views about the American condition” (40).7 Like Charters,
he is aware of the book’s ostensibly difficult style while also defending its language and
methodology. For him Ishmael is “a complicated, tightly reasoned examination into the meaning
and significance of Melville’s novel,” in which Olson’s argument
“reads as though each step of his complex thought had been trimmed to
essentials and then stitched very deliberately into sequence. The prose
never flows, it leaps from one moment of close concentration to the next;
our attention is always focused on a series of details as a thesis is fashioned
that explains and integrates them. At no time are we allowed to relax with
a broad overview of the whole novel, nor are we given clear signs of where
the next step will lead us. The effect is that of being led quickly through
the stages of a revelation.” (30-31)
Christensen argues that Olson’s vibrant, rhapsodic language and compositional method throughout
Ishmael, “would become the dominant mode of his poems” (31). Much like Charters, Christensen
reads Ishmael as a study in which Moby-Dick “is not the primary focus,” yet he differs from her
reading in claiming that the focus of Ishmael is “America” (ibid.). Moby-Dick then provides Olson
an important account of the socioeconomic and psychological conditions of mid-19th century
America. For Olson, these conditions are the result of a dominant form of psychology initiated in
ancient Greece, passed along through Europe, and inherited by America.
Christensen argues that “Olson articulated a typology of consciousness in Melville’s
characters and formulated the conditions of a profound shift in American history from one kind of
awareness, the enclosed ego-oriented consciousness of Ahab,” the captain of the Pequod, “to the
open consciousness of Ishmael” (40). Much of this typology is developed in the middle parts of
Ishmael, where Olson elaborates his view on Melville’s relation to Shakespeare. 8 As I will focus

See also Charters, who argues that Dahlberg and Emerson are the two main influences on Olson’s style in this
regard (36).
8
These same middle chapters provide Charters much of the basis to argue for Ishmael as a study of Melville
generally.
7
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here on the first and last parts of the book, in the interest of advancing the argument I will adopt
Christensen’s interpretation of Olson’s typology. His incisive reading of Ishmael will allow us to
better understand how Olson attacks the Ahab-type in the book’s final revelation. Further, leaving
the middle parts of the book unaddressed here does not diminish the interpretation I am putting
forth. What emerges clearly in both Olson’s interpretation of Moby-Dick and Christensen’s
analysis of it is a contrast between: a) Ahab’s consciousness as limiting, power hungry, and closed
off from commune with both his fellow humans and nature; and b) Ishmael’s consciousness as
unmotivated by power relations, and open to both humans and nature, hence capable of
overcoming certain of Ahab’s limitations. This contrast between closed and open modes of human
activity, including poetry and thought itself, pervades Olson’s poetics, appearing most decisively
at the beginning of “Projective Verse.”9 Nevertheless, as Christensen explains it, these two modes
of consciousness “are antithetical at many levels” (ibid.). He continues:
“the drive to power is a narrowing of energies toward the one aim of
domination; the open consciousness seeks converse with nature instead of
the power which ends in exclusion; the open consciousness seeks inclusion
in nature to satisfy its hunger for contact with phenomena. Both are forms
of the human will, but it is perhaps more exact to say that they are the
dialectical extremes of will: Ahab is the mind closed in its knowledge;
Ishmael seeks to increase his” (ibid.).
Though his interpretation is generally insightful, I am unwilling to follow Christensen’s
emphasis on the dialectical relationship between these two character types. For instance, he speaks
at length of the presence of Hegel in Olson’s later lecture series The Special View of History, a text
I will consider in Chapter 6. It is important to note here, however, that for Christensen the conflict
between these two character types grounds Olson’s reading of Moby-Dick. Though he does not
go so far as Charters’ claim that Ishmael itself has the power of myth, Christensen does emphasize

‘Modes’ is my term. Christensen uses the terminology “character types,” “typology of consciousness,” and “forms
of consciousness” somewhat interchangeably (see Christensen, Ch. 2, esp. 40-41).
9
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Olson’s mythological reading of the novel. As he argues, in Ishmael Olson is “test[ing] his theory
that Melville had created a new and important myth in Western literature” (39). To summarize
these two important critical interpretations of Ishmael, we can say that both Charters and
Christensen recognize: a) the importance for Olson of Moby-Dick as a diagnosis of American
culture; b) that for Olson, Melville’s novel offers a model for the potential cure of the ills of that
culture; and c) that Olson is developing his own concepts of space and myth through applying
them to Moby-Dick more so than finding them in Melville’s novel per se.
Olson gives singular praise to Melville when he refers to him as the “poète d’espace,” a
writer who “had a way of reaching back through time until he got history pushed back so far he
turned time into space” (CMI 94, 14). As Charters points out, however, Olson himself uses the
term ‘space’ “in such varied contexts that any precise meaning evaporates” (49). She further
concedes that “Olson’s belief that Moby-Dick illustrates the principle of quantity as intensive,” a
principle she labels ‘projective space,’ is “severely challenged when tested against close textual
analysis of the novel itself” (18). This is fair criticism; however, her terminology is misleading.
Ishmael was composed five years prior to “Projective Verse,” and before Olson became familiar
with, or even read, the non-Euclidean geometry of Bernhard Riemann.10 Thus it is inaccurate, in
my view, for Charters to retrofit the adjective “projective” back onto Ishmael. Of course she is
not alone in this. Many Olson scholars apply the term, and other ideas from Olson’s later writings,
onto his early publications to make their case. This seems to indicate a desire among Olson
scholars to remove the historical development of his thinking in the name of demonstrating its

Charters herself credits Olson’s essay “Equal, That Is, to the Real Itself,” written 13 years after the composition of
Ishmael, as the source of his topological “principle of ‘quantity as intensive’” (13), which she attributes to his
understanding of the non-Euclidean geometries of János Bolyai, Nikolai Lobatschewsky, and Riemann. Ralph
Maud documents that Olson’s reading notes on H.M.S. Coxeter’s Non-Euclidean Geometry are in a notebook dated
1946, and that late in the same year he quotes a translation of Riemann in a letter to Pound of 15 December (Maud
1996, 267, 71). Both then are from the year following Olson’s completion of the Ishmael manuscript.
10
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systematic cohesiveness. Its cohesiveness is not in question, as far as I am concerned, nor would
attention to its evolution thwart arguments for its cohesiveness. One unfortunate consequence of
this application of the term retroactively onto Ishmael is that it diminishes how significantly the
book both anticipates Olson’s concept of the projective and demonstrates his inclination to nonEuclidean conceptions of space. It also overlooks how heavily myth is tied to space in Ishmael.
This latter connection becomes less explicit as Olson’s career continues and his concept of space
becomes more informed by his reading of Riemann and the English philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead. I think Christensen’s definition of space in Ishmael as “the phenomenal totality that
constitutes nature” is closer to the mark (37). Though this definition is heavily reliant on
philosophically loaded terms, and perhaps too Kantian to be fairly applied to Olson, it succinctly
captures the cosmic magnitude of his concept of space. It does not, however, capture the
geographical element of it. This element becomes more prevalent later in Maximus, where Olson
incorporates specific locales and landmarks of Gloucester. In Ishmael Olson foregrounds a much
broader notion of American geography in his reading of Melville as a means of developing his
own poetics of space. He also begins to articulate therein his view that the concept of space
becoming less mythological, hence less communal, coincided with the development of a more
individualistic Western psychology, and that this transformation, already visible in Homer, truly
takes hold with the classical Greeks.

2.3

Land, Ocean, and Space in Ishmael and Moby-Dick
Olson opens Part One of Ishmael boldly: “I take SPACE to be the central fact to man born

in America, from Folsom cave to now” (CMI 11). He goes on to tell us:
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“I spell it large because it comes large here. Large, and without mercy.
It is geography at bottom, a hell of wide land from the beginning….
Something else than a stretch of earth—seas on both sides, no barriers to
contain as restless a thing as Western man was becoming in Columbus’
day.” (ibid.)
Olson identifies here a spirit of exploration inherent in the American character. Moby-Dick then
is for Olson a literary exploration of an expanded American geography.

According to Olson,

Melville’s extending of American geography, specifically his use of the Pacific, “made [his]
story”—or at least, Olson adds parenthetically, “part of it” (ibid.). Olson asserts that the Pacific
was three things to Melville: “an experience of SPACE”; “a comprehension of the PAST”; and “a
confirmation of FUTURE” (CMI 114, 116). In this section, we will consider the first of these three
aspects in Olson’s interpretation of Moby-Dick.
Later in Part One Olson makes another rather bold claim about Americans when he uses
the first person plural to proclaim: “We are the last ‘first’ people” (CMI 14). Despite what may
fairly be labeled American exceptionalism in Olson’s claim, he is not uncritical of America here.
He continues: “We forget that. We act big, misuse our land, ourselves” (ibid.). Olson indeed thinks
there is unique potential in America to establish a new mode of living and thinking—one which is
not trapped by classical Greek and Eurocentric discourses which have shaped (or misshaped)
Western history. Americans can be first by ushering in a “new history” (CMI 117), and as a
civilization of the new world can simultaneously become the last to mark such a paradigmatic
shift. Olson’s critique of the American ego, which he equates generally to the Ahab character
type, can help put Ishmael in better perspective here.
Olson suggests in the opening pages that the American desire to dominate nature as an
economic resource has had two unfortunate consequences. First, it has alienated American people
from a deeper connection to the geographical space they occupy. Second, this desire has corrupted
the promise of democracy as it has effected the economic relations not only between humans and
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the natural world, but also between humans themselves. “Americans still fancy themselves such
democrats,” he writes, “[b]ut their triumphs are of the machine. It is the only master of space the
average person ever knows, oxwheel to piston, muscle to jet” (CMI 12). Melville’s portrait of the
whaling industry then provides both an expanded American geography and the socioeconomic
facts of this expansion, including the hierarchy and working relationships among the crewmen of
the Pequod. Olson argues that for Melville
“it was not the will to be free but the will to overwhelm nature that lies at
the bottom of us [Americans] as individuals and a people. Ahab is no
democrat. Moby-Dick, antagonist, is only king of natural force, resource.
I am interested in a Melville who decided…to write a book about the
whaling industry and what happened to a man in command of one of the
most successful machines Americans had perfected up to that time—the
whaleship.” (ibid.)
That commander was of course Ahab, who Olson asserts “knew space,” but limited his own
knowledge of it by having “all space concentrated into the form of a whale called Moby-Dick”
(ibid.).
Olson’s argument along these lines corroborates Christensen’s reading of Ishmael. Recall
that for Christensen, Olson filters working relationships on the Pequod through certain character
types, the primary dichotomy being between Ahab and Ishmael. Thus we can begin to see how
Olson is shaping his reading of Moby-Dick. For Olson, Ahab is in command of a particular
machine. That machine allows him to know space and to gain economically from his relationship
with space which the machine provides. However, Ahab’s desire to master space as an economic
resource (Olson’s interpretation of the whale) limits his capacity to relate to space in a more
fundamental way. It also leads to his ultimate demise. Ishmael alone survives Ahab’s singlemindedness, paying his respects in, and through, the novel to his fellow crewmen who were
drowned in the end by Ahab’s obsession and his command of their labor to serve that obsession.
Ishmael’s constant attention to the Pacific suggests, on Olson’s reading, that his openness to the
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majesty and immensity of the ocean (space) not only helps him survive Ahab’s dictatorial will, an
ill-fated and false democracy, but also marks the foundation for a new relation to space, a relation
which for Olson can ultimately ground a new history.
Olson also tells us in the first few pages of Ishmael that he is “interested in a Melville who
was long-eyed enough to understand the Pacific as part of our geography, another West, prefigured
in the Plains, antithetical” (CMI 12-13). Olson returns to this idea in the book’s conclusion,
“Pacific Man,” where he asserts “[t]he Pacific is, for an American, the Plains repeated, a 20 th
century Great West. Melville understood the relation of the two geographies” (CMI 114). The
first assertion is curious as Olson seems to be suggesting that the Pacific either is just being
explored, or needs to be explored further, in his own day. This would contradict the praise he
gives Melville for his use of the Pacific in the novel, and Olson’s own knowledge of the American
whaling industry. We see here the aforementioned confusion often caused by Olson’s writing in
Ishmael. I take it Olson wants to express how contemporary he considers Melville’s thinking, his
use of the Pacific representing for Olson a very twentieth-century conception of space. But Olson
also reads Melville as the creator of a new myth. These two ideas are perfectly harmonious in the
framework of Olson’s thinking, as revitalizing an archaic epistemology in the present is paramount
for him. Regarding the second assertion that Melville understood the relation between the Pacific
and the Plains, the important distinction for Olson between the two geographies, and I presume
their attendant literature, is that the plains “is a time experience” (ibid., italics in original), whereas
Melville renders the Pacific a spatial experience, hence Olson’s use of the term “antithetical.” But
without much textual analysis of his to go on, is Olson’s notion of the subordination of time to
space in Moby-Dick objectively satisfying? Considering some passages from Moby-Dick may put
us in better position to answer this question.
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The experience of reading Moby-Dick can be affecting for readers in part due to what Olson
calls “the sense of immensity” the Pacific carries throughout the novel (ibid.). This immensity in
conjunction with a) the sense of desolation in the novel; and b) Melville’s interjection of chapters
which sit outside of the succession of events comprising the Pequod’s journey gives the narrative
an atemporal quality.11 We see Melville’s evasion of a precise temporal frame for the narrative
from the book’s second sentence: “Some years ago—never mind how long precisely—having little
or no money in my purse, and nothing particular to interest me on the shore, I thought I would sail
about a little and see the watery part of the world” (25). Hence from the onset Melville puts an
indeterminate temporal distance between the start of the narrative and the events of the tale it tells,
incorporating the reader into a narrative space more so than a narrative time.

He also

simultaneously extends the spatial setting of the narrative beyond dry land into the vastness of the
seas. Though Melville does include specific dates eventually, Moby-Dick operates on a massive
timescale. On the one hand, Ishmael diligently provides publication dates for his sources on
cetology. 12 Yet, on the other hand, Melville also conveys a mysteriousness about whales by
acknowledging their prehistoric existence. In one instance, Ishmael’s use of an exact time and
date of his storytelling appears in the midst of a passage in which he also employs an elongated
historical timeframe.
The chapter “The Fountain,” which describes the expulsion from a whale’s blowhole,
begins:
“That for six thousand years—and no one knows how many millions of ages
before—the great whales should have been spouting all over the sea, and
sprinkling and mistifying the gardens of the deep, as with so many
11

I am thinking here of the numerous chapters in Moby-Dick which describe whaling generally, life aboard a
whaling vessel, and those on cetology, broadly speaking.
12
Moby-Dick, Ch. 32, “Cetology.” References are made to books written by “Captain Scoresby, A.D. 1820,” i.e.,
William Scoresby (1789-1857), and “Surgeon Beale, A.D. 1839,” a factual surgeon on an English whaling vessel
(121); and to Linnaeus’ “System of Nature, A.D. 1776” (123), in addition to the names of many authors on whales.
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sprinkling or mistifying pots; and that for some centuries back, thousands
of hunters should have been close by the fountain of the whale, watching
these sprinklings and spoutings—that all this should be, and yet, that down
to this blessed minute (fifteen and a quarter minutes past one o’clock P.M.
of this sixteenth day of December, A.D. 1851), it should still remain a
problem, whether these spoutings are, after all, really water, or nothing but
vapor—this is surely a noteworthy thing.” (300)
It is ambiguous to me if “this blessed minute” is meant to be the date and time Ishmael is currently
telling the tale, or if it represents the date and time of the notes Ishmael recorded during the voyage
he is recalling and to which he is presumably referring here. Nevertheless, we see in this passage
Melville stretching and contracting his time frames and number units, directly juxtaposing these
with a precise time stamp of the narrative to underline both the mystery of, and Ishmael’s
uncertainty regarding, the whales and their biology. The number of years whales, and their hunters
and researchers, have been around is of minimal importance—as is the nature of what the whales
actually exhale. What is important is the continuation of the real-life mystery into this moment of
the narrative, and the reading experience of it, which Melville superbly puns with “mistifying.” I
would also argue that in longer sentences such as this, of which there are many in Moby-Dick,
Melville’s use of multiple clauses and non-terminal punctuation (semicolon, multiple hyphens)
subverts the periodic sentence. Such long sentences resist any regularity in their progression, thus
elongating the reading experience itself. It bears mentioning that little analysis has been done on
the technical connection between Melville and Olson. Olson employs similar techniques in his
poetry and prose as those just described in Moby-Dick. For example, Olson timestamps the
composition of many Maximus poems and includes many historical dates and times, often taken
from archival material. He also implements non-terminal punctuation and cascading clauses
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throughout his poetry especially. However, it would misrepresent the point to say Melville was
Olson’s primary stylistic influence in these matters.13
Consider two more moments from Moby-Dick. Melville often uses mainland prairies as a
metaphor for the expansiveness of the Pacific. Chapter 79, for example, titled “The Prairie,” is a
meditation by Ishmael on the physiognomy of the whale. Nearly 300 pages into the novel, we can
say that the Pequod is firmly in the middle of its journey, and the ocean, by this point—the waves
rolling along seemingly without end like the plains of the central United States might have
appeared to early pioneers.

Finally, the following lines from chapter 111, “The Pacific,”

demonstrate Olson’s argument for Melville’s command of the relation between the two
geographies, though Olson does not cite these lines himself in Ishmael:
“There is, one knows not what sweet mystery about this sea, whose gently
awful stirrings seem to speak of some hidden soul beneath; like those fabled
undulations of the Ephesian sod over the buried Evangelist St. John. And
meet it is, that over these sea pastures, wide-rolling watery prairies and
Potters’ Fields of all four continents, the waves should rise and fall, and ebb
and flow unceasingly; for here, millions of mixed shades and shadows,
drowned dreams, somnambulisms, reveries; all that we call lives and souls,
lie dreaming, dreaming, still; tossing like slumberers in their beds; the everrolling waves but made so by their restlessness.” (380-381)
Here, Melville employs nouns (e.g., stirrings, undulations, restlessness), adverbs (e.g.,
unceasingly), and attributive verbs (e.g., ever-rolling) which conjure up images of eternity. We
may argue with Olson that in this way, Melville subordinates the “time experience” of the plains
to the spatial experience of the Pacific in a most emphatic fashion: he weaves images of the former
into those of the latter precisely to demonstrate the spatial immensity and unimpeded, endless
movement of the Pacific.

There are of course more direct poetic influences on Olson’s poetry. For example, the rejection of punctuation
convention is apparent in Modernists such as Pound and Williams, to name but two.
13
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To conclude these remarks on Olson’s reading of the Pacific in Moby-Dick as an image of
‘space’, I reiterate that critics such as Charters are correct to point out Olson’s lack of textual
analysis in Ishmael. Considering that none of the excerpts from Moby-Dick that I have analyzed
above appear in Ishmael, it is only speculative that they serve as examples of Olson’s reading of
Melville, textually non-specific as it is. My intent here is to demonstrate that perhaps some of the
criticism from many readers and critics of Ishmael is alleviated if we apply Olsonian theory to our
own analysis of the text, a strand of Olson scholarship all too rare. Next, we will consider how,
for Olson, this conception of space in Moby-Dick establishes the novel as a new myth for the
American people.

2.4

The End and New Beginning of Myth in Ishmael
Early in Ishmael Olson marks a distinction between “two alternatives in American

literature” (Charters 48): Melville and Whitman. Olson typically is reticent about Whitman,
Ishmael offering one of his more extensive commentaries on him. Olson’s assessment is that
“Whitman appears, because of his notation of the features of American life and his conscious
identification of himself with the people, to be more the poet. But Melville had the will” (CMI
14). This will, Olson believed, established an American mythology which marked a new era in
human history (albeit one to which only Olson seems to be privy). Olson argues that though
Whitman was considered America’s “greatest voice because he gave us hope,” in fact “Melville is
the truer man” (CMI 15).14 Melville “lived intensely his people’s wrong, their guilt” but also
“remembered the first dream.” He wrote from “the coldness we have” while also “warm[ing]
himself by first fires after Flood.” Olson uses provocative language here, conjuring mythological
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imagery. However, in moving from one thought to the next so quickly he leaves much of his ideas
frustratingly undefined and unsupported. Olson’s opinion seems to be that despite Whitman’s
self-identification with “the noble character of the young mechanics and of all free American
workmen and workwomen” (Whitman 5), an identification with laborers for which Olson surely
would have an affinity, he fails to dig beneath this romanticized veneer. Thus, Olson is skeptical
of Whitman’s ability to portray the American experience as authentically as Melville did. In
Olson’s estimation, “[t]he White Whale is more accurate than Leaves of Grass. Because it is
America, all of her space, the malice, the root.” Melville’s exploration of space as a fundamental
aspect of the American experience “gave him the power to find the lost past of America, the
unfound present, and make a myth, Moby-Dick, for a people of Ishmaels.”
Unfortunately, Olson yet again does little in the way of explaining the term myth as he is
using it in his study of Melville. He later explained during a 1956 lecture at Black Mountain
College on Whitehead’s Process and Reality that among the main “words” operative in Ishmael
were “space” and “myth” (Charters 85).15 Olson went on to stress the primacy of the latter, saying
myth “was the first one, at least in the sense that the word as word had power over me” (ibid. 86).
He omitted, however, any explicit definition of the term during the lecture. He did at least make
it clear that by the time he composed Ishmael, he had been contemplating myth for quite a few
years. He recounted: “And I remember exactly the place and hour of my first attempt to write
down how I understood myth to be – on the Annisquam River, winter, 1939…” (ibid.).16 Olson
also admitted to his audience that whatever his understanding of myth was in Ishmael, it was too

The other two main “words” were “fact” and “object.” Olson defines “words” in this lecture as “facts. And
forms.” He also claims words are “substances…actual entities” (Charters 85). The influence of Whitehead is clear
in the latter definition.
16
Olson would poeticize this moment from an intense and apparently distressing ride down the Annisquam in “A B
Cs (2)” (CP 173), composed 10 April 1950.
15
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private. As he put it, his understanding of space and myth “was stuck in the second of the three
stages in the process of feeling” which, according to Whitehead, is “governed by the private
ideal…whereby the many feelings…are transformed into a unity of aesthetic appreciation
immediately felt as private” (ibid. 85, 86).17 But Olson also said in the lecture that the power the
word ‘myth’ had over him “wasn’t even finally home” until “Tuesday night of this week at about
1:30 am of Wednesday morning” (ibid. 86). This was the moment he discovered Jane Ellen
Harrison’s research explaining that ‘myth,’ in Greek muthos, comes from the same root (mu) as
the word for mouth. His retroactive self-criticism seems fair considering some of the criticism of
Ishmael we have seen. However, just as I am uneasy when critics apply later Olson terminology
to Ishmael, I am equally reluctant to fully accept his own application of Whitehead in assessing
the book. It is characteristic of Olson to be caught up in whatever he was reading at the moment
and to apply that theory or way of thinking to everything, including his own previous work. Olson
had only just read Process and Reality for the first time in the spring of 1955 (Maud 1996, 290),
about a year before the lecture.18 And by his own admission he had only within the week of the
lecture come to an understanding of myth with which he was willing to admit comfort. His
recognition of myth and space as concepts central to Ishmael, however, is undeniable. What then
is Olson’s understanding of myth in Ishmael?
To answer this question, I will first borrow a much more recent definition of myth to
establish our own parameters. In his Greek Mythology and Poetics, Gregory Nagy credits
comparative mythology for its insights concerning myth across archaic Indo-European languages
and cultures. Most notably for him, archaic usage of the word myth did not convey something
antithetical to reality. Hence we ourselves must not consider myth fictitious per se, as fiction is

17
18

The latter quotation is Olson citing Whitehead directly. (Cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 333.)
See Maud 1996, 102, 290n30, for details. (Cf. Charters 84.)
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“a matter of individual and personal creativity,” according to Nagy’s account (8).19 Myth rather is
much more communal, or societal, “a living tradition.” Thus myth “represents a collective
expression of society, an expression that society itself deems to be true and valid. From the
standpoint of the given society that it articulates, myth is the primary reality.” Nagy punctuates
his definition with a modified translation of Walter Burkert, who defines myth as “a traditional
narrative that is used as a designation of reality. Myth is applied narrative. Myth describes a
meaningful and important reality that applies to the aggregate, going beyond the individual.”20 For
our purposes, the three main takeaways from these definitions are: 1) myth is a narrative technique
that is not strictly speaking fictitious; 2) the content of myth for archaic peoples then is a reality;
and 3) that reality is assumed by a community, and is not an individual interpretation or
representation of reality. Though not explicit, I believe all of this to be true in Olson’s use of the
term.
In Olson’s discussion of myth in Ishmael, Homer comes to fore. Myth of course is much
more archaic than Homer, who is in a sense the beginning of the end for Olson. That is, Homer
stands at the nexus between a world in which the aggregate, social practice of myth was the
dominant form of narrative and integral to constructing reality, and a world where logic is the
arbiter of truth and individuals debate their own perspectives of the latter. Olson argues that Homer
supplied the paradigm for Western exploration and individualism, calling Homer the “end of the
myth world from which the Mediterranean began” (CMI 117). Homer’s Odysseus marks a
“creative act of anticipation” which “projected the archetype of the West to follow” (CMI 117118). 21 We may fairly be concerned that Olson referring to Homer’s creativity jars with the
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From Burkert 1979, “Mythisches Denken.”
21
In Ishmael, Olson uses the Latinized form ‘Ulysses’. I am using the Greek name for consistency.
20
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definition adopted above, but I think that definition actually solidifies Olson’s argument if
unbeknownst to him. That is, if individual creativity yields fictitious narrative, as Nagy asserts,
then we can read Olson as making the claim that with the Odyssey, Homer becomes a precursor
both to modern literary narrative techniques and to modern Western individualism.

Rhys

Carpenter articulates the latter point superbly, and adds a crucial layer to the present discussion
when he states:
“For us of today, the Homeric poems constitute the very beginnings of
Greek literature; actually, they could not possibly have occupied that
position. Rather, they must have been very near the ending…of a long
antecedent tradition of oral poetry in Greece. Were we to insist that, as its
name implies, all literature must be written with letters, then Hesiod and
Archilochos would begin Greek literature; but Homer would precede it, as
a survivor from an older and different genus.” (16-17, italics in original)
Though Olson does not explicitly mention the oral nature of Homeric epic, I see no good evidence
not to think that in Ishmael Olson assumes that archaic myth was an oral mode of constructing
reality. Olson would eventually read Carpenter, but certainly his early education in the classics
would have at least acknowledged Homeric epic as oral performance.22
So how, according to Olson, did Homer push the boundaries of his mythological world?
Olson correctly points out that “Homer’s world was locked tight in River Ocean” (CMI, 118)23 an
archaic worldview itself based on a mythological conception of space. Homer’s hero Odysseus
“is already pushing against the limits, seeking a way out.” Hence in what Olson considers a
seminal act of modern culture, “Homer gave his hero the central quality of the men to come:
search, the individual responsible to himself” (italics in original). This marks a break from reality
grounded in communal mythology as self-directed responsibility presupposes: a) a sense of one’s
independence from the community; and b) the capacity to interpret reality for oneself and to

22
23

See Maud 1996, 246n12, for details of Olson’s reading Carpenter.
This and following citations until noted.
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determine one’s own actions based on that interpretation. Olson implies that this self-awareness
evolves concurrently with a kind of knowledge based increasingly on abstractions which reaches
its pinnacle with the classical Greeks. When Plato “prospected” new geographical boundaries by
“locat[ing] Atlantis outside Homer’s terminus, the Pillars of Hercules,” the Greek mythological
worldview was finally renounced in favor of a broader Mediterranean worldview. Interestingly,
Olson would later champion the “prospective” element of his projective verse (CPr 239).
Nevertheless, despite these geographical expansions of the classical Greek world, Olson laments
“that by 200 B.C. the scope of Western thought had been more or less outlined.” Hence the need
for a new mode of thinking, which for Olson coincides with a new mode of history.
The end-of-myth marks for Olson not only a cultural shift, but also a major epistemological
shift. Olson takes issue in Ishmael with “[l]ogic and classification,” modes of thinking which “led
civilization toward man, away from space” (CMI, 14).24 Olson will explicitly pin the degradation
of the West on the classical Greeks for grounding their discourses in abstractions (necessary of
course for logic, or taxonomies of any kind) in “Human Universe” (1951). Yet here we begin to
see his disdain for the methodology of classical Greek thought. Classical methodology has two
unfortunate, concurrent consequences for Olson. First, it dissociates humans from the community,
hence from a reality grounded in communal knowledge and from a sense of communal
responsibility. This consequence has the attendant repercussion of isolating humans as individuals
from both the communal whole and from one another (civilization). The movement “toward man”
establishes an abstract sense of the individual as having priority over the community. Thus, even
in discourses aimed toward acquiring knowledge one individual’s opinion takes priority over the
community’s shared beliefs. That is, as societies become more individualistic, one’s opinions
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dominate, or succumb to, those of another. The second consequence is that abstract discourse
dissociates humans from a more immediate phenomenological experience of space, replacing
geographical milieus with an abstract Euclidean conception of space. Olson laments, “In place of
Zeus, Odysseus, Olympus we have had Caesar, Faust, the City.” This marks for Olson a
“shift…from man as a group to individual man.” In a mythological culture, communal images
define the world and a people’s interaction with it and each other. These communal images, local
myths, define and preserve their history. For instance, we know from Homer how archaic Greeks
were to appropriately give sacrifice to gods, or to treat guests in their home. Those images, Olson
suggests, have been superseded by instances of power and corruption typified by certain
individuals. It seems that Olson is also thinking certain modern metropolises may have great
cultural, financial, or political importance, but they do not ground the worldview of entire
civilizations. We could argue against Olson that global metropolitan centers indeed affect
worldviews, national and international, through their ability to disseminate culture and dictate
financial and political realities. But Olson may make the counter-argument that it is precisely
because these global cities disseminate culture through finance and media that they lack the
cultural primacy of orally disseminated myths. Fortunately, according to Olson, all is not lost “in
spite of the corruption of myth by fascism” (CMI 14-15), where by fascism, I take it, he means the
rise of individualism.
One way to overturn the corruption of myth, Olson thinks, is precisely to reestablish the
mythological mode. According to Olson the “swing…out and back,” the “pull to the origin of
things,” began with Melville, who “sought prime” (CMI 15). Melville inverted the historical
progression (or regression) stemming from abstract discourse. That is, where the classical
movement was “toward man, away from space,” Melville “went to space to probe and find man”
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(CMI 14).

Olson continues, “Early men did the same: poetry, language and the care of

myth…grew up together” (ibid.). For Olson, Melville’s achievement was aligning his language
and the image of the Pacific to create a new American mythos. To be sure, Moby-Dick is not an
imitation of mythology in Olson’s view. For him, it is of a different order than all previous,
contemporary or subsequent American literature: it is myth. Melville’s novel then both recalls an
archaic mode of thought and formulates the basis for a new mode of thought. Such a new mode
of thought marks for Olson both a new understanding of the past and present by reinfusing
contemporary history with mythology, and a new mode of determining the future through a radical
break from the long-since established epistemology initiated by the classical Greeks which has
defined Western thought since. Here we see the importance of the Pacific for Melville as “a
comprehension of the PAST” and “a confirmation of FUTURE” (CMI 114, 116). Recall that Olson
also claimed that the Pacific was for Melville “an experience of SPACE” (CMI 114). Provided
we read Moby-Dick in the same manner Olson does, Melville marks a radical transformation in
human consciousness. That is, if knowledge derives in part from the active exploration of
(geographical) space—from the very moving about which the etymology of the word ‘knowledge’
suggests 25 —then with his literary exploration of the Pacific Melville not only presents a new
understanding of space, but also a new mode for constructing knowledge in the 20th Century and
beyond. Thus “[w]ith the Pacific,” Olson asserts, “opens the NEW HISTORY” (117).
For Olson, the new history means also the closing of an era. The era which began with
Odysseus traversing the Mediterranean Sea is completed by Ahab’s sailing from the Atlantic,
around Cape Horn to the South Pacific. Olson’s view is that this westward movement not only
continues, and ultimately brings to a close, the individualism Homer’s hero initiated, but that it
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also mirrors the cultural and socioeconomic history of the West. With Dante’s Inferno, Odysseus
“is again prospective,” the hero’s journey extending out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic
(CMI 118). Dante encounters Odysseus spending eternity among the evil counselors in the eighth
bolgia of the eighth circle of Hell (Dante XXVI). Odysseus shares the tale of him and his crew
passing from the known Mediterranean “southwest out of the world of man,” how they “sailed at
last into the narrow pass/ where, warning all men back from further voyage,/ Hercules’ Pillars rose
upon our sight” (XXVI.116, 101-103).26 Recall that Olson referred to the “Pillars of Hercules” as
“Homer’s terminus” (CMI 118). Thus “in Dante’s hands” Odysseus is “already an Atlantic man”
(ibid.). Melville’s depiction of “[t]he third and final odyssey” (ibid.), Ahab’s chase after the white
whale, has important consequences for Olson. First, it expands the geographical scope of the myth,
opening the myth itself up to more of the very space which informs its images. Second, it closes
the evolution of individualism indicative of the West’s psychological development. This leads
Olson to his aforementioned “revelation” (Christensen 31) on the last page of Ishmael. There,
Olson proclaims: “The Atlantic crossed, the new land America known, the dream’s death lay
around the Horn, where West returned to East. The Pacific is the end of the UNKNOWN which
Homer’s and Dante’s [Odysseus] opened men’s eyes to. END of individual responsible only to
himself. Ahab is full stop” (CMI 118–19).
The significance of Moby-Dick for Olson is then threefold. First, Moby-Dick has literary
significance as it evolves one of the great, foundational Western myths. Second, the novel has
psychological significance. Olson claims “3000 years went overboard in the Pacific…going back
to Homer” (ibid. 117). Olson lauds in Melville the deconstruction of Western individualism, which
reaches its ugly pinnacle in Ahab. Finally, Moby-Dick is significant as its literary evolution mirrors
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the economic development of the West. According to Olson “[t]he evolution in the use of
[Odysseus] as hero parallels what has happened in economic history” (ibid.) That is, a desire in
the classical Greeks for expanding their geographical world is paralleled by the Early Modern
European desire to expand economic reach and prowess. The geographical exploration West and
South from Europe facilitated the imperialistic conquer of countries in the Americas and Africa.
To be sure, Olson is not ignorant of the fact that Asian and indigenous Pacific island peoples would
have sailed the Pacific long before European explorers, and well before Melville wrote his epic
tale. I note also that I am unaware of Olson ever considering any literature which would close the
circumnavigation of the world by traversing Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East back to
the Mediterranean center of Western culture. The point here, however, is that the progression of
a certain character type, begun with Odysseus and brought to its demise with Ahab, the progression
from the Mediterranean origins of Western culture to a new “Pacific” mode, clearly parallels for
Olson the development of an egocentric psychology and a (largely exploitative) economy in the
West. Thus Melville’s extension of America, both its geography and its mid-nineteenth century
socioeconomic mechanisms, into the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean not only mark a literary
enactment of America’s spirit of exploration, but bring to a close an individualism initiated by
Homer. It is in the conclusion of Ishmael where Olson first posits the demise of these Western
psychological and economic principles.
To conclude this discussion of Ishmael, I want to stress that the spatial and mythological
aspects Olson reads in Melville’s use of the Pacific are also components of his own developing
concept of history. I will address Olson’s more mature concept of history later in the dissertation.
For now, I point out that in Ishmael, Olson creatively weaves archival research, criticism, history,
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poetic prose, theory and conjecture. This “uniquely animated blend of fact and interpretation”
(Charters 60) provides a glimpse of what Olson’s poetics and poetry would become stylistically.

2.5

A “Préface” to Olson’s Poetics
Olson did not write his first poem until the age of 30 (circa 1940), without having studied

the subject formally to any significant degree. Within a few years, he would be dedicating his life
to writing poetry. The decision to change careers came while Olson and his first wife Connie (née
Wilcock) were vacationing with his fellow Roosevelt administration colleagues in Key West
during the early winter months of 1945 following a successful presidential reelection campaign.
Somewhat quickly but not without deliberation, and with a strong desire to change his life path,
Olson decided not to accept any position the Roosevelt administration would offer him (Clark 93),
begin writing poetry seriously, and make a major push to finish and publish Ishmael. Sherman
Paul posits Olson’s “choice of the vocation of poet” as a clear response to World War II (Paul 2).
While I would not insist on the war as the single reason Olson began writing poetry, scholars
generally agree that the war had a significant effect on his literary career. As we shall see below,
the war signified for Olson a logical end of sorts to the egocentric, humanistic struggle against
nature as an economic resource Olson believed was ushered in by Homer’s Odysseus. In terms of
Olson’s decision to leave his promising political career for the life of a poet, he certainly sought a
greater freedom of expression in his writing. Feeling increasingly constrained in his political
writing for the Office of War Information, Olson left the agency and took a position as director of
the Foreign Nationalities Division of the Democratic National Committee. There, “Olson was
crucial in turning out the immigrant vote for FDR’s fourth and closest victory” (Szalay 257). It
was also in this role that Olson “had made the mistake of vociferously backing Henry Wallace
over the more conservative Harry Truman as Roosevelt’s running mate” (ibid.). Shortly after
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Olson and Connie returned to Washington, D.C., in April of 1945, he learned of FDR’s passing
from a morning newspaper (Clark 99). Though Olson had essentially made his decision to pursue
a career in writing, this news, and the eventuality of Truman and his people inheriting the White
House, made clear to Olson that his future was no longer in political administration.27
Olson essentially taught himself how to write poetry through mimicry of his favorite
Modernists. On this matter, Paul’s assessment of Olson’s earliest verse is decisive: “exercises,
somewhat stiff and formal, mostly in tutelage to Williams and Pound” but which “lack the charged
emotion Pound asks of poetry” (4). They did, however, exhibit some of the concerns which Olson
would always have “with the visual shape of the poem, with its format…and with its design”
(ibid.). These meager poems, short by Olson’s later standards, were “nowhere so far along as in
the prose of Call Me Ishmael” (ibid.). But Olson kept at it, further developing his style and writing
some quality poetry between his earliest attempts and his watershed year of 1950—a year which
saw the publication of Olson’s manifesto “Projective Verse” and the first compositions of
Maximus. Several of Olson’s poems of the mid-to-late 1940s demonstrate his maturing poetic
voice, one engaged with history conceptually and for content. This is especially clear in his first
published book of poetry y & x (1948), which included “La Préface.”28 Beyond the poems in this
collaborative chapbook, Olson would engage poetically with history in several non-Maximus
poems throughout his career. In addition to the aforementioned “The Kingfishers,” “To Gerhardt,
There, Among Europe’s Things…” and “The Death of Europe” among others provide meditations
on history and Olson’s desire to break from suffocating Western historical and poetic traditions.29
For more on Olson’s political career see: Clark 2000, esp. Chs. 7-8; Maud 2008, Ch. 9. For more on the presence
of New Deal politics in Olson’s poetics see: Szalay 2000, “Conclusion: New Deal Postmodernism”; and von
Hallberg 1978, Ch. 1.
28
“La Préface” was originally composed in 1946. Olson would revise the poem up until its appearance in In Cold
Hell, In Thicket (1953), but the revisions were mainly typographical.
29
See CP: “The Kingfishers” (c. 1949), 86-93; “To Gerhardt, There, Among Europe’s Things of Which He Has
Written Us in His ‘Brief an Creeley und Olson’” (c. 1951), 212-222; “The Death of Europe” (c. 1954), 308-316.
27
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“La Préface” (CP 46-47), an appropriately titled poem in terms of Olson’s new career path,
presents a poetically unseasoned Olson. However, we also see in it an Olson who is wrestling with
the crises of his own time and pushing against the European nostalgia and elitism he read in some
of his Modernist predecessors.30
As mentioned, y & x was a collaborative effort featuring five Olson poems alongside five
drawings by the Jewish-Italian painter Corrado Cagli which either directly inspired or loosely
related to its accompanying poem. Olson first met Cagli in Gloucester in 1940 through mutual
friends. Cagli had recently immigrated to the United States in response to Mussolini’s intensified
anti-Semitic persecutions. Clark notes Cagli had “been forced to flee his homeland after an
exhibition of his paintings had been closed down by Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-inlaw and foreign minister” (64).31 Trying to make his way as an art teacher, Cagli had then only a
limited command of English. Olson highlights this in “La Préface” when recalling an intense
philosophical conversation they had on a beach in Gloucester: “He talked, via stones a stick sea
rock

a hand of earth.” Olson’s weaving of autobiographical material into a poem ostensibly

taking up a larger historical and philosophical subject would become a consistent approach in
Maximus, one inspired to a significant degree by Pound's Cantos.

However, it is Cagli’s

involvement in American war efforts that come to the fore in y & x. After the U.S. officially
entered World War II, Cagli enlisted in the Army and would eventually participate in the liberation
of the Buchenwald concentration camps. Olson and Cagli would reunite in New York a few
months after the war had ended, Olson having driven up from D.C. to sign his contract for the
recently accepted Ishmael. During their visit, Cagli showed Olson a series of drawings based on
his experience in Buchenwald, thus inspiring Olson to write “La Préface.”

30
31

For an interesting reading of Olson’s poetics as a response to the crisis of the Cold War, see Hickman 2015, Ch. 3.
All details of Olson’s relationship with Cagli, and Cagli’s biography, are from Clark 2000, 63-65, 112-123.
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The poem begins with one line broken into three fragments extending downward across
the page, likewise extending the image conjured by the first fragment through the visual breaks:
The dead in via
in vita nuova
in the way
The first fragment refers to Cagli’s drawings of dead, emaciated bodies lying in the roadways of
Buchenwald. Reading “via” in Latin (as opposed to Italian) creates a forceful juxtaposition to the
next fragment, which is undoubtedly in Italian. This second fragment, an allusion to the title of a
poem by Dante, acts as a proclamation of the new life (“vita nuova”) Olson believes is a necessary
response to the atrocities of the war. By overturning the Latin in homage to Cagli’s native tongue,
Olson rejects both Roman political and Latin poetic tradition in favor of a new “way” which he
sees himself and Cagli ushering in. The third fragment then reiterates the first two lines. Despite
its own urge to move forward, reinforced by its typography, it recalls the image of the first
fragment with rather grim colloquial phrasing. It also completes a linguistic evolution from Latin
to Italian to English. This seems to mirror Olson’s point in Ishmael regarding the literary evolution
of Odysseus through Dante to Melville, as the former wrote the Divine Comedy in Italian, the latter
Moby-Dick in English. Taken together the second and third fragments announce the possibility
of, and need for, a new way of life, a new history as Olson called it in Ishmael, following such
horror. If for Olson the destruction effected by World War II was “not merely of a civilization
but…of the entire humanistic proposition underlying it,” as Clark argues (113), then endeavoring
into this new way is for Olson the only logical response to the war.
The opening line of “La Préface” demonstrates Olson’s capacity for beginning his poems
with a dense, layered first line from which the poem then unpacks itself. His best poetic moments,
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in my opinion, showcase his talent as one of the great first line poets.32 Though this aspect of
Olson’s poetry is on display in “La Préface,” two lines later Olson ends the first strophe by
demonstrating one of his more frustrating qualities as the line’s ambiguity suggests a performative
contradiction. Olson ends the strophe, “You, do not you speak who know not.” The very writing
and reading of this line would seem to prohibit Olson from commenting on the scenes Cagli
witnessed at Buchenwald. Ralph Maud reads the line this way, asserting “Olson is speaking to
himself as much as anybody” (Maud 2008, 93). I tend to disagree, however, as that would
seriously undermine the remaining 25 or so lines of the poem. My reading is that Olson implies
here that his having seen Cagli’s drawings makes him capable of speaking knowledgeably, and
with sympathy, about the realities of the war despite his having never been physically present at
it. Olson’s lack of firsthand knowledge of the war, however, is not a reason to dismiss the poem.
Rather, we could make the case that the last line of the opening strophe echoes the first line in
calling people toward a new way, in this sense one which urges people to learn about the realities
of the war, and the history of the world generally. Presumably then with some knowledge of the
catastrophe, albeit indirect knowledge, people would be in a better position to speak about the
events of the war.

In Cagli’s sketches Olson saw a friend’s immediate experience of the

abhorrence of war. The sketches themselves then become historically important as pictorial
depictions from which Olson, and anyone reading y & x, can indirectly experience that moment of
history. The first three lines of the next strophe depict some of the particulars Olson learned from
Cagli’s drawings, a knowledge Olson in turn shares with his readers.

Two further examples are “The Kingfishers,” which begins “What does not change / is the will to change” (CP
86); and “Maximus, to himself,” which begins “I have had to learn the simplest things/ last” (MP 56). Note the
latter example extends past the line break. However, much like the former example and that above, it is a single
syntactical unit.
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In the second strophe, Olson equates the images in Cagli’s drawings, and the events of
Buchenwald generally, to a “new Altamira cave.” Despite what may seem a poor analogy, or
worse a flippant summation of such horrific events, this phrase too has layered and poignant
meanings. Cagli’s initial sketches were of graffiti he saw upon entering the Buchenwald camps
(Clark 113). Olson cites some of these graffiti in the first three lines of the strophe. The first
predicts the date of its author’s death: “I will die about April 1st.” The second comments on its
author’s physical condition: “I weigh, I think, 80 lbs.” The third announces the author’s anonymity
in the experience of cultural erasure: “My name is NO RACE.” Thus Olson seems to be making
the case that we learn about the life of the Buchenwald prisoners from their graffiti as historical
material, the same as we learn about the life of Upper Paleolithic peoples from their cave drawings.
However, equating these Buchenwald graffiti to early humans drawing scenes of their hunting
excursions on cave walls is too crass for my taste. Olson extends the analogy ending the second
strophe with a particularly harrowing description of the manner in which these graffiti were
“scratch[ed]” into the walls: “With a nail they drew the object of the hunt.” “Nail” could have two
meanings, but I take it to mean the body part and not the metal object here. I read the “object of
the hunt” as referring to the appalling aim of the genocide itself: the systematic elimination of the
Jewish people. Hence the Buchenwald graffiti represents for Olson an accomplished Nazi
objective, manifested in the graffiti itself. The primary sense of “Buchenwald

new Altamira

cave” that Olson wants to convey, of course, recalls the new beginning announced in the first line
of the poem. The Holocaust and the general destruction of World War II signify for Olson, in
Paul’s words, a “death to which the humanist enterprise of abstraction, power and ego, has
contributed” (8). Taken as a whole, the war is “the fact that changes everything” (ibid.), sentiments
we have also seen in Clark’s interpretation of “La Préface.” Hence, much like the discovery of
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cave drawings in Altamira changed our conception of human history, knowledge of the human
potential for violence on a grand scale and of the utter inhumanity displayed during World War II
must mark a new history.
To push things toward the new way, Olson calls readers to “[p]ut war away with time,
come into space.” This echoes ideas developed in Ishmael, here Olson intent on reversing the
damage done when “civilization” suppressed its mythological understanding of space, and moved
“toward man” (CMI 14).33 The implication in “La Préface” seems to be that geographical space
as a shared, concrete phenomenon can facilitate a more communal rebuilding and healing process;
‘time’ is for Olson an abstraction which facilitates the old history-making, the kind which led the
world into the war and its outcomes in the first place. Olson enacts this replacement of time with
space, proceeding to tell the story of his aforementioned conversation with Cagli on the beach in
Gloucester.34 Interestingly, he starts that story with a specific temporal marker: “It was May,
precise date, 1940.” But two lines later when he revisits this syntactical structure—“It is now,
precise, repeat.”—Olson is, I think, undoing the specificity of the previous line. In naming the
universal indexical “now” to mark the time of the poem, Olson simultaneously makes explicit the
ability to “repeat” it. That is, May 1940 happened once and although Olson recalls that specific
moment with a fond nostalgia, again anticipating his principles of projective verse when
remembering “I had air my lungs could breathe,” it is the energy toward the new way that Olson
wants to perpetually repeat. This repetition of the “now” of the poem is then subsequently
accomplished in each reading of “La Préface.”
To bring readers “into space,” Olson uses both bodily and geometric images. He refers to
“the lines” Cagli drew in the sand as “polytopes.” The latter term, as David Herd interprets it,
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See p. 50 above.
See p. 57 above.
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doubles as a description for Olson and Cagli themselves. For Herd, in “La Préface” Olson
“establishes the primacy of ‘space’ to [his] new poetic, presenting the human body (figured as
‘polytopes’) in space as a necessary resistance to the obliterations of war” (274). In addition to his
use of “lungs” and “breathe,” Olson also conjures up bodily imagery when he admits that during
the conversation with Cagli he “talk[ed] of Bigmans organs,” “Bigmans” being an early label for
a series of poems about great men of history Olson was conceiving at the time (Maud 2008, 93).
But Cagli taught Olson about non-Euclidean geometry and the Tarot, two sources of knowledge
and imagery which would come to figure prominently in Olson’s poetry. Hence the “Bigmans
organs” Olson spoke about are overturned in the next line, “Birth in the house is the One of Sticks,”
in favor of Cagli’s Tarot imagery, thus also enacting a new way for Olson’s own poetry.
This starts a series of 14 lines in the poem which circle around the theme of death and the
birth of the new. For instance, “the One of Sticks” refers in Tarot to “the card for creation, source,
birth” (ibid.). Olson marks this birth with another specific temporal reference:
Draw it thus: ( ) 1910 (
Noting the year of he and Cagli’s birth, Olson implements the specificity so that “[i]t is not
obscure” on whom the onus for the radical change he envisions must fall. It is his and Cagli’s
generation—they “are the new born.” The closed parentheses before the year denotes everything
that has come before the birth, a history which taken as a whole should offer little now for Olson,
Cagli, et al. As Olson explains, “The closed parenthesis reads: the dead bury the dead,/ and it is
not very interesting” [sic]. The single left parenthesis after the year, a punctuation trademark of
Olson’s projective verse, indicates that the new history is an open one. As this parenthesis is never
typographically closed in the poem, the new history after 1910 remains syntactically open as well,
both in the poem and beyond. The openness Olson refers to is also psychological. It is an openness
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both to the new history and to the violence of the war depicted in Cagli’s drawings. “Open,” Olson
writes, “the figure stands at the door, horror his/ and gone.” The war and its terror are over, it is
“possessed,” but it is more importantly something beyond which humanity needs to be move
quickly. Olson does not want to lament but rather record, file away, and move forward ever
recording the new. For the “new born”:
there are no flowers.
Document means there are no flowers
and no parenthesis.
Thus Cagli’s pictorial documentation of the war and “La Préface” itself occupy an interstitial
space, acting both as documentation of World War II as the end of the old history while also acting
as documents representing the new way and marking a new history. For me, Olson again comes
across as callous in saying the new history will forego the ceremonial flowers typically placed on
graves and at sites of death in favor of the open parenthesis of the new history.
“La Préface” is a poem in the new way Olson envisions, the initiation of which is
incumbent upon himself and Cagli, “two bodies” who are “the radical, the root.” They “put [their]
hands to these dead” Cagli has drawn. The imagery of rebirth is clear here, though the American
revivalist sense of resurrection which this latter line conjures up is not a typical theme in Olson.
Despite the phrasing, Olson is again putting Cagli and himself in the interstice between the closed
parentheses of everything that came before the revolution Olson self-ascribes and the new way
brought forth by their art. Olson and Cagli employ their hands to create something new from the
destruction. Thus, much as they do not lament the dead with flowers, neither do they attempt to,
nor claim to have the power to, revive them. Even the laying of their hands to the dead is in the
way of the new history. As Olson asserts toward the end of the poem, “We are born not of the
buried but these unburied dead.” Olson read Melville as overturning the history of individualism
which he believed began with Homer’s Odyssey. But seeing Cagli’s drawings made it clear to
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Olson that the old history had only just reached its ugly logical end with World War II. “La
Préface” is Olson’s call, literally in the vocative, to re-project the post-Homeric history of the
West: “o new Osiris, Odysseus ship.”
Inspiring though this call may be for some readers, and admittedly “La Préface” can evoke
a creative energy when I read it in the right mood, Olson ends the poem with a cryptic and I believe
incorrect image. Referring to Cagli and himself as the “Blake Underground,” the last line of the
poem reads:
The Babe
the Howling Babe
An allusion to William Blake’s poem “The Mental Traveller,”35 it seems as though Olson wants to
punctuate the consistent theme of rebirth we have seen throughout the poem with one last image,
a newborn baby. This is apparently meant to symbolize the infancy and newness of the way
signified by his collaborative effort with Cagli. However, if this is indeed Olson’s reasoning
behind this image, with it he has undermined the poignancy of his own idea of a new history as
clearly demarcated from the old history symbolized by Western individualism. The reappearance
of “the Babe” at the end of Blake’s poem indicates rather that a perpetual tragic cycle is beginning
yet again. Though it does in one sense mark a beginning, it is not that of a radically different sort
for which Olson calls in “La Préface.” Thus invoking “The Mental Traveller” at the end of the
poem mistakenly introduces a theme, the tragic recurrence of history, Olson wants to reject in “La
Préface.”

35

See Blake 1976, 145-148.
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2.6

Conclusion: Olson, Myth, and the Critique of Neoliberal Individualism
If to this point readers have been frustrated with Olson’s broad, often vague terminology,

I admit my own frustration at times trying to ascertain exactly what Olson means by a particular
word. I have called attention to this issue above, especially in regard to Ishmael, but note here that
Olson’s terminology should be understood as having a broad meaning. Olson was a global, even
cosmological thinker from the outset of his writing career. I believe this scale of thought is largely
a product of his interdisciplinary educational background and research interests, all of which
becomes more apparent in the methodology and writing style of his mature poetics. The two early
Olson texts we have been considering in this chapter show us how deeply interconnected for Olson
were the loss of myth as reality and the rise of individualism. These social and psychological
evolutions in the West would function as a binary in Olson’s thinking for the remainder of his
career.
In both the critical monograph Ishmael and the poem “La Préface,” Olson encourages us
to prioritize space and the community, over time and the individual, as pathways toward a less
abstracted experience of the world and a new history. Olson wants to overturn classical Greek
epistemology and its methodology of abstraction and taxonomy in favor of an archaic
epistemology. Archaic epistemology is, for Olson, harmonious with myth. Previously I asserted
three aspects of Olson’s concept of ‘myth’ implied by his discussion of the term in Ishmael, noting
that they were speculative as Olson himself never explicitly defines the term therein.36 The aim of
my assertions was to establish that Olson understood myth not as fictitious narrative, but rather as
a depiction of reality as understood by the people who preserve a particular myth. In 1950, a few
years after he completed writing Ishmael, Olson would come across a definition of myth from

36

See p. 48 above.
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Bronisław Malinowski which clearly established myth as such for Olson (Maud 1996, 100).37 He
found Malinowski’s definition cited in Carl Jung and Károly Kerényi’s Essays on a Science of
Mythology:
“The myth in a primitive society, i.e., in its original living form, is not a
mere tale told but a reality lived. It is not in the nature of an invention such
as we read in our novels today, but living reality, believed to have occurred
in primordial times and to be influencing ever afterwards the world and the
destinies of men.…[Myths] are the assertion of an original, greater, and
more important reality through which the present life, fate, and work of
mankind are governed, and the knowledge of which provides men on the
one hand with motives for ritual and moral acts, on the other with directions
for their performance.” (Jung and Kerényi 5)38
Olson would incorporate this definition more fully into his thinking in the spring of 1953
while preparing to host Institute of the New Sciences of Man at Black Mountain College (Maud
1996, 100-101). Much of the institute was to be dedicated to discussing mythology as a science.
Sadly, Jung did not accept Olson’s invitation to be a part of a panel on mythology (Clark 233).
Nevertheless, Olson referenced Malinowski’s definition during the institute and seems to have
adopted it wholeheartedly from this point forward. As George F. Butterick has demonstrated,
Olson would eventually “insist that mythology is the same ‘hard’ science as any of the taxonomic
sciences such as physics…Some ten thousand pages of his own notes survive as evidence of just
how rigorous a study mythology could be and the demand he made of it” (13). Some may dispute
that copious notes on mythology count as science, yet Olson’s interest passion for studying the
subject is clear. Another aspect of Olson’s thinking I find interesting is apparent here: his intuition.
Olson’s own understanding of many concepts he would use in his writing is not only enriched but
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See also Butterick 1980, 12.
Cf. Malinowski 18, 30. Jung and Kerényi cite two different passages from two different pages, but do not make
this clear. An ellipsis in their citation of Malinowski marks the different passages, though they present it as one
excerpt. Further, there is some language difference between their citation and the actual passages in Malinowski.
Malinowski’s book has no translation credit, so the reason for the discrepancy is unclear.
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often validated by subsequent discoveries. Olson might concede that his understanding of a
concept was unrefined before reading scholars who elucidate it, but he never refutes his initial
understanding.

Projective verse allows him to incorporate new understandings constantly,

continually constructing new vectors of thought. In terms of his early understanding of myth,
however, Olson’s own intuitive concept seems to have only been bolstered by Malinowski’s
definition.
One aspect of Olson’s early understanding of myth which remained throughout his life was
that myth is not a fiction, but rather an expression of reality. Charles Doria corroborates this in his
article, “Pound, Olson, and the Classical Tradition.” Offering a retrospective analysis of Olson’s
understanding of myth, Doria argues that Olson approached myths “as credible wholes” (140).
Hence for Olson myth “was literal, ‘like theology’” (ibid.). 39 As such, myth transmits and
disseminates to a community real knowledge of real events. Doria concludes that
“[f]or Olson myth conveys information of importance: the compact
expression of lived experience over generations, not a single lifetime. It
preserves what is necessary for racial and cultural survival while it scants
the personal and the unique.…[M]yth remarks the salient and forebears
repetition. Myth can survive from generation to generation, since, like
genes, it is the carrier and repository of the only true knowledge. Like the
Classical Tradition myth conserves, but for reasons of survival. It is the oral
encyclopedia and it is not employed merely for cultural decorousness.”
(141)
To be sure, much of Doria’s conclusion is his own—in my opinion quite eloquent and correct—
expression of what he believes myth is. This should not lead us to dismiss it as applicable to
Olson’s concept of myth, however. As we shall see, Olson’s belief that history ought to be
preserved and disseminated through myth, and that myth is by nature oral, drives the Maximus
project.

The internal citation is from “Poetry and Truth,” a transcription of three lectures Olson gave at Beloit College
(WI) in late March of 1968, toward the end of his life. See Olson 2010, Ch. 10.
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Regarding the term ‘individualism,’ on the other hand, Olson never gives it an explicit
definition nor does he ever adopt one from another source. Yet his critique of individualism
appears throughout his poetry and prose. For our own purposes, I would suggest the meaning
seems clear. ‘Individualism’ indicates a culture of prioritizing oneself as an individual over the
group, whether that group is a small local community, a larger population inhabiting a
geographical space, a team, a group of colleagues, a nation, etc.

We can fairly consider

‘individualism’ an equivalent of the term ‘egocentrism.’ I would not suspect these definitions to
earn us a strong rebuke. Yet I have many questions regarding Olson’s use of these two terms,
questions such as: What do these terms imply about Olson’s theory of subjectivity? What do they
say about his theory of consciousness? psychology? social psychology? What is the difference
between the interior thought process of a person in archaic, or Homeric Greece, and that of a person
in classical Greece? What exactly is the difference between an individual in, say, 451 BCE and
450 BCE? I do not profess to have answers to these questions. Olson’s thoughts on some of these
matters become clearer as his career progresses, some of which we will see in the coming chapters.
For now, I offer some thoughts on Olson’s critique of individualism by noting more recent
critiques.
In a recent episode of the podcast Sea Change Radio, sustainability activist and author
George Monbiot decried the excessive individualism of contemporary culture. Discussing how
building a more sustainable planet requires an alternative to both neo-liberalist and Keynesian
economic policies, Monbiot called deregulated neo-liberalism “capitalism on steroids” which
“cause[s] crises on just about all fronts”.40 Focusing mainly on the environmental repercussions
of neo-liberalism, Monbiot also expressed concern for its capacity to “redefine human life by the

40

Wise, George Monbiot: Altruism For An Age Of Crisis. Monbiot discusses Verhaeghe from 00:18:31-00:20:06.
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market.” Rather than talking of “people,” we are now “defined as consumers or as producers”
who are taught to value “transactional relationships and never mind all this community stuff.”
Referencing Belgian psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe’s book What About Me?, Monbiot says
Verhaeghe argues that we “have been induced to see ourselves as individuals…as no longer being
part of a community, part of society.” Monbiot sounds Olsonian to me when he critiques how we
use language. Monbiot argues:
“we have a whole inspiring lexicon which is supposed to validate and
valorize the idea of being alone…we don’t talk about people anymore, we
say ‘individuals’…We can’t complete a sentence without using the word
‘personal’, ‘personally speaking’…We use this redundant word all the time
because we are induced to imagine that we are completely alone…”
What About Me? is Verhaeghe’s self-described Freudian critique of neo-liberalism’s
effects on identity construction and public and mental health. Therein he asserts that “[t]he neoliberal organization of our society is determining how we relate to our bodies, our partners, our
colleagues, and our children—in short to our identities” (4). In the second half of the 20th century,
Verhaeghe claims, society shifted from patriarchal social structures centering on “the obligations
of the individual and on responsibility towards the group” to “the liberation of the individual and
a decline in the importance of the group” (105). Verhaeghe also notes that during the same era,
civil rights movements, broadly speaking, across the West “call[ed] for greater freedom, not so
much for certain groups, but first and foremost for individuals” (106). This was “the age of the
autonomous self…preferably with as many rights as possible” in which “[o]bligations were
transferred to the community” (ibid.). 41 However, the “fashion…to decry this attitude” of
individualism takes aim at the wrong source. Against the reactionary “need to return to norms and
values” which blames “the layabout hippies of 1968” who later “took the welfare state and their
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This and following citations.
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own rights very much for granted,” Verhaeghe sets out to critique what he calls ‘Enron society.’
The term is effectively a synonym for contemporary neo-liberalism, indicating “a new social
model that has produced a new identity with different norms and values.” This social model is
rabidly individualistic.

“Its most marked characteristic,” Verhaeghe asserts, “is depressive

pleasure-seeking on credit.”
To be sure, there are many critiques of individualism and contemporary society which we
could bring into dialogue with Olson, and many scholars have done so. I mention these two
critiques here neither to elaborate on the concept of individualism per se, nor to suggest that they
can help us better understand Olson. I introduce them to demonstrate rather that ‘individualism’
is being critiqued in varying disciplines today, often without any explicit definition of the term.
The negative reaction the term inspires in Monbiot, for example, makes Olson’s passionate
denunciation of individualism that much more relevant today. Both critiques remind me of the
opening pages of Maximus, where Maximus denounces “these entertainers, sellers” who have
made of Gloucester a corporatized, seaside resort (MP 14).42 He tells us that the town had, by the
early 1950s, succumbed to
(the trick
of corporations, newspapers, slick magazines, movie houses,
the ships, even the wharves, absentee-owned43
To the Madison Avenue set he declares:

When not italicized, ‘Maximus’ refers to the author of the letters in Maximus the epic. There is critical debate
about whether Olson and Maximus are one and the same. I tend to read the first volume of letters as attempts by
Olson to project his poetry through a mythical figure named Maximus. Thus, I refer to the early letters, and in
general any poem whose title specifically claims Maximus as its source, as being in Maximus’ voice. I do, however,
believe that as the epic develops, Olson’s own voice emerges more explicitly and cannot be distinguished from
Maximus’ voice, despite Olson’s intention to project the poem through Maximus. I ask readers to be patient with
this potentially confusing aspect of my reading of Maximus.
43
MP 14.
42
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Let those who use words cheap, who use us cheap
take themselves out of the way
Let them not talk of what is good for the city44

44

MP 13. All the lines cited in this paragraph are from “Letter 3.”
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CHAPTER 3. THE PRINCIPLES OF PROJECTIVE VERSE AND THE
ROOTS OF CHARLES OLSON’S POETICS

whatever you have to say, leave
the roots on, let them
dangle
And the dirt
Just to make clear
where they come from1
3.1

Introduction
Just as his poem “La Préface” was to be a starting point for a new history, Olson intended

for his seminal essay “Projective Verse” (1950) to mark a new era of poetry. In this manifesto for
post-World War II poetic composition, Olson expounds a methodology whereby poets must
channel a kinetic energy unencumbered by the dictates of prescriptive form, relying instead on
their own breath to generate lines of poetry. In opposition to the “inherited line, stanza, over-all
form” which Olson thought had been hampering English language poetry for centuries, projective
verse, as Olson dubbed this brand of poetics, calls the poet to create poetry “as though not the eye
but the ear was to be its measurer” (CPr 239, 246).2 As such projective verse was both a rejection
of formalist English language poetry and the foundation for a more visceral poetry than the
formalist tradition was capable of producing in Olson’s view.
“Projective Verse,” like much of Olson’s work, is enthusiastic, didactic, challenging, and
inspiring of a range of reactions. Part of the challenge of the essay is that it contains several
dichotomies. For example, Olson overtly acknowledges some of the sources inspiring the
The poem “These Days” (c. January 1950) in its entirety, italicized here (CP 106).
As noted in the Introduction (pg. 5 above) I am using the term ‘projective verse’ throughout this dissertation to
refer to Olson’s poetics generally. In the essay itself, however, Olson also uses the terms ‘open verse,’ ‘composition
by field,’ and ‘field composition’ interchangeably with ‘projective verse.’
1
2

72
principles he puts forth in the essay. Yet many other influences go unnamed to the point some
critics read the essay as disingenuously original. Then there is the sense that the new poetics Olson
is proffering is decidedly postmodernist. However, more than once in the essay he traces a lineage
for projective verse to the Modernists Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams. The dichotomy
which seems to trouble most readers in “Projective Verse” is twofold. On the one hand, Olson
defines projective verse as a poetry based on breath and sound. Yet on the other hand, Olson
carefully carves space for the role of the intellect and insists on the importance of the typewriter
for projective verse.
As the principal essay of Olson’s career, “Projective Verse” is the subject of numerous
critical analyses. Nevertheless no meditation on Olson would be complete without giving the
essay its due treatment. The task of the present chapter is to examine what Olson’s projective
verse is, what its core principles are, and to consider its sources and the influences on it. The next
chapter will focus mainly on the philosophy of ‘objectism’ which Olson develops in the essay, and
the oral poetics underlying projective verse.

3.2

The Principles of “Projective Verse”: Olson’s Manifesto
One inherent challenge in discussing “Projective Verse” is determining an accurate term

to describe the tenets Olson sets forth therein. At the beginning of part I of the essay, Olson
introduces three “simplicities that a man learns, if he works in OPEN” (CPr 239). However, the
items he then enumerates are anything but simple. This is a typical rhetorical maneuver from
Olson as “simplicities” takes on a double meaning. Here he is asserting both that what follows are
fundamental to projective verse, and that through regular practice of projective verse they will
become second nature to the poet. Adopting a different term directly from “Projective Verse,”
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critics Thomas Merrill and Enikő Bollobás use the term “dogmas” instead.3 Immediately after
explicating the three “simplicities,” all of which will be considered in detail momentarily, Olson
declares: “So there we are, fast, there’s the dogma” (CPr 240). I hesitate to borrow this latter term
from Olson for the same reason I avoid using “simplicities.” Olson’s use of ‘dogma’ is equally
rhetorical and, I would argue, an ironic rejection of Pound who affirmed three poetic “principles”
of his own in his essay “A Retrospect” (Pound 1968, 3). Therein, Pound makes it clear to readers
that they “consider the three propositions…not as dogma,” adding they should “never consider
anything as dogma” (ibid. 4).4 Hence, I prefer the term ‘principles,’ commonly used in Olson
criticism, in part because it avoids any of Olson’s rhetorical flourish. Technically, however, Olson
uses the term ‘principle’ only when describing the second of the three.
To be sure, Olson felt very strongly that his projective principles should be followed
closely, and that they could signal a new poetry. Just how regulatory these principles were meant
to be speaks to a larger, problematic tension in Olson’s didacticism. If projective verse is to be
“open,” unrestrained by the prescribed parameters of formalist verse, can its principles be anything
more than loose guidelines? Strict rules of composition would seem to run contrary to the idea of
an open poetry. The tone of the essay, however, is quite adamant.
At the outset of the essay, Olson uses three terms to define projective verse5:
(projectile

(percussive

(prospective

He marks each of these terms with an open parenthesis, none of which is reconciled by the closing
parenthesis readers may expect—a hallmark of his noted in the previous chapter. Thus, Olson

3

See Merrill 1982, Ch. 2, esp. 47-50; Bollobás 1992, Ch. 2, esp. 15-22.
By the time he was writing “Projective Verse,” Olson’s relationship with Pound had become contentious, and had
all but evaporated. For more on Olson’s relationship with Pound, see: Olson, 1975; Clark 2000, Chs. 9, 11; Maud
2008, Ch. 10.
5
This and all following citations until the next subsection are from CPr 239.
4

74
immediately establishes projective verse as the open poetry he professes it to be. This brand of
poetry is then directly contrasted to “The NON-Projective” or the “‘closed’ verse…which print
bred and which is pretty much what we have had in English & American, and have still got, despite
the work of Pound & Williams” (my italics).6 Olson goes on to say in the next paragraph that
closed verse “persists, at this latter day, as what you might call the private-soul-at-any-publicwall.”7 He then proposes this important caveat if projective verse is to succeed in overturning
closed verse:
“Verse now, 1950, if it is to go ahead, if it is to be of essential use, must, I
take it, catch up and put into itself certain laws and possibilities of the
breath, of the breathing of the man who writes as well as of his listenings”
(italics in original).
Up to this point, just three paragraphs into the essay, Olson has: offered a cryptic definition
of projective verse; established an antagonism between it and its professed rival, closed verse;
established an ambiguous lineage between projective verse and the poetics of Pound and Williams;
dismissed the lyric tradition (the target of his “private-soul-at-any-public-wall” comment); and
proclaimed projective verse must necessarily be a physiological poetry based in the poet’s breath
and audial perception if it is to push poetry past the limitations of closed verse. It would be an
understatement to say, colloquially, that Olson comes out swinging—an apt description
considering that as a teacher he would sometimes flick his nose with his thumbs and gesture like
a boxer limbering up for a fight in front of his classes. There is certainly an aggressive, even
contentious tone to Olson’s language from the beginning of the essay. Projectiles, indeed!

This and the following citation are taken from the first two paragraphs of “Projective Verse,” which appear entirely
in italics in the published version. I have put them in regular font here to allow for my own emphasis. Generally,
however, I cite Olson’s work exactly as it appears in published form, including punctuation, misspellings,
capitalization, and other typography (e.g., italics, underlines), unless otherwise noted.
7
I will use the term ‘closed verse’ throughout the chapter but note that in the essay Olson also uses the terms ‘nonprojective’ and ‘closed form’ synonymously with it. Olson credits an anonymous “French critic” as the source of
the term “closed” (CPr 239). I have not come across any scholarship which uncovers that source.
6
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Following this opening salvo, in effect a preamble to the essay, Olson tells us he has two
objectives in the remainder of the essay: 1) to demonstrate what projective verse actually is; and
2) to “suggest a few ideas about what stance toward reality brings such verse into being.” Toward
the first objective, Olson explicitly states his intention to “show what projective or OPEN verse is,
what it involves, in its act of composition, how…it is accomplished.” This, however, turns out to
be somewhat misleading as he includes very few lines of poetry, whether projective or closed
verse, in the essay.

Thus “Projective Verse” becomes more expository than illustrative.

Ultimately, Olson’s explanation of the open poetry he is envisioning revolves around three core
principles. Olson’s second objective is to explain a technical term in his vocabulary, ‘stance.’
This term is most effectively explained in conjunction with the philosophy of ‘objectism’ which
Olson presents in part II of the essay. We will return to these two concepts in the next chapter.
Before examining the three principles Olson enumerates I want to offer one further
terminological clarification. Olson uses the terms ‘form’ and ‘content’ frequently in the essay.
The terms work hand in hand, both explicitly and implicitly. Though Olson himself does not
define what he means by these terms, they take on some specificity in the context of his poetics.
‘Content’ in Olson’s vocabulary is mainly the language of a poem. By language here I mean the
words constituting a poem, but also crucially, if not more importantly, the sounds of the words.
The content of a poem would also seem to include the poem’s topical or subject matter (e.g., a
biographical anecdote, a historical event, a scientific discovery), and the tone of the poem (e.g.,
informational, nostalgic, speculative). First and foremost, however, the content of a poem for
Olson is the very language of which the poem is composed. ‘Form,’ in the lexicon of projective
verse as I understand it, means the spatial and visual layout of the words on the page. Thus, the
way a poem actually appears as text, its font notwithstanding, constitutes its form. We will revisit
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the form of a projective poem when we discuss Olson’s second principle below, but I will add here
that we can, I believe, fairly include the length of a poem in the concept of its form. Hence at 635
pages full of topical, tonal, and syntactical shifts, the complete edition of Maximus (1983) becomes
the quintessential manifestation of Olson’s projective verse, or open form. We will now turn our
attention to the three principles of projective verse with which Olson begins part I of the essay.

3.2.1 “the kinetics of the thing”8
How exactly does a poet practice projective verse? Olson begins his explanation by
asserting that “[a] poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it (he will have some several
causations), by way of the poem itself to, all the way over to, the reader.” It follows for Olson that
“the poem itself must, at all points, be a high energy-construct and, at all points, an energydischarge.” This establishes the poem as a ‘projectile,’ something thrust outward from the poet to
the reader or, I would argue, from a speaker to the listening audience. Olson then asks the crucial
question: how is this poetic transference of energy to be achieved? How does the poet maintain
“energy at least the equivalent of the energy which propelled him in the first place, yet an energy
which is peculiar to verse alone and which will be, obviously, also different from the energy which
the reader, because he is a third term, will take away?” (my italics). Olson’s question, perhaps
inadvertently, suggests an ontology of the poem in which the energy causations of the poem are
primary; the poet as a sort of conduit for the transference of this energy is secondary, yet is
apparently capable of maintaining an energy equivalent to the causations; and the audience is
tertiary, ultimately receiving the energy now diminished to an unspecified degree.

8

The titles of the following three subsections appear here as in the original. All Olson citations in these three
subsections, including their titles, are from CPr 240 unless otherwise noted.
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Olson acknowledges that how a poet achieves the projective poetic act is problematic,
chiefly because it involves “a whole series of new recognitions” by the formerly closed verse poet
“ventur[ing] into FIELD COMPOSITION” for the first time. The initial solution offered by Olson
is that budding projective poets must have a thorough commitment to this poetics. Once the poet
“puts himself in the open,” that is once the projective method is adopted, the poet, Olson tells us,
“can go by no track other than the one the poem under hand declares, for itself. Thus he has to
behave, and be, instant by instant, aware of some several forces just now beginning to be
examined.” This latter claim about awareness is layered in meaning. In one sense, Olson is telling
poets that they must attend to the energy causations of the poem at hand and to be aware of, and
follow, new causations arising at each instant of poetic composition. This will help determine the
content, including topical and tonal shifts, and form of the poem. This awareness of forces is also
an allusion to scientific discoveries of his time, in which Olson had a keen interest. He felt strongly
that poets should be familiar with current research in social and hard sciences, and that they should
incorporate that knowledge into their poetry, if only implicitly.
Peter Middleton examines this conviction in his essay “Discoverable unknowns: Olson’s
lifelong preoccupation with the sciences.” Middleton attributes Olson’s description of a poem as
a “high energy-construct” to his interest in the life of J. Robert Oppenheimer, one time head of the
Manhattan Project’s secret weapons laboratory, among other eminent scientists.

“[S]uch

physicists as Oppenheimer,” Middleton asserts:
“understood what was entailed in the creation of a ‘high-energy construct’
[sic], whether a bomb that released the enormous energies governed by the
equation E=MC2, or a theoretical model that explained how those energies
were squeezed into the atom. High-energy constructs were research tools,
and by inviting poets to create them Olson was saying that he thought poets
too could be researchers.” (38)
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Middleton offers substantial evidence of how ubiquitous science was in mid-twentieth century
America, especially in the form of public conversations and information regarding the nuclear
threat. Though he makes clear “[n]o one was proposing a physics of poetry,” poets found
themselves in a situation in which they had to engage with scientific discovery if their own art was
to compete for cultural importance (41). Middleton argues that “a poet who wanted to claim
truthfulness, make a contribution to knowledge, and find some cultural authority for poetry, had
to reckon with...what constituted knowledge and the means to produce it” (ibid.). Olson’s
commanding of projective poets to be aware of progress being made in the sciences was in part an
effort to progress poetry itself. As Middleton interprets Olson’s mandate: “Poets, at least those
who are not ignorant of science, can help make discoveries about the inner universe as significant
as those of the scientists who study the outer one” (38).9
Olson himself makes this point in “Human Universe” (1951), in effect a companion essay
to “Projective Verse,” when at the beginning he declares: “There are laws, that is to say, the human
universe is as discoverable as that other. And as definable” (CPr 155). The “other” universe Olson
is referring to is that which is external to humans, i.e., the physical world as it presents itself as an
object of our inquiry, scientific or otherwise. The human universe, then, is the internal perceptualpsychological universe of human beings, our internal mechanisms of “sensation,” as they interact
with and define the external world of objects (ibid.). We will return to this latter essay in the next
chapter, but I note here that Olson is proposing that the human universe is both a) itself a valid
object of scientific investigation, and b) that the objects of the external world which we investigate
are not ontologically different from our representation of them.

9

For a concise demonstration of how scientific discovery influenced twentieth-century American poetry more
broadly, see Middleton 2005. For more on the effect of the Cold War on American poetry, see Middleton 2015.
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William Carlos Williams was also a major influence on Olson’s interest in both “the new
physics” and the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Williams 282). In a 1948 talk given at
the University of Washington, later published as “The Poem as a Field of Action,” Williams asks:
“How can we accept Einstein’s theory of relativity, affecting our very
conception of the heavens about us of which poets write so much, without
incorporating its essential fact—the relativity of measurement—into our
own category of activity: the poem[?]” (283)
It is unclear how familiar Olson was with Williams’ talk, if at all, by the time he wrote “Projective
Verse,” but it seems unlikely that he was familiar with it as the essay version of the talk was not
published until 1954.10 The following is, however, certain: that Olson had met Whitehead while a
Ph.D. candidate at Harvard (von Hallberg 1978, 83); that Williams had been reading Whitehead
for years by the time he gave the talk; and that Olson had a relationship with Williams by the time
he was writing his manifesto, admired Williams’ work, and read it carefully. 11 In discussing the
influence both Pound and Williams were having on Olson by the late 1940s, Ralph Maud asserts
that “Olson’s loyalty to Williams was unwavering and…he probably read everything [of
Williams’] as it came out” (Maud 1996, 68). Thus, whether or not Olson had read “The Poem as
a Field of Action,” he would have been absorbing Williams’ terminology, poetics, and likely his
interest in scientific discovery and insistence that poetry should be informed by it from Williams’
other publications, their personal correspondence, or through conversations with other poets,

10

This raises for me something of a quandary in Olson scholarship. Christensen 1979, Bollobás 1992, and Belgrad
1998 all discuss Olson having initially learned Whitehead’s philosophy through Williams, making specific mention
of William’s “The Poem as a Field of Action.” Belgrad even claims that Williams cites Whitehead in the essay
(122). However, Whitehead is neither cited nor named in the published version of “The Poem as a Field of Action.”
I have not been able to find any evidence that the published version was different from Williams’ talk, but it is
possible. Nevertheless, Belgrad specifically references the essay. (See Christensen 1979, Ch. 3, esp. 72-75;
Bollobás 1992, Ch. 2, esp. 16-17; and Belgrad 1998, Ch. 5, esp. 122-125.)
11
For a discussion of Williams reading Whitehead, see Weaver 1971. Both von Hallberg 1978 and Christensen
1979 cite Weaver: von Hallberg in his discussion of the objectivist philosophy shared by Olson and Objectivist poets
Williams and Louis Zukofsky (cf. von Hallberg 1978, 82-83); Christensen in his discussion of Williams’ influence
on Olson, in particular as relates to Whitehead (cf. Christensen 1979, 73-74).
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including with Pound. It seems clear that Williams’ vocabulary at least (e.g., ‘activity,’ ‘field’)
imbues Olson’s first principle, and his projective verse more generally. If at this stage of his career
Olson had yet to read Whitehead for himself, doing so would only strengthen his conviction in his
own poetics. Shahar Bram makes this point in his insightful monograph, Charles Olson and Alfred
North Whitehead: An Essay on Poetry. In analyzing the principles of projective verse, Bram
asserts that Olson’s insistence on incorporating into his poetry “the implications of science and
metaphysics as he understands them,” as well as his belief in the poem as a field of energy, was
“intensified” by his eventual reading of Whitehead (23). How much of Whitehead’s philosophy
made its way into “Projective Verse” via Williams is, for me, much less certain than Williams’
own influence on the essay.12
Of course, Williams was not the only influence on this first principle. Merrill attributes
Olson’s notion of poetry as an energy-construct to Pound’s poetics as much as Williams’. Before
Merrill, both Marjorie Perloff and Sherman Paul had credited Pound for Olson’s use of the term
energy-construct. 13 Pound’s conception of poetry as an expression of a certain energy can be
traced back to two publications from 1914. In the inaugural (and penultimate) edition of the
Vorticist magazine BLAST, Pound defines “the vortex” as the initial presentation of a concept or
an emotion to the “vivid consciousness” of the artist, calling it “the point of maximum energy”
(Pound 1970, 81).14 Where poetry is concerned, the “primary form” of this presentation is “the
image” (ibid.). Pound then elaborated on these ideas in his essay “Vorticism,”15 describing it as
an “intensive art” which included not only associated paintings and sculptures but also
For a discussion of the relation between projective verse, the Objectivist school, Williams, and Whitehead’s
philosophy, see von Hallberg 1973 and 1978, Ch. 3. The latter reprints parts of the earlier publication.
13
Cf. Merrill 1982, 48; Perloff 1973, 289; and Paul 1978, 41.
14
Originally published on 2 July 1914, though dated 20 June 1914. Pound citations in this paragraph are from the
New Directions edition (1970) of his 1916 memoir of the French sculptor and artist Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, in
which he cites some of his statement in BLAST before reprinting “Vorticism” in its entirety.
15
Originally published in The Fortnightly Review, September 1914.
12
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“‘Imagisme’ in verse” (ibid. 90, 82). In imagist poetry, Pound tells us, “[t]he image is not an idea.
It is a radiant node or cluster…a VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, ideas
are constantly rushing” (ibid. 92). We can see traces of this in Olson’s notion of the poet as a
nexus into/through/from which certain causal energies flow toward expression in a poem.
One of Pound’s own intellectual influences would also contribute to the language of
Olson’s first principle. Merrill reads Olson’s notion of poetry as energy transferred from poet to
audience as Ernest Fenollosa’s “concept of the sentence as a ‘transference of power’ applied to
verse” (48). Paul demonstrates this by mapping a correspondence between “Fenollosa’s account
of the sentence as a ‘flash of lightning,’ as necessarily following the syntax of process, the natural
order of cause and effect” and Olson’s “valuable appropriations” of it in “Projective Verse” (41).
According to Paul, Fenollosa’s progression
term from which or agent > transference of force or act > term to which or object
becomes in Olson
poet > poem > reader
(ibid.). If we follow Paul’s logic of mapping both onto a subject > verb > object syntax, then the
poem is, in his reading of Olson, a verb. I believe this to be correct, however, I disagree with Paul
on the following two points. First, the poet in projective verse should bear little resemblance to
the traditional lyrical subject of closed verse. Remember that projective poets are to transfer
energy to their audience, as opposed to generating a poem from their own creative faculties—at
least based on what we have seen in this first principle. Because Olson himself makes the poet the
intermediary between the causal energies inspiring the poem and those eventually reaching the
audience, ‘poet’ should be the middle term if we follow Paul’s (via Fenollosa’s) syntax. As Olson
implies in his initial explanation of the first principle, the poem is the entire process, which
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foreshadows the third principle. Thus, I think a more accurate visual depiction of Olson’s syntax,
regardless of this first principle’s debt to Fenollosa, would be
the poem
causal energies

>

poet

>

audience

Before moving on to Olson’s second principle, I want to return briefly to Olson’s
suggestion that the poet must “accomplish…an energy which is peculiar to verse alone.” On the
one hand, we could interpret this as Olson saying that every art form is unique, and as such poets
interact with causal energies, implement a method of composition, and create an output which is
specific to their own art form. On the other hand, we could interpret this as Olson saying that these
causal energies, method of composition, and output are unique to poetry full stop. If this latter
possibility is the case, then this is Olson being myopic—a not uncommon state for him. That is,
this would be Olson failing to recognize other artistic genres already working in a similar
compositional milieu, namely abstract expressionist painting and jazz.16 Abstract expressionism,
in particular, was something Olson had direct contact with by the time he wrote “Projective Verse”
as Black Mountain had a strong tradition of abstract expressionists since before his arrival and
eventual leadership. To be fair, his interaction with the abstract expressionists at the college,
namely Robert Motherwell, who like Williams fed Olson’s interest in Whitehead, had yet to reach
full flower. Olson likely would also have been exposed to improvisational jazz recordings by 1950
considering the time he had spent with other writers and artists in both New York and at Black
Mountain by this time. The little, mostly anecdotal evidence for this latter point does not indicate
how much of a direct influence jazz would have been on “Projective Verse.” I suspect it would
have been marginal at best. Olson’s regular exposure to, and education in, bebop jazz would come

16

For an analysis of how these different art forms intersect in mid-twentieth century America see Belgrad 1998.
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later, following Robert Creeley’s arrival at Black Mountain in 1954. Ultimately, even after
Creeley’s tutelage of Olson in the music of Charlie Parker, for example, I would argue that Olson
was never a fan of jazz.17 Nonetheless, Olson should have seen or heard in these other artistic
genres of the mid-twentieth century the very kinetic composition he was urging his fellow poets
to practice. If indeed Olson’s claim is of this myopic variety, as I believe it is, what then is this
“energy which is peculiar to verse alone”? It lies, as I will argue in the next chapter, in the oralaudial nature of projective verse as Olson envisions it.

3.2.2 “the principle…FORM IS NEVER MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF CONTENT”
The second principle of projective verse, the only one which Olson explicitly calls a
“principle,” is an inversion of the compositional methodology of closed verse poetics. Recall that
on Olson’s view, closed verse employs an “inherited line, stanza, over-all form” (CPr 239). This
inheritance provides a “base” from which a poet fits poetic content to a prescribed meter and rhyme
scheme (ibid.). Recall also that ‘content’ in Olson’s vocabulary is mainly the language of a poem,
which here refers to the sounds of the words constituting a poem as much as, if not more than, the
words themselves. As we defined the term above, the content of the poem also includes a poem’s
topical or subject matter, and its tone. First and foremost, however, the content of a poem for
Olson is the very language of which the poem is composed. And to reiterate, in the lexicon of
projective verse ‘form’ means the spatial layout of a poem on the page where the text of the poem
is concerned, and could include the poem’s length.
In closed verse, insofar as I interpret Olson’s dismissal of it, form is primary, content
secondary. An unfortunate consequence of producing poetry to fit a form, in my opinion—as well

17

For an insightful discussion of Olson and jazz poetics, see Lempert 2015, esp. 315ff.
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as in Olson’s opinion and that of many of his Modernist precursors and his contemporaries—is
that closed verse poetry can sound stilted. To combat poetry that he thinks sounds, and reads as,
stale and anemic, Olson’s “Projective Verse” inverts the formulaic approach to composing closed
verse. Olson is declaring that poetic content should be primary, form secondary. That is, form
should follow from the content rather than determining it. To connect the first two principles, we
might say that some indeterminate (in number, if not kind) causal energies inspire a poet toward
composing a poem with certain content; the content then drives the form of the poem. By a
transitive relation, we might then say that the causal energies which inspire the projective poem
determine its form.18 Though secondary in projective verse, form is by no means irrelevant. It is
equally as vital as the content, serving at least two purposes for the text of a projective poem. First,
form extends the content of a projective poem by acting as the vehicle by which the poem can
reach the reader as text. In this sense, form extends the poem to the reader. For this transference
to the reader to be successful, the form of a projective poem must also act as a visual representation
of the sound of the poem. In this second sense, form is an extension of the more fundamental
sound content. It is determined by the content, then itself helps direct its own reading, including
rhythms and breath patterns, to produce a more accurate vocalization of the projective poem. The
form thus acts as a kind of scoring for the reader, a notion which will be revisited in the next
chapter.
Referring to this second principle also as a “law,” Olson gives it the weight of a necessary
condition for the production of projective verse.

As he puts it, this principle “presides

conspicuously over such composition, and, when obeyed, is the reason why a projective poem can
come into being.” Here again we see in the principles of projective verse more than just guidelines

I think this follows from the logic of Olson’s principles. However, I want to make clear that Olson never makes
this argument.
18
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for composition. There is an ontology of the poem being developed, one aspect of which Olson
readily declares in this instance. That is, adherence to this second principle is necessary for a
projective poem to exist as such.
After admitting in a long parenthetical sentence, with several clauses, that he has borrowed
this principle from Creeley, Olson adds “this possible corollary, that right form, in any given poem,
is the only and exclusively possible extension of content under hand.” This echoes his claim in
the first principle that once poets adopt the projective method they “can go by no track other than
the one the poem under hand declares, for itself.” If Olson’s first principle suggests that the causal
energies of a poem will guide the poet toward manifesting the content of the poem being
composed, then this comment in the second adds an important layer to this. However the poem
ends up sounding and looking, Olson is now telling us, it is necessarily the correct form (again, I
would argue, including its length). Hence once composition is completed, the projective poem
demonstrates the only possible form its content, as inspired by the initial causal energies, could
have finally occupied.
Interpreting Olson in this way, and again by the transitive relation, we have a one-to-one
correspondence between a poem’s causal energies and the final form of a poem whereby each
poem comes into being precisely the way it was meant to sound and look. If Olson wants to assert
that poems are sui generis, this is hardly problematic—for either projective verse or earlier poetic
traditions. Of course, the closed verse of certain earlier traditions will more frequently resemble
one another in form, including rhyme scheme. Practically speaking, however, this interpretation
does not align with Olson’s meticulous, often obsessive editing practices. We will address those
practices and the typewriter’s role in projective verse later when we examine how sound, breath
patterns, and typography ultimately render a projective poem into text. In the meantime, I want to
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place this second principle of projective verse in context with a larger tradition of English language
poetry.
The innovation that for poetry to be its most vital form should emerge from content, rather
than determine it, was not Olson’s or Creeley’s.

The idea can be traced back to British

Romanticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in particular the poetics of
Samuel Taylor Coleridge. In his lecture “Shakspeare [sic], A Poet Generally,” which extols
Shakespeare’s merits as a poet and the virtues of his unique genius, Coleridge makes the distinction
between mechanic and organic form. According to Coleridge:
“The form is mechanic, when on any given material we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the
material;—as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish
it to retain when hardened. The organic form, on the other hand, is innate;
it shapes, as it develops itself from within, and the fulness [sic] of its
development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form.”
(46-47)
Coleridge does not explicitly make the claim that form is determined by content here. In fact,
according to this statement at least, it seems that form is itself generative, and not ontologically
secondary as Olson’s principle implies. However, Coleridge and Olson align in that both their
poetics assert that the final result of composition is always as it should be. As we have seen, for
Olson once the causal energies have exhausted, the projective poet is left with a poem necessarily
in the “right form.” For Coleridge, a poet some would consider Olson’s Romantic predecessor in
the lineage of organic form poetics, the “outward form” of a poem always manifests a perfect
embodiment of its process of development.
Several critics have examined the affinity between Romantic poetics and Olson’s
projective verse. In The New Poetries, Donald Wesling frames his structuralist-formalist analysis
of modern verse prosody by drawing its fundamental poetic lineage back to Romantic innovations
in organic form. Wesling asserts that the organicist approach to form, or what Coleridge called
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“form as proceeding,” emerges with Coleridge and William Wordsworth in 1795 (13), more than
fifteen years prior to Coleridge’s aforementioned Shakespeare lectures. Wesling argues that from
then on, “form as proceeding is the manner of writing all poets will have to contend with” (31).
He even equates Olson with Wordsworth—a seemingly unlikely pair—claiming that the
“Wordsworthian association of ideas in a state of excitement is still the way of Charles Olson”
(59-60). He then cites as proof part of Olson’s explanation for his third principle, which we will
examine next. For Wesling, in the organicist aesthetic, which both Wordsworth and Olson exhibit,
“the poetic means are considered as parts rather than rules, with each unit at once end and means,
position and trajectory” (60). Unfortunately, Wesling does not explain what these units are
exactly, but I do not completely disagree with his conclusion that means and end coincide in
projective verse. I would add, however, that the authority in Olson’s expression of his principles
would suggest they are to be taken as rules.
Charles Altieri has also examined Olson’s projective verse as an extension of Romantic
poetics in several of his works. In his essay “Olson’s Poetics and the Tradition,” Altieri begins
with the premises that Olson’s poetics is unique and exhibits “the internal coherence of his
thought”; yet that coherence, he claims, is dependent on “Romantic organicist models of poetic
experience” (173). As with Wesling, Altieri claims Olson and Wordsworth have a similar starting
point, “linking the creative imagination with direct perception” (ibid.). I disagree slightly with this
latter point of Altieri’s. I do not read Olson as being concerned with the creative imagination of
the poet per se, for reasons I will clarify momentarily. Of course, upon further examination readers
may disagree more generally with Wesling’s and Altieri’s theories of Romantic organicist poetics,
regardless of how they feel about a potential lineage from organic form to projective verse.
Nevertheless, Olson’s desire to define a poetics which communicates a more direct perception of
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the world, which Altieri explores eloquently in several places, and which was a major concern for
the Romantics, is clear.19
What role then, if any, does the imagination of the poet play in Olson’s poetics? There
seems to be two schools of thought here. On the one hand, there are critics like Altieri who read
Olson as being deeply concerned with the imagination. Also in this camp is Miriam Nichols. In
her essay “Myth and document in Charles Olson’s Maximus Poems,” Nichols asserts that “Olson
emphasises creative imagination over critical detachment” (35). While I do not necessarily
disagree with many of the conclusions these critics reach on Olson’s poetics and poetry, I do
disagree with the premise that the imagination is of primary concern to him. My position here is
based mainly on the fact that the term ‘imagination’ rarely comes up in Olson’s work. If and where
it does, it does not resonate, with me at least, in a way that suggests it is crucial to the conversation.
Neither is my position unique among Olson critics. In her Heideggerian reading of Olson’s
poetics, The Topology of Being, Judith Halden-Sullivan corroborates my position. According to
Halden-Sullivan, part of Olson’s attempt to undercut the lyrical ego’s role in poetry is his refusal
to “use the term ‘imagination’” (18). This speaks directly to my concern with the importance some
critics assign to the imagination in Olson’s poetics. If the creative act of composing a projective
poem is grounded in the imagination, does this reduce the poem to a subjective enterprise of the
poet?
Of course, how we define ‘imagination,’ and certainly the aforementioned Romantics and
their peers had varied definitions, will affect our answer to this question. Leaving further
discussion of the imagination in, and Olson’s relation to, Romanticism to more capable hands, I

For more of Altieri’s examination of how Olson’s poetics is both dependent on and exceeds Romantic organicist
poetics, see his “From Symbolist Thought to Immanence: The Ground of Postmodern American Poetics” (1973a)
and Enlarging the Temple (1979).
19
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offer these final three thoughts on the topic. First, Olson’s dismissal of the lyrical ego in
“Projective Verse,” and his general aversion to individualism and theories of subjectivity that poets
may have leaned on both historically and during his lifetime, clearly indicate that projective verse
is meant to be something other than a series of aesthetic decisions made by a poet. For me, this
implies a rejection on Olson’s part of the imagination as a mechanism which gives an individual
poet the capacity for (artistic) creativity. Second, Olson’s aversion to subject-object and mindbody dualisms, a topic of further consideration in the next chapter, implies a rejection of the
imagination as a mechanism for filtering the external world into a subjective experience. In fact,
as we shall see when discussing his philosophy of ‘objectism,’ Olson thinks that humans are as
much an object of the physical world as any external, inanimate object is. In this way, Olson puts
subjectivity and objectivity, mind and body, on the same plane with no ontological gulf between
the two.20 Lastly, and most definitively for this discussion, the term ‘imagination’ never appears
in “Projective Verse.”
Nevertheless, the poet is, ultimately, responsible for the composition of the poem. This
brings to the fore a larger problematic in projective verse: what is the role of the poet’s intellect?
Setting this issue aside for the time being, I will reiterate the main thrust of Olson’s second
principle: a poem’s form is to be determined by its content. How then does the projective poet
facilitate the initial causal energies of a poem toward its right form? The third principle of
projective verse offers an answer to that question.

My renditions of the poetic imagination, and Olson’s rejections of them, are not intended to stand in as definitions
of the imagination in Romanticism in general, nor any Romantic poet in particular.
20
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3.2.3 “the process of the thing”
Olson’s third principle refers to the composition process itself, the very act of producing a
projective poem. Incorporating both of the first two principles, Olson claims this process is
ultimately “how the principle can be made so to shape the energies that the form is accomplished.”
It is necessary to interpret Olson’s language here precisely in the context of “Projective Verse.”
By “the principle” Olson means specifically the second principle (as I am referring to them), “form
is never more than an extension of content”—the only one Olson specifically labels as such.
“[T]he energies,” of course, refers back to the first principle which asserts that a poem is the
transference of causal energies, which inspire the act of creating the poem, through the poet to the
audience (readers or listeners). Thus, Olson’s third principle of projective verse asserts that the
process of creating a projective poem is how the causal energies from which a poem’s content is
borne ultimately achieve the “right form” through application of the second principle to those
causal energies. To put it more succinctly, hopefully, the third principle of projective verse is the
compositional process by which the second principle shapes the first principle into the necessary
outcome of the second principle.
Without wanting to excuse what may simply be an ineloquent explanation on my part, I
find Olson’s syntax here frustratingly circular. The reality is that Olson’s projective style often
leads him into these quandaries of circular syntax. As such, we may read “Projective Verse” as a
performative piece, one which, to borrow from Ann Charter’s analysis of Ishmael, enacts the very
poetics Olson is setting out to describe in the essay. 21 As projective verse prioritizes the process
of creation over the refinement of the final product, though to be sure we will revisit this idea with
some counterpoints below, some of the causal energies of Olson’s manifesto will inevitably lead

21

See p. 33 above.
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him into such circularity, or worse, lack of clarity. For many readers, myself included, the energy
of the piece never diminishes throughout. This energy coupled with the essay’s occasional lack of
clarity further demonstrate that the roots of projective verse can be seen in Ishmael, where Olson
eschewed a more standard demonstration of his argument, instead expressing his ideas in waves
of thought with little to no supporting evidence. Nonetheless, the logic and semantics of Olson’s
initial explanation of the third principle are not corrupted by his seemingly circular syntax.
The question still remains, however: how exactly does a poet accomplish the feat of
producing a projective poem? Olson credits his friend, American writer Edward Dahlberg, with
insisting on the following dictum, which effectively becomes the third principle proper: “ONE
PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A FURTHER
PERCEPTION.” Olson explains that this
“is a matter of, at all points (even, I should say, of our management of daily
reality as of the daily work) get on with it, keep moving, keep in, speed, the
nerves, their speed, the perceptions, theirs, the acts, the split second acts,
the whole business, keep it moving as fast as you can.” (italics in original)
Olson then reiterates Dahlberg’s dictum, adding this imperative for would-be projective poets:
“USE USE USE the process at all points, in any given poem always, always one perception must
must must MOVE, INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER!”
Dahlberg’s influence on Olson’s poetics was significant. The two men shared a turbulent
friendship which included several sabbaticals. Their relationship was in many ways like that of a
master and an apprentice. To Olson, the elder Dahlberg was a literary sage, a powerful and unique
voice among American writers. Olson sent his writing to Dahlberg for feedback, desperately
hoping for Dahlberg’s approval. Dahlberg did not hold anything back from his assessments, which
could easily disturb the sensitive Olson. John Cech analyzes their relationship and mutual
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influence on one another in his Charles Olson and Edward Dahlberg: A Portrait of a Friendship.
In regard to Dahlberg’s influence on projective verse, Cech writes:
“Dahlberg had been instrumental in helping Olson to define the process by
which the projective poet should work; and Olson took Dahlberg’s advice
and constant proddings about the need to avoid delay and propel himself
quickly, deeply, and personally into the work at hand—transforming these
personal experiences into one of the general rules of Projective Verse [sic]
composition.” (111)22
To reduce the third principle to Dahlberg’s influence alone, however, would be overstating the
case. Though much of the third principle’s language came from Dahlberg, Olson’s insistence on
composition as a continuous process also grew from his interest in non-Euclidean geometries, and
that of Bernhard Riemann in particular.
It was Corrado Cagli who initially exposed Olson to these theories. After returning from
his service in World War II, Cagli shared with Olson ideas he had read in Roberto Bonola’s La
Geometria non-Euclidea, which contains passages from Riemann (Maud 1996, 71; 2008, 93).
Olson would eventually read an English translation of Bonola for himself. As we saw in the
previous chapter, Olson’s concept of space evolved into the projective space Charters ascribes to
Ishmael the more familiar he became with non-Euclidean geometries.23 Riemann, as Olson was
aware, posits spatiality as a multiplicity, or manifoldness. Further, there are two kinds of
multiplicities: ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous.’ Sarah Posman describes the difference between the two
in her essay analyzing Olson’s poem “‘To Gerhardt, There, Among Europe’s Things….”
According to Posman, ‘discrete’ multiplicities are “determined by the number of their elements,
and continuous multiplicities, determined by the phenomena unfolding in them or the forces acting

Cech then cites Olson’s third principle in full.
It was the English translation of Bonola’s book which provided Olson with the quotation of Riemann he included
in a letter to Pound written 15 December 1946 (Maud 1996, 71). See also p. 1.9n9 above. For Charters’ reading of
Olson’s concept of space, see pp. 1.5-6, 1.9-10 above.
22
23
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in them” (229). It is the concept of a continuous multiplicity which Olson incorporates into his
own concept of space, and which seems to be partly responsible for the third principle of projective
verse.
In Olson’s 1958 essay, “Equal, That Is, To the Real Itself,” which contributes significantly
to Charters’ reading of his concept of space, he credits Riemann with “defin[ing] the real as men
since have exploited it: he distinguished two kinds of manifold, the discrete (which would be the
old system, and it includes discourse, language as it had been since Socrates) and, what he took to
be more true, the continuous” (CPr 120). As I have been reluctant to apply later Olson works to
his developing poetics of the mid-1940s to early 1950s, I am not arguing here that Olson’s
statement in 1958 explains his thinking in 1950. I do, however, think that we can reasonably see
in “Projective Verse,” and in its third principle in particular, the roots of what Olson has to say
regarding Riemann in 1958. To be sure, we saw Olson’s dismissal of the ancient Greek system of
discourse already in Ishmael. And although Olson does not explicitly engage with Riemann’s
theory of multiplicity in “Projective Verse,” his dismissal of closed verse therein strongly implies
that he believes projective verse is a “more true” method of poetic composition—one designed to
express a continuous projection of the poet’s thought to the audience.
I would also argue that Olson would have had an affinity for Riemann’s own
interdisciplinarity. In the previous chapter, we saw that Olson’s education was interdisciplinary,
especially during his time as a PhD student at Harvard. Perhaps Riemann, to some degree, would
have reinforced this approach for Olson.

Riemann exhibited an interdisciplinary approach

throughout his work as manifested in, for example, the concept of ‘manifold.’ Arkady Plotnitsky
explains this concept was “developed by bringing together algebra, analysis, and geometry, and
thus by means of a multiple or manifold – heterogeneous yet interactive – theoretical practice”
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(192, italics in original). Undoubtedly, Riemann’s “capacity of combining different fields in
approaching problems apparently belonging to a single field” would have resonated with Olson
(ibid. 191).24
Olson’s emphasis on poets’ ability to express in poetry the instantaneous, fluid shifts in
their perception harkens back also to the first principle’s insistence that a poem be a “high energyconstruct.” Here again we can draw a lineage from Olson’s projective verse back to Pound’s
vorticist poetics. But for all of Olson’s encouraging of poets to attend to the “speed” of the “split
second acts” of their perception, and to keep the very process of producing a poem “moving as
fast as [they] can” by attending to these perceptions, Olson is by no means mandating that poets
write inchoate poems that lack cohesiveness. Nor is he encouraging poets to only produce poems
about their immediate sensory perceptions. Maximus is evidence of this latter point as many of its
poems include, or are primarily meditations on, certain moments from Olson’s biography or the
history of Gloucester.
Reserving examination of Olson’s poetry for later chapters, I want to point out two
common misconceptions of “Projective Verse,” and this third principle in particular. The first
pertains again to the influence of Whitehead’s process philosophy on the essay. To reiterate some
of the discussion of the first principle, Olson’s familiarity with Whitehead during this stage of his
career would have been minimal and indirect at best. Yet despite the fact that Olson did not read
Whitehead’s Process and Reality until the spring of 1955 (von Hallberg 1978, 83; Maud 1996,
102), critics read the latter’s process philosophy into Olson’s description of the process that is

See Plotnitsky 2009, in Graham and Roffe (eds.), Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage. Plotnitsky’s chapter
examines Riemann’s influence on Deleuze’s philosophy. Posman, in her essay in Contemporary Olson (ed., Herd
2015) cited above, references Deleuze’s argument for the Riemannian influence on Henri Bergson’s philosophy of
duration when discussing Olson’s understanding of vitalism. I have cited both Plotnitsky and Posman elsewhere in
demonstrating the intersection of Deleuze’s philosophy and Olson’s poetics, including some influential sources they
share (e.g., Riemann and Whitehead).
24
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projective composition. Bollobás even attributes such a reading to Merrill, whom she claims
“points out” that the third principle “is the poetical application of the ontological truth Olson
learned from Riemann and Whitehead” (19). However, Merrill in fact only mentions Riemann’s
influence on Olson when he provides this effective assessment: “If reality, as Riemann and Olson
both believed, is a continuous rather than a discrete manifold, the expression of that reality
accordingly should be continuous and not discrete. Thus the [third principle] proposes a poetic
process consonant with the natural process of the universe” (49). I would add that, as noted above,
Olson’s belief in reality as a continuous manifold came from his reading of Riemann. Olson may
very well have had a similar intuition before Cagli introduced him to non-Euclidean geometry. If
he did have such an intuition, this would not be unprecedented for Olson, but I can only speculate
here.25
The second critical misconception I want to dispel pertains to the description of projective
poetics as improvisational, based largely it seems on the ideas Olson puts forth in the first and third
principles. Daniel Belgrad, for example, takes this position in his The Culture of Spontaneity, an
examination of the improvisational techniques of various artistic genres in post-World War II
America. Belgrad draws an affinity between Olson and Williams, pitting them against both the
“academicism” of T.S. Eliot in particular, and the ad men propagating a mass culture (31). Against
the cultural trends of Eliot and his disciples on the one hand, and Madison Avenue on the other,
Belgrad argues, Williams and Olson were an “oppositional voice” whose “strategy was
voluminous production, which the embrace of a spontaneous or improvisational style made
possible” (ibid.). Belgrad reads “Projective Verse” as Olson’s insistence
“on the poet’s need to trust the unconscious leanings of the mind and ear in
collaboration, letting the syllables flow automatically and accepting an
In the previous chapter I made such an argument for Olson’s early understanding of Homeric orality, which was
later solidified by his reading of Carpenter 1958 and Havelock 1963.
25
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unconscious sense of their fitness. To stop to search for a word was to let
proprieties interfere, and so to fail to capture or communicate the meaning
one intended to convey.” (29)
I am unconvinced that Olson was encouraging poets to abide by an “unconscious”
acceptance of how the sounds of syllables and words fit together. This is my main concern with
Belgrad’s analysis, namely, his terminology. Describing projective poetics as a “spontaneous” or
“improvisational” method relying solely on the poet’s unconscious belies two important aspects
of projective verse: 1) the key role Olson assigns to the intellect; and 2) Olson’s own editorial
obsessiveness, both of which we will return to below. However, Belgrad’s reading of projective
verse does yield some valuable insights. I agree with his assessment that as a ‘prospective’ method,
projective verse is “exploratory, its fruits uncertain at the outset” (29). Further, it seems clear from
Olson’s elaboration of the third principle that for a poet to pause and contemplate the appropriate
word or phrasing at any juncture would indeed halt the projective process, effectively ending the
act of producing the poem at hand, or at least significantly impeding its momentum. Belgrad also
rightly points out Williams’ and Olson’s conviction that “spontaneity alone was not enough to
ensure poetic truth, without the discipline of empiricism” (31), a reference to the value both poets
placed on the role of scientific discovery for poetry.
Taken together, these three principles of projective verse offer only vague instructions
toward producing a projective poem. This is not necessarily a shortcoming, as projective verse is
open form poetry, and the essay itself can be read, as I have suggested, as a performative piece,
enacting the very principles it sets forth. These principles do, if only implicitly, develop an
ontology of the projective poem, which relates to the larger ontology underlying Olson’s poetics.
Thus Merrill’s aforementioned assertion that the third principle is “the poetical application of an
ontological truth” can, I believe, be applied to all three principles (49).
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The ontology of projective verse dovetails with an ethos being expressed in the essay. If
we extract from each principle Olson’s poetic charge to his contemporaries and future readers and
map it to a roughly equivalent ethical principle, we get the following. First, Olson urges us to
attend to the “kinetics” both of the external world (including research and discovery, social
movements, political events, etc.), and our own internal psychology, and to let these “energies”
guide not just the composition process, but our interaction with and understanding of the world.
Second, just as we must avoid imposing form onto content poetically, we must also “resist
imposing…forms egotistically upon Nature as a matter of perceptual propriety” (Merrill 49). For
Olson, as Merrill points out, failure to do so results in the “lyrical interference of the individual as
ego” on poetry in the former instance, and on our understanding of the world we inhabit in the
latter (Merrill, ibid.; citation from CPr 247). 26 Finally, Olson urges us to be mindful of our
cognitive process of perceiving the world in its own process of development. This is intended to
help the projective poet compose a more immediate poetry. Recall Olson’s parenthetical aside,
however, that the third principle applies to “our management of daily reality as of the daily work.”
Whether that work is producing projective poems or our means of earning a living (poetry or
otherwise), this explicit application of a projective principle beyond poetry is, much like the first
principle, meant to yield a “more true” understanding of our “continuous” reality, as Olson sees it
(CPr 120). The larger ethos Olson is developing in “Projective Verse” comes to the fore in part II
of the essay, to which we will turn in the next chapter.

26

Merrill is citing Olson’s definition of ‘objectism’ here, a topic we will return to in the next chapter.
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3.3

Critical Reception of “Projective Verse,” For and Against
As mentioned in the introduction, Olson’s body of work has at times, both during his career

and since his death, received little or no critical attention. Yet to reiterate, there are a multitude of
monographs and essays dedicated to his work, particularly in certain moments since his passing,
including in the late 1970s and within the last 15 years or so. The energy of “Projective Verse”
was contagious to many of Olson’s contemporaries, including one influential poetic precursor to
his poetics.
Shortly after the publication of “Projective Verse,” Williams wrote a letter to Creeley
saying, “I share your excitement, it is as if the whole area lifted. It’s the sort of thing we are after
and must have…Everything in it leans on action, on the verb: one thing leads to another which is
thereby activated” (SW 6, italics in original). This is high praise from a poet who we know inspired
Olson’s own thinking about poetry as something which takes place in a field of action. Creeley
shares Williams’ and his own thoughts in his introduction to Olson’s Selected Writings (1966),
where he says of Williams’ sentiments:
“It was an excitement which many of us shared, because what confronted
us in 1950 was a closed system indeed, poems patterned upon exterior and
traditionally accepted models. The New Criticism of that period was
dominant and would not admit the possibility of verse considered as an
‘open field’” (ibid.).
Creeley dedicates much of his introduction to discussing “Projective Verse,” though interestingly
the essay is the second piece featured (following a short prose piece dedicated to Jean Riboud
titled, “The Resistance”).27 Both Williams and Creeley were in a sense predisposed to be laudatory

See, “The Resistance,” SW 13-14; CPr 174. Jean Riboud was a French sociologist and business person who,
during World War II, as a member of the French Resistance, was captured and imprisoned by the Nazis at the
Buchenwald concentration camp. This creates an interesting link between “The Resistance” and Olson’s poem “La
Préface.” “The Resistance” is a fitting opening to Selected Writings also for its suggestion of the eternity of “[t]his
now,” as well as its depiction of humans as breathing, acting, physiological organisms—elements which all come to
the fore in “Projective Verse.”
27
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of, and inspired by, “Projective Verse” as they rejected the New Criticism—the dominant
academic paradigm at the time which favored close readings of poems as closed (in the
terminology of projective verse) aesthetic units of meaning contained strictly within the confines
of the poem itself, as distinct from the biography or psychology of the poet. Hence, Williams as
an outsider to the high Modernist tradition of Eliot in particular, the preferred model of the New
Critics, and Creeley as a kindred avant-garde poetry outsider, were always going to have an affinity
to their friend Olson’s manifesto.
Not all critics were as admiring of the essay, however. Take for example Marjorie Perloff’s
vehement critique of the essay’s lack of originality in her “Charles Olson and the ‘Inferior
Predecessors’: ‘Projective Verse’ Revisited.” Perloff’s essay, itself equally famous among Olson’s
allies and detractors, “reconsider[s], as objectively as possible the nature of the argument in
‘Projective Verse,’ the sources of Olson’s aesthetic, and the extent to which Olson’s own poetry
meets the requirements laid down in his manifesto” (Perloff 1973, 286–87). She even lays out
excerpts of “Projective Verse” alongside excerpts from Pound and Williams to demonstrate just
how much Olson borrowed from them. Most notably, Perloff argues that Olson did not cull the
term ‘projective’ from H.M.S. Coxeter’s 1942 treatise Non-Euclidean Geometry, but rather from
Pound’s 1927 examination of the American avant-garde composer George Antheil, Antheil and
the Treatise on Harmony (ibid. 287).28 Therein, Perloff tells us, Pound applies the term ‘projectile’
to Antheil’s description of the “rhythm unit” in music as a spatio-temporal “‘mechanism’” or
“‘construction.’”29 She also notes that Antheil himself, in recognizing French composer Claude
Debussy’s innovations in composition, defines the “locomotive quality” in music as its “projective
element” (italics in original).

28
29

This and following citations until noted.
See Pound 1968, 49-50, which Perloff cites in her essay.
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Ultimately, Perloff’s verdict on “Projective Verse” is that: Olson’s argument therein is
flimsy; he is a mere derivative of his Modernist forebears Pound and Williams; and his poetry, in
practice, does not meet his own aesthetic principles described in the essay. Perloff reiterates the
second point in her later book The Dance of the Intellect, where she again notes the lineage one
can draw from Pound’s Gaudier-Brzeka and Williams’ Kora in Hell to “Projective Verse” (Perloff
1985, 61). We are undoubtedly indebted to Perloff for some of her insights, as evidenced by my
referencing her work above. However, there are many sources (Dahlberg, Riemann, etc.) which
she does not highlight in her effort to defend the more original work of Pound and Williams.
Toward proving the third point, Olson’s failure in her mind to achieve the poetics he so
passionately demands of poets, Perloff uses Olson’s relatively late poem “From The Song of
Ullikummi” (c. 1964). The poem (CP 600-02) is an incomplete and rather loose translation, as
Olson claims in its subtitle, “from Hurrian and Hittite.” Perloff points out the poem is actually
“based on Hans Güterbock’s 1951 translation of the incomplete epic” of a myth about the god
Kumarbis and the origin of his son Ullikummis (Perloff 1973, 302). Ullikummis, a “gigantic pillar
of diorite” according to Perloff, was borne of the intercourse between his father and a massive rock
formation (ibid.).
Olson dedicated the poem to Pound, reading it publicly in Italy at the Spoleto Festival of
July 1965 with Pound on the dais with him. Intended to honor Pound, the elder and exiled poet
did not receive it well, in part because of Olson’s rather vulgar language in rendering Ullikummis’
conception by Kumarbis’
fucking
of the Mountain
fucked the mountain
the other side

went right through it and came out
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Perloff does admit that some lines of “From The Song of Ullikummi” “are somewhat reminiscent
of Pound: the retelling of ancient myth in contemporary idiom, the casual free verse, the
juxtaposition of foreign text with its English equivalent” (Perloff 1973, 303). However, she takes
issue with Olson’s “harp[ing] with tiresome monotony on the same theme,” namely the conception
of Ullikummis, as a failed imitation of Pound’s skillful counterpoint of “different myths, playing
off one against another to create a new image” (Perloff 1973, 302-03).
To be sure, the poem is not what I consider to be one of Olson’s best, and it does seem as
though he intended it to ruffle Pound’s considerably frail feathers at that stage of the latter’s life.
Perloff rightly notes that the poem would become a staple in Olson’s readings of the mid-1960s.
However, Perloff intentionally, it would seem, chose a relatively short, ineffective poem from
Olson’s vast body of poetry to prove her point. His retelling of Gloucester’s history in the
“MAXIMUS, FROM DOGTOWN” series in Maximus may have yielded different results for her,
but she clearly had her axe to grind.

Her adamant final assessment of “From The Song of

Ullikummi” is meant to be applied to Olson’s larger poetic oeuvre. In concluding, Perloff argues
that this poem
“simply manifests in particularly blatant form Olson’s central imaginative
failure. Pound and Williams, one should recall, talked of prosody only after
long and arduous experiments with different verse forms, line units, and
syllable combinations…Olson on the other hand began by announcing that
the syllable and the line were the ‘HEAD’ and the ‘HEART’ of the new
prosody and hoped that no one would notice that, in his own poetry, he let
the lines fall where they may. Again, whereas Pound’s and Williams’
objectivist theories were the natural outgrowth of the experiments with
imagery, Olson simply announced that the ‘objects in field’ that compose a
poem must refer to nothing outside themselves, only to discover that in his
own poetry, references to external reality became increasingly obtrusive.”
(Perloff 1973, 305–06)
I find Perloff’s essay in poor taste considering Olson had only passed away three years
prior to its publication, but when is the appropriate time to criticize a recently deceased poetic
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didact? This opinion aside, some critics have responded to Perloff’s essay equally dismissively.
Christopher Beach and Ralph Maud have mitigated much of Perloff’s criticism of “Projective
Verse” by pointing out the flaws in her argument. Both point out that the very title of Perloff’s
essay misuses Olson’s phrase “inferior predecessors,” taken from a letter Olson wrote to his friend,
and editor of the journal Origin, Cid Corman on 23 November 1953 (Maud 2008, 168). In the
letter, Olson “scolds Corman for comparing Olson’s poems to those of Pound and Williams”
(Beach 117). Part of Olson’s admonishment of Corman is that he feels that his poetry which
Corman recently published is inadequate. In the portion of the letter Perloff cites, she clips the
citation in a way that makes it seem as though Olson is referring to Williams and Pound as inferior
predecessors.30 But, as Beach makes clear, Olson continues the sentence by stating that he is both
“inferior” to and a “predecessor” of himself. Olson’s point is ultimately that though Pound and
Williams are great poets, the music of their poetry is not going to be moving to readers of the day
(ibid.). Nor is the failed music of the pieces he has recently published with Corman good enough.
Olson feels that poems he had previously published with Corman were much better at capturing
what he wanted projective verse to manifest. Maud adds to this that in the original letter there was
another instance of the phrase “inferior predecessors,” which Olson employs to refer to two
previous letters he had written to Corman.31 This “neutral, non-judgmental” use of the phrase,
Maud argues, demonstrates that Olson “has gone back to the root meaning of the word ‘inferior,’”

The relevant excerpt from Olson’s letter to Corman reads: “I know what’s missing in the music. But it’s olson
[sic] which ain’t there, not Williams or Pound. And you should know that’s who is missing. Not these two inferior
predecessors”—this is the point at which Perloff clips the citation. However, Olson continues the last sentence thus:
“…it’s olson [sic] which ain’t there, not Williams and Pound. Not these two inferior predecessors—just as I am
inferior, to myself! and [sic] predecessor, of myself!” Cited in Maud 2008, 169. See Maud 2008, 168-72; and
Beach 115-22 for their responses to Perloff’s argument. For Olson’s original letter to Corman, see Olson 1987,
1.102.
31
The relevant excerpt from Olson’s letter to Corman here reads: “I am not one to keep after a man. But you will
recognize this letter as having inferior predecessors—at least two, one last year on Origin [sic], a penny postcard;
and another, three years ago, on the whole biz of how such a mag might live.” Cited in Maud 2008, 168. See also
Olson 1987, 1.102.
30

103
expressing not “that his previous two letters of complaint were of lesser quality,” but rather that
“[t]hey stand below or underneath this latest one, as a scaffold; they give backing from the past,
which can be considered a layer under the present” (Maud 2008, 169). I cannot fault Perloff for
not delving into the possible etymological connotations of the word “inferior”; however, it does
seem inexcusable that she abbreviated Olson’s full sentence the way she did in her essay. Equally
inexcusable is Perloff’s aforementioned recognition of Pound’s book on Antheil as the source of
the word ‘projective.’ As Maud points out, however, this supposed “‘source’…does not include
the word ‘projective’ at all” (ibid. 172). The actual source of the term for Olson which Perloff
calls into question, Coxeter’s Non-Euclidean Geometry, does according to Maud “contain
discussions of ‘projective’ geometry” (ibid.).32 Further, Perloff never offers any proof that Olson
had read Pound’s book on Antheil, though decades later Maud would affirm this in a different
context.33
Perloff’s essay is in many ways an insightful reading of Olson’s relation to Pound and
Williams.

Her larger contributions to twentieth century American poetry scholarship are

undisputedly valuable. However, “Charles Olson and the ‘Inferior Predecessors’: ‘Projective
Verse’ Revisited” misses the mark, due to its lack of analysis of certain of Olson’s sources, her
selection of “Ullikummi,” and her abbreviation of the Olson excerpt from which she got the essay’s
title. It is clear that Perloff wanted to champion Pound and Williams in the essay. Much of her
work examines the importance of Pound to the American tradition. This is what makes her
argument against Olson in the essay all the more curious. In The Dance of the Intellect she admits

Maud also confirms that these discussions of projective geometry appear in Coxeter’s later book Regular
Polytopes (1948), which Olson had also “keenly explored” by the time he was composing “Projective Verse” (Maud
2008, 172).
33
See Maud 1996, 293n5. Maud notes that though Olson “did not own a copy” of Pound’s book on Antheil, he “had
previously called attention to [it]” in a letter to Creeley dated 22 June 1950.
32
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that Pound’s technique is collagist, which implies the use of material from various sources. Of
course, Pound’s sources are not always explicitly named in, for example, The Cantos. Williams’
technique in Paterson is equally collagist. Whether or not these two poets’ sources have always
been cited properly is not the point. The point is rather that many Modernist poets, Pound and
Williams among them, were more than comfortable incorporating a broad, diverse, and historically
expansive set of sources into their poetry, or on which to build their poetics. Olson’s “Projective
Verse” is no different in this regard. In fact, he repeatedly mentions the debt he and his
contemporaries owe to Pound and Williams in the essay. This is particularly important to the sonic
and visual qualities of the poetry Olson envisions, a topic to which we will now turn.
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CHAPTER 4. “BY EAR, HE SD.”: OBJECTISM, THE SYLLABLE,
AND BREATH IN PROJECTIVE VERSE

4.1

Introduction
In the previous chapter we examined the three basic principles of Olson’s poetics manifesto

“Projective Verse.” It is my hope that readers will have gained some appreciation for the essay,
its energy, and the difficulty of its prose—keeping in mind that to this point we have discussed but
the first two pages of the essay. One focus of that discussion was to demonstrate that the poetics
Olson decrees in the essay was not necessarily innovative, having been derived, as we have seen,
from various sources. This latter point should not be taken as an indictment of Olson’s originality,
however. Many critics depreciate Olson’s efforts, arguing that “Projective Verse” is a mere
rehashing of mainly Modernist, but also certain aspects of Romantic, poetics. I would argue,
rather, that Olson’s capacity to assimilate and build on the poetics of his predecessors, and
especially to incorporate mantras from his friends and mentors—which he does explicitly on two
occasions in the essay—demonstrates the communal and democratic nature of the Black Mountain
poetics he was so influential in developing.
There is, in my opinion, something which does make projective verse original in its own
right. To be clear, I am not claiming that projective verse is completely distinct from other poetics
or aesthetics, whether prior to or contemporary with Olson. However, as much as we have sought
the roots of the three main principles of “Projective Verse,” it is after that initial trajectory of the
essay when Olson’s own voice truly emerges. This chapter will examine the remainder of
“Projective Verse,” that is, what Olson has to say after he enumerates the three main principles we
examined in the previous chapter. Doing so requires an explanation of ‘objectism,’ the philosophy
Olson puts forth in the essay and insists is necessary for poets to adopt if they are to compose
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projective verse properly.1 Objectism is also necessary for Olson himself to ground the physicality
of projective verse, namely, its sound qualities. It is, ultimately, the oral-audial aspect of projective
verse which Olson intends to distinguish it from other poetics. Yet it is this very aspect which also
leads us into an element of projective verse which has been problematic for critics, not to mention
for its practitioners. Readers often point out an apparent contradiction in the essay between: the
crucial role Olson claims for the typewriter for composing projective verse as the poet intends it
to be read and to sound; and his simultaneous demand, noted in passing in the previous chapter,
that the projective poet must compose poetry “as though not the eye but the ear was to be its
measurer” (CPr 246). The current chapter aims to give this issue its due. Thus a central question
here is: How can we reconcile the fact that Olson emphasizes the importance of the typewriter for
projective verse, with his proclamations that projective verse is a methodology which prioritizes
sound, the ear and the breath?
In this chapter, I will try to relieve the tension this has elicited in many of Olson’s readers.
I maintain that these apparent tensions between breath and text are less problematic than many
critics claim, especially given Olson’s objectism. That is not to say Olson’s arguments are not
flawed. We will indeed consider some potentially problematic aspects of his breath poetics. As
with the previous chapter, the focus here is on the text of “Projective Verse” itself. My goal is to
offer what I hope is fresh insight on the essay by proposing the unorthodox interpretation that,
though we interact with the essay as a written text, as we do most of Olson’s poetry, Olson’s
intention in the essay is to reinvigorate orality. This will allow us to explore Maximus as an oral
epic later in the dissertation.

1

I have placed the first instance of objectism in single quotation marks to highlight the fact that it denotes a specific
concept in Olson’s thinking. Henceforth the term will not appear in quotation marks. The same applies to other
Olson terminology in this chapter.
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4.2

Olson’s Objectism and the Human Universe
Olson states early on in “Projective Verse” that beyond defining its principles, he wants to

“suggest a few ideas about what stance toward reality brings such verse into being, what that stance
does, both to the poet and to his reader” (CPr 239). After explaining the three core principles of
projective verse, Olson dedicates the remainder and majority of the essay to: 1) elaborating
projective verse as a breath poetics, which is oral-audial in nature; 2) highlighting the importance
of the typewriter as a valuable technology for projective poets; and 3) explaining his philosophy
of objectism which grounds those principles. As the first two aspects of “Projective Verse” are
deeply, and at times problematically, intertwined, we will consider the philosophical foundation
of Olson’s poetics first.2
Olson presents objectism as a foil to what he believes is the limiting and problematic
discourse of subject-object dualism invented by the classical Greeks, and later most egregiously
postulated by Descartes in his view. In fact, this is how Olson distinguishes his objectism from “a
movement which got called ‘objectivism,’” in which he claims “Pound and Williams both were
involved variously” (CPr 247). As Olson understands it, that movement’s name “was then used
in some sort of a necessary quarrel, I take it, with ‘subjectivism’” (ibid.). Central to Olson’s
objectism is his concept of ‘stance.’
Critics will use the terms ‘worldview’ or Weltanschauung as synonyms for stance, but I
find both to be underwhelming substitutes. In Olson’s philosophy, stance indicates more than a
worldview—if by the latter term we mean, broadly, a culturally influenced personal perspective
on the world. To be sure, a person’s stance is, for Olson, localized in his or her individual
consciousness. That a stance is an individual perspective is not at issue. Where a term like

Olson’s explanation of objectism does not appear until part II of “Projective Verse,” which constitutes roughly the
last two-and-a-half pages of the essay.
2
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‘worldview’ falls short of the mark for me is that it does not capture the nuance of Olson’s concept
and the various elements he intends it to connote. This is not to say, of course, that all critics have
failed to capture the nuance and complexity of stance. For instance, in his Charles Olson and
Alfred North Whitehead, Shahar Bram begins the chapter examining stance by employing the term
Weltanschauung to explain Olson’s concept. Bram’s definition of Weltanschauung is especially
effective as he adds a crucial layer to it. He asserts that “Olson sees his poetics as his actual
Weltanschauung” and that for Olson, “his poetry is his deeds, his life” (111). Thus, Bram argues,
for Olson stance is “an ethos of action” (ibid.). Indeed, the ethical element is an important one for
properly understanding stance, and Bram’s recognition of it gives his reading valuable depth.
However, the geometric and geographical aspects of stance are equally vital to the concept as is
its ethical element.3
Olson’s interest in non-Euclidean geometries and Riemann again play a part in his thinking
here. Don Byrd reads stance as a relationship between humans and the world in which the ego
dissipates and a person becomes instead “a medium through which space finds its realization as
fact” (22). Byrd defines ‘fact,’ another important term in Olson’s vocabulary, as “the geometric
projection of space as it appears in the space of human consciousness” (15). Thus if space is a
field made up of a continuous multiplicity of energies and objects interacting, as Olson indeed
believes it is by the time he was composing “Projective Verse,” then human consciousness
localizes these energies and objects into a perceived geometrical relationship which establishes the
‘fact’ of the physical universe.

The right stance then, for Olson, involves an individual

See Bram 2004, Ch. 7. In terms of the geometric element in Olson’s concept of stance, I note here that Bernhard
Riemann, the major influence on Olson’s understanding of non-Euclidean geometries, does not appear in Bram’s
chapter on stance. In fairness, however, Bram’s focus is on Olson’s relationship with Whitehead, as the title
indicates.
3
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consciousness understanding itself as one object not only in the localized field of action but in the
totality of space. As Olson puts it:
“Objectism is the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as
ego, of the ‘subject’ and his soul, that peculiar presumption by which
western man has interposed himself between what he is as a creature of
nature (with certain instructions to carry out) and those other creations of
nature which we may, with no derogation, call objects. For a man is himself
an object, whatever he may take to be his advantages, the more likely to
recognize himself as such the greater his advantages, particularly at that
moment that he achieves an humilitas sufficient to make him of use.
It comes to this: the use of a man, by himself and thus by others, lies in
how he conceives his relation to nature, that force to which he owes his
somewhat small existence. If he sprawl, he shall find little to sing but
himself, and shall sing, nature has such paradoxical ways, by way of
artificial forms outside himself. But if he stays inside himself, if he is
contained within his nature as he is participant in the larger force, he will be
able to listen, and his hearing through himself will give him secrets objects
share. And by an inverse law his shapes will make their own way.” (CPr
247)
As we have seen, it is Olson’s call for the removal of the lyrical ego which grounds, at least
in part, the first and third principles of projective verse. But is this removal as simple as stating
explicitly that humans are objects among many other objects in a field of action? Rhetorically, at
least, for Olson—yes, it is this simple. Consider the fact that in a later essay, “The Present as
Prologue” (c. 1952), he rejects dualism out of hand by simply stating “there is no such thing as
duality either of the body and the soul or of the world and I…all hierarchies, like dualities, are
dead ducks” (CPr 205). 4

As compelling as this sentiment is, surely something more

philosophically robust is needed to definitively reject dualism. Yet this is also the charm and
profundity of Olson. His assertion in “Projective Verse” that our use “lies in how [we conceive
our] relation to nature” implies that we do have the power to simply change the way we think. For

“The Present as Prologue” was not published until 1955, but I have listed the date of composition here as it is
closer to the dates of composition, and publication, for both “Projective Verse” and “Human Universe.” For details,
see the editors’ notes, CPr 422.
4
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Olson, such a sea change in our thinking can result in the overturning of thousands of years of
intellectual history. This idea was present in his poem “La Préface,” written several years before
he composed “Projective Verse,” in which Olson commands readers to “[p]ut war away with time,
come into space” (CP 46).5 Whether thinking of history as spatial rather than temporal, or thinking
of humans as one object among many in a field of objects, the gesture is ultimately an
epistemological one for Olson. This is not to suggest that a massive, global shift in our manner of
thinking could be as easily achieved as Olson’s rhetorical candor suggests he thinks it can be. The
momentum of more than two millennia is quite a bit of history to push back against. That is, on
Olson’s view a prior monumental shift in epistemology has defined Western thinking since roughly
the time of Socrates.
This latter point is one Olson makes explicitly in “Human Universe,” published the year
after “Projective Verse.” As noted previously, the two are regarded as companion essays,
representing Olson’s most focused efforts to articulate his poetics during this still early stage of
his career. “Human Universe” is an extended meditation on the effect the classical Greeks had on
subsequent Western history, having led us astray, intellectually speaking. As such, the essay
becomes Olson’s critique of the humanist tradition.

Humanism, like so much of Olson’s

terminology, has a specific meaning in his lexicon. Generally speaking, humanism is a philosophy
which values human agency, and the human capacities for reason and the collection of empirical
data to ground its arguments as opposed to basing arguments in religious dogma or supernatural
beliefs. This is certainly part of Olson’s understanding of humanism. The humanism which he
explicitly rejects in the essay however, stems from, and indeed is synonymous with, the turn toward
abstract discourse and the creation of a dichotomy which distinguishes the individual human being

5

For a detailed reading of “La Préface,” see pp. 49-58 above.
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from the natural world. For Olson, this can be traced back to a specific date and three specific
thinkers.
In “Human Universe,” Olson elaborates on his rejection of the subject-object dichotomy
which he intends objectism to counter. He is ultimately dismissing the notion that the interior,
private psychic world of an individual human being is ontologically distinct from the external,
physical world of objects we inhabit. As he states in the essay, “I am not able to satisfy myself
that these so-called inner things are so separable from the objects, persons, events which are the
content of them and by which man represents or re-enacts them despite the suck of symbol which
has increased and increased since the great Greeks first promoted the idea of a transcendent world
of forms” (CPr 161). This is an elaboration of the opening of the essay, referenced in the previous
chapter, in which Olson insists that the internal universe and the external universe are not as
fundamentally different as humanists would have it.6 Olson is arguing that our mental image of
objects in the world is neither a mere representation of qualities (primary or secondary) nor a
simulacrum of a form which constitutes true reality. Olson asserts that humans “are confronted
by, not the thing’s ‘class,’ any hierarchy, of quality or quantity, but the thing itself, and its
relevance to ourselves who are the experience of it (whatever it may mean to someone else, or
whatever the other relations it may have.)” (CPr 158, my italics). Olson is creating a problematic
complexity here, unintentionally I believe, by weaving rejections of different threads of Lockean
empiricism, Kantian idealism, and Plato’s theory of forms. In the context of “Human Universe,”
the latter is the obvious target, a point we will return to momentarily. First, I want to draw the
reader’s attention to another interesting, and potentially problematic, aspect of Olson’s assertion:
the psychological (and emotional) element he raises by prioritizing the “relevance” an object has

6

See p. 78 above.
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to the individual human perceiving, or “confront[ing],” it. Olson makes similar statements
throughout the essay and elsewhere in his prose. This strikes me as slightly confusing, considering
his overt rejection of the lyrical ego in “Projective Verse.” He seems to be walking a fine line
between dismissing the lyrical ego, for him a product of humanist conceptions of the subject, yet
insisting that the objects we perceive, presumably permissible fodder and even the very causal
energies of a projective poem, must affect us personally on some level to be appropriate material
for such a poem. Beyond this potentially contradictory notion of the necessary psychological
affect of objects on the poet, to put it in the context of projective verse at least, I read “relevance”
here as also indicating the spatial proximity and availability to investigation of the objects in
question to the perceiving human(s).
Olson’s primary concern in the essay, however, is to overturn the humanism developed by
the “great Greeks”—namely, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all of whom are mentioned in the
essay. Olson charges Socrates with a “readiness to generalize” and a “willingness (from his own
bias) to make a ‘universe’ out of discourse instead of letting it rest in its most serviceable place”
(CPr 156). As a result, Olson contends that “w[e] have long lived in a generalizing time, at least
since 450 B.C.” (CPr 155). The latter date thus marks the beginning of the modern era for Olson,
at least where “Human Universe” is concerned.7 It is with Aristotle that “the two great means
appear: logic and classification,” epistemological modes which have become so deeply
foundational for modern thought “that action is interfered with, absolutely interfered with” (ibid.).
Plato, whom Olson notes Melville once referred to as a “honey-head,” represents an interesting
case. Olson admits Plato “had more of a sort of latitude and style my tribe of men are apt to indulge
him for,” whereby “tribe” Olson presumably means poets (CPr 157, 156). Nevertheless, it is

Olson provides different dates for the beginning of what he calls “modern man.” These dates, whether given
generally or specifically, range from the Homeric era to the fifth century BCE.
7
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Plato’s “world of ideas, of forms as extricable from content” which for Olson becomes “as
dangerous an issue as are logic and classification, and they need to be seen as such if we are to get
on to some alternative to the whole Greek system” (CPr 156–57). As we have seen, one of the
core principles of projective verse is “form is never more than an extension of content” (CPr 240).
Olson revisits this mantra in “Human Universe,” which now reads as an inversion of the Platonic
theory of forms. Olson ties this rejection to what I interpret to be another elaboration of objectism,
in which he again expresses his dissatisfaction with the inner universe/outer universe distinction,
when he tells us:
“I equally cannot satisfy myself of the gain in thinking that the process by
which man transposes phenomena to his use is any more extricable from
reception than reception itself is from the world. What happens at the skin
is more like than different from what happens within. The process of
image…cannot be understood by separation from the stuff it works on.
Here again, as throughout experience, the law remains, form is not isolated
from content.” (CPr 162)
The three great Greek figures then, taken as a whole, mark for Olson the culmination of a
major shift in epistemology. To reiterate our previous discussion, in Ishmael Olson asserts this
epistemological shift began with Homer’s portrayal of Odysseus, and implicates Plato in the
transgression.8 In “Human Universe” Olson explicitly condemns the classical Greeks as the most
dangerous and influential inventors and practitioners of this methodology. Further, Olson believed
this detrimental humanism continued to plague his own time. For him, the transformation to a
new, but not necessarily improved, mode of thinking is a direct product of the classical Greeks’
“divisive” system of logic and classification, which in turn spawned the development of a plethora
of disciplinary discourses based on discursive logic (CPr 158). To put it plainly, the classical
Greeks created a chasm between the human subjects doing the classification and the objects which

8

See pp. 44-54 above.
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those human subjects were classifying. This chasm pervades all forms of enquiry and theoretical
discourse (linguistic, philosophical, scientific, etc.), preventing what Olson determines to be true
progress in our knowledge of ourselves and the world—the binary elements comprising the human
universe Olson expounding. Olson laments that “[w]e stay unaware how two means of discourse
the Greeks appear to have invented hugely intermit our participation in our experience, and so
prevent discovery” (CPr 156). In light of this, we can view “Projective Verse,” and to a significant
degree Olson’s poetic career as a whole, as an attempt to find
“a means of expression…which is not divisive as all the tag ends and
upendings of the Greek way are. There must be a way which bears in
instead of away, which meets head on what goes on each split second, a way
which does not—in order to define—prevent, deter, distract, and so cease
the act of, discovering.” (CPr 157-158, italics in original)
With discursive logic as the guarantor of truth, humans occupy a rather tenuous position.
On the one hand, we wield power over space, or nature (effectively synonymous terms for Olson),
by being able to categorize and define it, and manipulate it toward our own economic
advancement. Yet on the other hand, we also seem to be only passively perceiving space as an
entity with the power to affect, and the vulnerability to be affected by, the simple objects with
which we share that space. This is, for Olson, a product of our choosing “to treat external
reality…differently than as part of [our] own process,” that is, as something fundamentally
“relevant” to the “inner life” of human beings (CPr 163). The result is the misuse of that external
reality, of nature, by humans. Hence creating the inner/outer dichotomy provides the basis for,
and in a sense justifies, our using nature
just exactly as [we have] used it now for too long, for arbitrary and willful
purposes which, in their effects, not only change the face of nature but
actually arrest and divert her force until man turns it even against herself,
he is so powerful, this little thing. But what little willful modern man will
not recognize is, that when he turns it against her he turns it against himself,
held in the hand of nature as man forever is, to his use of himself if he
choose, to his disuse, as he has.” (ibid.)
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This reveals another important aspect of Olson’s critique of humanism. As critical as he is of the
classical Greeks in “Human Universe,” he reserves his most severe indictment for his
contemporary world—the “modern” world, as he refers to it. “It is not the Greeks I blame,” he
tells us, continuing: “What it comes to is ourselves, that we do not find ways to hew to experience
as it is, in our definition and expression of it, in other words, find ways to stay in the human
universe, and not be led to partition reality at any point, in any way” (CPr 157).
In order to overcome our complacency with the methodology the classical Greeks
bestowed upon us, in order to overcome our self-imposed distance from nature, Olson again urges
us toward a new way of thinking. It is a matter of reconceiving, or perhaps having the proper
understanding in the first place, of our “end,” by which I interpret Olson to mean our function. I
hesitate to reference Aristotle’s ‘final cause’ in this context, as that would align Olson with one of
the classical Greeks he works so hard in the essay to repudiate, but I do think there is an element
of a (human) ‘purpose’ in Olson’s notion of end. As he employs the term in “Human Universe,”
it echoes the third principle of projective verse. Olson asserts:
“Idealisms of any sort, like logic and like classification, intervene at just the
moment they become ways as end instead of ways to end, END, which is
never more than this instant, than you on this instant, than you figuring it
out, and acting, so. If there is any absolute, it is never more than this one,
you, this instant, in action.” (CPr 157)
Byrd’s reading here is insightful. He refers to this emphasis on the perpetual instance of action as
Olson’s “presentism,” a philosophical attempt to free humans from a “transcendent order which
will make itself manifest” in dualistic thinking (6). Olson is intent on subverting any humanistic
methodology of abstraction, which for him necessarily creates a hierarchy that prioritizes humans
in nature and reduces nature to a set of objects which humans have the privileged capacity to
classify and use to our own gains. The result of this epistemological misstep is that we distance
ourselves from nature to such a degree that it prevents us from the fullness of the human
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experience. The real human universe was supplanted by humanism; it is now our task to overturn
humanism to put ourselves back in the properly human universe. Thus in both “Human Universe”
and “Projective Verse” Olson offers an approach for revitalizing the human universe as he
understands it. We must be constantly embedded in the present instant. As Byrd points out, this
methodology entails for Olson the prevention of developing hierarchies based on abstraction.
Another particularly incisive reading is Anne Dewey’s critique of what she determines to
be a commonly held interpretation of objectism. 9 In her book Beyond Maximus, Dewey
distinguishes two general camps of Olson criticism: critics who have “placed Olson’s work in the
tradition of the Modernist epic ‘poem including history’”; and those who have “emphasized his
break with Modernism in the tendency of his poetics to ground an ideal cultural order in nature”
(34).10 She then situates herself between these two camps, stating that though her own focus is
“on Olson’s break with the Modernists,” she examines this break “in the context of the Modernists’
notion of the force field” (ibid.). Dewey explains that Olson’s “objectifying impulse underlies
[his] utopian poetic project to reintegrate the self into nature” (35)—a position widely held by
Olson critics. However, in “tak[ing] Olson’s naturalizing poetics at face value”—that is, by
accepting Olson’s rejection of subjectivism and his replacing it with objectism—critics “accept”
by default Olson’s own categorical distinction between subjects and objects (34, 35). Thus, critics
adopt the Olsonian view that an object is “a natural entity defined by the rhetoric of natural
science” along with his “objectification of the subject as a reduction of thought and language to an

Special thanks to Dr. Daniel Morris, Professor of English at Purdue University, for suggesting Dewey’s book to
me.
10
In terms of critics who place Olson in the Modernist tradition, Dewey mentions von Hallberg 1978, and Bernstein
1980. For those who emphasize Olson’s break with the Modernist tradition, she lists Faas 1978, Paul 1978,
Christensen 1979, Byrd 1980. While there are many other critics who could be added to either group, I will forego
listing them here preferring to cite them when relevant, particularly when discussing Olson’s projective verse in
Chs. 3-4. See Dewey 228-229n52.
9
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origin in physical existence” (35).11 While I agree that many critics do take many of Olson’s
declarations at face value, whether in regard to objectism or otherwise, and often to the detriment
of their criticism, I disagree that this implies a tacitly physicalist reading of Olson’s notion of the
subject. To be fair, Dewey’s aim here is to ground her reading of Olson’s theory of the polis, so I
admit I am guilty of taking her argument out of context.12 My minor rejoinder to Dewey aside, I
note here another of the many valuable insights her reading of Olson gives us, one which helps to
offer further context to “Projective Verse,” in particular. She demonstrates convincingly that
Olson “drew his language of physical vitality as quantity and force from Simone Weil’s essay ‘The
Iliad, or The Poem of Force.’” While this certainly reveals another of Olson’s many inspirations
for the language he uses in the first principle of projective verse, it is also helpful for understanding
objectism. As Dewey points out, “[i]n Weil’s analysis, war unleashes violent, impersonal energy
that creates dehumanizing extremes of power and vulnerability. These extremes destroy the
‘armor’ of ethical and metaphysical or religious idealism by which Western metaphysics would
obscure human bondage to physicality, mortality, and time.”13 The connection she makes here is
fascinating to me. Considering Olson’s reaction to World War II, he obviously would not view
war as necessary to overturning Western metaphysics (humanism in the context of “Human
Universe”), limiting though he thinks it is. To be sure, Dewey is not making this point. However,
I raise it for two reasons. First, Olson does often take a combative tone against his philosophical
and poetic foes—classical Greeks, humanists, poets who write closed verse from the perspective
of the lyrical ego, etc. Clearly he sees the necessity of drawing certain battle lines and issuing

11

This and following citations until noted.
Her point is ultimately that such an acceptance of Olson’s brand of naturalism by critics cannot sufficiently
“explain his choice of the polis as the framework for human thought” (Dewey 2007, 35).
13
Dewey’s chronology of Weil’s influence on Olson is noteworthy. Her research in the Charles Olson Research
Collection demonstrates that Olson was reading Weil years earlier than Ralph Maud records. Maud places Olson’s
earliest reading of Weil in 1952 (see Maud 1996, 282, 332). However, Dewey uncovers that “ideas from Weil”
were “mentioned in the draft essay that became ‘Projective Verse’” (229n54).
12
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marching orders, as it were. Second, in “Projective Verse” the importance of epic poetry emerges
not so much as a mechanism for combating closed verse, but rather as a potential eventual outcome
of projective verse. Before exploring this latter point, I want to raise one concern I think arises in
what we have seen of “Projective Verse” and “Human Universe” thus far.
There is for me a tension which arises in Olson’s insistence that his “fellow citizens” stay
diligently in the present instant, poetically or otherwise, and his arguments for certain historical
discontinuities (CPr 166). That is, as much as Olson’s thinking is inspired by Riemann’s concept
of the continuous manifold, and as much as he incorporates this concept into the third principle of
projective verse (which demands poets stay in the instant and push their process of composition
ever forward), he is oddly adamant that certain events mark transformative breaks in human
history. These discontinuities include: the epistemological shift he posits in 450 BCE which we
have been considering in this section; his desired new history, the dawn of which Olson hopes was
initiated by Ishmael and “La Préface”; and perhaps most counterintuitively given his insistence on
process therein, “Projective Verse” itself proclaims 1950 as the year in which closed verse will
finally be defeated and Olson’s brand of poetics will emerge as the new paradigm. One of the
most intriguing elements in Olson’s thinking is that to be postmodern, to overcome both cultural
modernity and poetic Modernism, is simultaneously to be archaic. Recall that the epistemology
of the archaic world was for Olson radically different from that of the modern world because the
archaic world was one in which myth was responsible for the preservation and dissemination of
knowledge. Thus, projective verse is meant to spark an era of postmodernity in poetry both by
rejecting the humanism of modernity with its objectism, and by producing poetry based on a breath
poetics. As the latter is akin to archaic oral poetic practices, Olson’s proclaimed new poetic
paradigm is, in fact, meant to reinvigorate an archaic form of poetry.
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4.3

Breath, Syllable, and the Intellect in “Projective Verse”
Objectism is, in a sense, Olson’s underlying philosophy at this stage of his career. The

case could be made that it remained his underlying philosophy for the rest of his life. Olson’s
thinking is made up of so many different layers, however, that it is difficult to determine a single
foundational idea in it.

It also seems far too reductive to attempt such a determination.

Nonetheless, objectism allows Olson to reject the tradition of humanism, thereby establishing an
epistemology both old and new, archaic and postmodern. One of the most important consequences
of this philosophical maneuver is the effect it has on Olson’s poetics, specifically the oral-audial
nature of projective verse, as it allows Olson to establish the “solidity” of the breath as a
compositional tool (CPr 244).
After explaining the three guiding principles of projective verse, the next section of the
essay focuses on the relationship between breath, the ear, the syllable, the line, and the role of the
intellect. Olson wants to establish the importance of breath for poetic composition, a role which
he claims “has not…been sufficiently observed or practiced, but which has to be if verse is to
advance to its proper force and place in the day, now and ahead” (CPr 241).14 Breath’s role has
been diminished heretofore due to the rigidity of the “concept of foot” and its “smothering of the
power of the line.” Already an important connection is being made between the breath and the
poetic line, which for Olson runs parallel to the connection between the ear and the syllable, a
notion we will return to shortly. If there is a “lesson” to be learned from projective verse it is,
according to Olson, “that that verse will only do in which a poet manages to register both the
acquisitions of his ear and the pressures of his breath” (italics in original). This lesson first requires
a proper understanding of the role “the smallest particle of all, the syllable” plays in poetry—the
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syllable being for Olson “the king and pin of versification.” That is, the syllable reigns over, in a
sense, “and holds together” the poetic line. Further, syllables, or “particles of sound,” determine
how words in a poem “juxtapose in beauty” as much as “the sense of the words they compose.”
The magnitude Olson assigns the syllable is thus multi-faceted: it is the fundamental building block
of the poetic line; it is responsible for the cohesion of a poetic line; and it is partly responsible for
creating the aesthetic relationship between the words in a poem.
Which syllables get rendered into a poetic line is ultimately a matter of the poet’s choice.
This seems to run counter to the third principle, which insists that poets stay in the act of the instant.
Yet Olson is now beginning to place the poet’s intellect front and center in projective verse,
particularly in relation to the syllable. He asserts:
“[i]n any given instance, because there is a choice of words, the choice, if a
man is in there, will be, spontaneously, the obedience of his ear to the
syllables. The fineness, and the practice, lie here, at the minimum and
source of speech.” (my italics)
For me, there is an inherent tension here. Readers may recall that one of my arguments against
labeling projective verse a practice of improvisation or spontaneity was to acknowledge the role
of the intellect in it. Here, however, Olson is making the claim that a poet can make a choice,
presumably an act of the intellect, but do so spontaneously, which would seem to imply that one
is eschewing the deliberation of the intellect in favor of spontaneity. Admittedly, I may be
misunderstanding Olson’s point, but how exactly we are meant to a) attend to each instant of the
poetic process, b) understand that process as a continuous multiplicity of instants which reflects
the ontological nature of the world, and c) use our intellect to make syllabic decisions in each of
those instants is confusing, to say the least. Olson is adamant, however, that “it is from the union
of the mind and the ear that the syllable is born” (CPr 242).
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Olson moves on with his argument at his typical breakneck speed, revisiting, repeating,
and reiterating his point as he continues along. In this instance, Olson moves on by citing the four
line sixteenth century song “Westron Wynde” (which he transliterates to modern English spelling,
except the word ‘wynd’)—one of only a handful of examples of verse, closed or projective, he
offers in the essay. Olson seems to be using it as an example of closed verse, remarking that we
can correct “prose and verse as now written” by letting the syllable “lead the harmony on” (CPr
241). This is again curious phrasing for me as the harmony of the song he uses as an example, or
any similarly structured song for that matter, would seem to be “lead on” precisely by its syllabic
count and rhyme scheme. Nevertheless, Olson warns us that the practice of using the intellect to
guide minute syllabic choices in each instant is no easy task. According to Olson,
“to step back here to this place of the elements and minims of language, is
to engage speech where it is least careless—and least logical. Listening for
the syllables must be so constant and so scrupulous, the exaction must be so
complete, that the assurance of the ear is purchased at the highest…price.
For from the root out, from all over the place, the syllable comes, the figures
of, the dance:” (CPr 241-42)
The meaning of ‘root’ here is layered, but Olson continues by accentuating the
etymological sense after the colon. Borrowing from an unpublished essay he had written years
earlier, “Mouths Biting Empty Air” (c. 1946), Olson inserts the following: “‘Is’ comes from the
Aryan root, as, to breathe. The English ‘not’ equals the Sanscrit na, which may come from the
root na, to be lost, to perish. ‘Be’ is from bhu, to grow” (CPr 242).15 Thus Olson is equating
breathing and growth—the former being necessary to human life, the latter a natural biological
process for humans and, say, plant roots—through different forms of the verb ‘to be.’ He
juxtaposes this expression of vitality to perishing and the negation of being. In one sense, Olson

See editors’ note, CPr 426. “Mouths Biting Empty Air,” composed 27 October 1946, is available at the Charles
Olson Research Collection.
15
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seems to be saying that breath is the root of poetry, as it shares an etymological root with the
ontological verb (in English, at least). Hence, breath is the life force of poetry and to dismiss its
role in poetic composition would be to compose lifeless verse. Yet he also seems to be implying
that the syllable, as the root of the poetic line, comes from many different places, which sounds
very much like the language of the first principle of projective verse. Hence, in this latter sense,
the root of a projective poem is the causal energies which inspire “the figures of, the dance.” These
words are echoed at the very beginning of Maximus.
The first strophe of the first letter, “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You” (c. 1950), appears
before the numeral 1, which marks the first section proper of this first poem. The title, the numeral
1, the majority of the section marked 1, the following sections 2-6, and at least the first strophe of
those subsequent five sections are aligned fully left. The strophe preceding the numeral 1 is
indented toward the center of the page. Thus, I read it as a proem to the entire epic. Sherman Paul
calls such introductory strophes an “epigraph,” noting the conspicuousness of the epigraph
throughout Olson’s poetry (120).16 Paul asserts that Olson’s poems “are often meditations on”
their epigraphs, “none…as important as the epigraph of the initial poem.” Paul also offers here
one of the great readings of Olson’s poetry, generally, suggesting that by composing poems which
are in essence meditative practices on their respective epigraphs, Olson “dances sitting still”!
Further, Byrd suggests that one possible reading of Maximus is that it is “an exegesis of ‘I,
Maximus of Gloucester, to You’” and the subsequent poem, “‘Maximus, to Gloucester [Letter 2]’”
(62).17 As both Paul’s and Byrd’s readings accentuate the importance of the first five lines of
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Maximus, and considering Olson’s affinity for ancient poetry and Hesiod in particular, my reading
of this first strophe as a proem to the whole of Maximus seems justifiable. The first strophe reads
(MP 5):
Off-shore, by islands hidden in the blood
jewels & miracles, I, Maximus
a metal hot from boiling water, tell you
what is a lance, who obeys the figures of
the present dance
There is much worthy of our analysis here, but to remain inside the present discussion, I
will focus on two moments in particular. That Maximus will tell us “what is a lance” echoes the
idea that projective verse is “projectile.” Though a lance is not necessarily launched in the air,
both it and a projectile are thrust toward an intended target. The syntax of the strophe allows for
simultaneous readings of the last clause. Maximus may be announcing his intention to “tell”
readers “who obeys the figures of the present dance”—presumably any would-be projective
poets—or assuring the reader that he himself will be obeying these figures. I read both meanings
as co-existent. The “figures” Maximus refers to are, based on the related passage in “Projective
Verse,” the syllables themselves. Thus, Maximus is telling us from the beginning that what
follows is not just any epic, but an epic in projective verse, and further that this very epic is itself
a demonstration of what projective verse is. Unfortunately here, Olson’s didacticism comes to the
surface straightaway in Maximus.
I admit to the reader that as much as I love Maximus as a project, I do not care for this
opening strophe. I find the lance-dance rhyme which closes the proem trite, which would seem to
be exactly what Olson wants to avoid. Interestingly, the first letter as it appears in the complete
edition of Maximus (cited above) was revised from the first publication of The Maximus Poems /
1-10 (1953). In this first edition, “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You” began:
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By ear, he sd.
But that which matters, that which insists, that which will last
where shall you find it, my people, how, where shall you listen
when all is become billboards, when all, even silence, is
when even the gulls,
my roofs,
when even you, when sound itself
This opening, left-aligned, then shifts to a more central alignment describing Gloucester as a “sea
city” where “the fixed bells” of Our Lady of Good Voyage “rang” out to the city and the sea. The
alignment and content shifts both accentuate the incomplete syntax of the poem’s opening, which
thus accentuates the suppression of the natural sounds of Gloucester (including the bells of Our
Lady).18 This original opening of Maximus puts the importance of the ear and sound in a more
prominent position in the epic, which for me is a better demonstration of the epic as a projective
project than is the ordering of the first poem on which Olson finally decided.19
Both orderings of “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You” mirror Olson’s emphasis on the
syllable and the ear in “Projective Verse”: the final ordering referencing the importance of the
syllable; the original ordering emphasizing that projective verse is to be sound-oriented rather than
sight-oriented. Taken as a whole, all of this begins to reveal the oral-audial nature of projective
verse. To be sure, Olson is not suggesting that poetry in 1950 and beyond should be strictly an
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instance, “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You” was, in its first form, a letter Olson wrote to the poet and editor
Vincent Ferrini, a fellow Gloucester resident, in May 1950 (ibid. xxx, 5). “Projective Verse” itself comes from
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oral act. In fact, he saw the typewriter as an ally to the poet’s writing process, a point we will
return to below.
In “Projective Verse,” Olson continually compels poets to shift the way they construct their
poetry. This means poets must use their ears and their intellect to guide the syllables, and their
breath to guide the lines. As he puts it, “[t]he two halves are” (CPr 242):20
the HEAD, by way of the EAR, to the SYLLABLE
the HEART, by way of the BREATH, to the LINE
Olson continues that he is “dogmatic, that the head shows in the syllable,” affirming that “[t]he
dance of the intellect is there” (ibid.).21 Thus, he reaffirms that the projective poet’s cognitive
decision-making is most recognizable in the syllable. Olson’s point here is less about the meaning
of the words a poet chooses and rather about the modulation of sounds, the intonation one can
achieve by attending to something as small as a syllable. If the lines of a poem are to be guided
by the poet’s breath, then the syntactical and thematic shifts of the poem will come from it.
Importantly, the syllable and the breath, work in tandem to produce the projective poem:
“And together, these two, the syllable and the line, they make a poem…the
line comes (I swear it) from the breath, from the breathing of the man who
writes, at the moment that he writes, and thus is, it is here that, the daily
work, the WORK, gets in, for only he, the man who writes, can declare, at
every moment, the line its metric and its ending—where its breathing, shall
come to, termination.” (ibid., italics in original)
As in the third principle, Olson again emphasizes the work required in developing as a projective
poet—though in the former instance the argument could be made that Olson is talking about the
working life, in general. The “termination” of a poetic line, based though it may be on the poet’s
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Olson centers these lines in a way which sets them apart from the rest of the paragraph. This gives them the
appearance of two lines of poetry. Hence, I have not placed them in quotation marks here.
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Olson borrows, without attribution, the phrase “the dance of the intellect” from Pound. Pound employed the
phrase to explain ‘logopœia,’ one of “three ‘kinds of poetry’” he describes in his essay “How to Read” (25). The
other two kinds of poetry are ‘melopœia’ and ‘phonopœia.’ The former is revisited below in section 4.4. This is yet
another instance of Pound’s influence on “Projective Verse.”
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breath, is also deeply reliant on the technological apparatus which Olson encourages poets to take
advantage of: the typewriter. Before considering the important, yet often problematized role the
typewriter plays in Olson’s manifesto, I want to make one final point about the relation between
breath, speech, and objectism.
As a poetic principle, breath “allows all the speech-force of language back in” to poetry
(CPr 244, italics in original). Speech, Olson argues, gives a poem its “solidity,” a tangibility akin
to that of physical objects (ibid.). Olson does go on to say that there is an “absolute difference of
the reality of verse from that other dispersed and distributed thing” (CPr 244). He does not
articulate what that other thing is, but presumably he means external reality (i.e., the objects in the
field of space surrounding the human as distinct from the human psyche). Marking such a stark
ontological difference between the objects of the natural world and the poem may seem to
contradict Olson’s own purpose in the essay. However, Olson leads himself into proclaiming this
“absolute difference” after he clarifies what the “OBJECTS” of a poem are “inside a poem, how
they got there, and, once there, how they are to be used” (CPr 243).22 We know from the first
principle that the objects in a poem have gotten there by way of the causal energies which
ultimately inspire the poem. Olson continues
“This is something I want to get to in another way in Part II, but, for the
moment, let me indicate this, that every element in an open poem (the
syllable, the line, as well as the image, the sound, the sense) must be taken
up as participants in the kinetic of the poem just as solidly as we are
accustomed to take what we call the objects of reality; and that these
elements are to be seen as creating the tension of a poem just as totally as
do those other objects create what we know as the world.” (my italics)
I will return to Olson’s pointing ahead to part II which I emphasized in a moment. Returning to
the present discussion, Olson states that the poet must treat the objects of a poem “which occur at
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every given moment of composition”—or, Olson adds parenthetically, the moment of
“recognition”—as they “occur” to her recognition, “as a series of objects in field.” Just as, say, a
scientist has to investigate phenomena objectively, without preconceived notions of what an
unexplained phenomenon or previously unencountered object is, a poet must handle the objects of
a poem without introducing “any ideas or preconceptions from outside the poem.”23 This is not to
say, however, that the poem is not effected by external reality. Surely the first principle of
projective verse establishes this much. Olson reiterates this in the passage in question, stating that
the poem is a cohesion of “a series of tensions” which “hold exactly inside the context of the poem
which has forced itself, through the poet” and the objects of the poem “into being” (CPr 243-244).
As mentioned, the poem’s being has solidity because it is a product of the poet’s breath.
Such a potential contradiction, which some readers may in fact view as an actual
contradiction, no doubt inspires, in part, the position Andrew Ross has taken in his book The
Failures of Modernism. Therein, Ross argues that Olson’s project is an “ambitious attempt to
modify the classical realist position of reflecting or reproducing the world ‘as it really is’” (98).
Ross concludes that Olson’s attempt, inevitably, does not succeed. Reading “Projective Verse,”
in particular, as making this “promise,” he asserts that despite the essay’s “anti-aesthetic bluster”
it nevertheless “insists on observing two separate cognitive registers, the inside and the outside of
the poem” (ibid.). Ross cites as evidence the beginning of part II, in which objectism is defined,
where Olson reassures readers that he is returning to what was “promised” in the preamble,
namely, that he will explain “the degree to which the projective involves a stance toward reality
outside the poem as well as a news stance towards the reality of a poem itself” (CPr 246). Though

23

Whether or not this is possible for the scientist or the poet is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I am
sympathetic to the viewpoint that an inevitable ‘researcher’s bias,’ or psychological bias in the case of the poet, will
effect the research/poetic composition process.

128
Olson does indeed end the sentence here, Ross conveniently ends his citation here accordingly.
We will revisit this in the next section, where I will highlight that it is how Olson continues in the
very next sentence, which Ross does not analyze, that puts what Ross has excerpted into its
appropriate context. Even without seeing here how Olson continues from this statement, it seems
that Ross is reading “as well as” as disjunctive. That is, he is interpreting Olson as saying that
projective verse is both a stance toward external reality (“reality outside a poem”) and a stance
regarding the poem itself, and that these are two distinct stances about two distinct things. As I
read it, however, Olson is using “as well as” as conjunctive. He is rather, I believe, stating his
intention to clarify how the proposed stances toward reality and the poem are of a piece.
Despite a worry over the potential contradiction between Olson’s assertion of an “absolute
difference” between the objects of the poem and the objects of the external world, I am not
convinced this is so problematic. I do think we can fairly criticize Olson of being unclear and
inconsistent here. I would also add that this is him being overzealous in trying to give priority to
speech as a privileged object in the larger field of objects. When he moves on to part II and
explains objectism, however, I think any potential concerns should be relieved.

Hence, I

emphasized above his own mention of the fact that he would further clarify his point in part II. A
perceived contradiction in the passage we have been analyzing is, at the very least, another
indication of the potential troubles with projective style. Consider further that Maximus can be
read, in a sense, as a series of starts, stops, restarts and returns to previous points which Olson
perhaps felt could be made more clearly. Nonetheless, based on our discussion of objectism above,
I am convinced that Olson believed in the ontological likeness of the objects in a poem and the
objects of the external world. To be sure, they may be different types of objects. Poems are oralaudial objects; trees, chairs, sidewalks, birds and such are solid objects. I take it that Olson’s
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objectism is meant to establish that the physicality of the former type is akin to that of the latter
type. The very fact he opens the essay by offering the term ‘percussive’ as one of three definitions
for projective verse suggests he understands the physical reality of sound, both in the sense of its
being a vibration and in the sense that human reception of sound entails the brain detecting the
pressure variances which constitute sound waves. To ask a frank question: why else would Olson
go to such lengths to establish the solidity of the breath?
I may simply be reluctant to admit this potential contradiction, but I take the difference he
asserts here as supporting his previous claim that there is an energy “peculiar to verse alone” (CPr
240). Following his comment about the “absolute difference” of the two types of objects, he states
that in a projective poem “each of these elements” (i.e., the objects in a poem and the objects of
the external world) “can be allowed to have the play of their separate energies and can be allowed,
once the poem is well composed, to keep, as those other objects do, their proper confusions” (CPr
244). Regarding the objects of verse, the “confusions” include: the juxtapositions of syllables,
words, images, and sounds; and tonal, topical and syntactical shifts of the poem. In terms of the
second principle, this would be differences at the level of content. As for the confusions of the
objects of the external world, I assume Olson is suggesting that there is ultimately something about
the nature of the universe which we cannot know, a final mystery. This is a reasonable conclusion
given his interest in the mysteries of ancient, ritualistic religions. How much this would have
influenced his use of the term “confusions” here, however, I can only speculate.
If Olson is suggesting here that we are consigned to be confused by the objects of the
external world in the phenomenological sense, this is a position which clearly changed by the time
he came to write “Human Universe.” Recall that there he argued that we are “confronted by…the
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thing itself” (CPr 158).24 Perhaps it is the case that he strengthened his arguments for objectism
in general in the latter essay. Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that Olson’s arguments in
“Projective Verse” are consistent enough to establish that breath, the ear, and speech gives poetry
a physicality which his objectism grounds, entails, and would seem to demand. As Olson puts it,
with the solidity of speech brought back into the poem, “everything in it can now be treated as
solids, objects, things” (CPr 244).

4.4

Orality and Text in “Projective Verse”
We now turn our attention to the elephant in the projective room, as it were. Many readers

and critics declare an inherent tension, if not an outright contradiction, between Olson’s assertions
that projective verse is a breath poetics and champions speech’s role therein, and his repeatedly
stating the importance of the typewriter for its composition. Is projective verse composed with
breath and speech, or is it a matter of sitting down and typing out a poem? How can we reconcile
Olson’s oral-audial poetics with his own production of numerous written texts? Does Olson’s
poetry adhere to his own insistence that poetics lines should be guided by the breath? How does
this effect the reading of his published poetry? I will attempt to alleviate this tension by arguing
that: a) the mechanics of producing projective verse, an oral-audial poetics, as a written (or more
accurately, typed in the context of the essay) presentation of poetry is a consistent position for
Olson to hold; b) it is a consistent position because Olson clearly subordinates the typewriter to a
function of visually representing the poet’s breath; c) linguistic analysis has shown that Olson’s
poetry does follow certain breath patterns consistent with his statements in “Projective Verse”; and
d) research in the field of orality, broadly speaking, supports Olson’s position, and aligns it with
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archaic oral poetics more closely than most critics realize. The first two points are the focus of the
remainder of this section.
To begin, Olson believed that poetry in his time had lost its oral component in large part
because of print publication practices and the resultant standardized visualization of poetry (leftaligned, set stanza forms, etc.). Olson argues that his contemporaries, and presumably their
predecessors, had “suffered from…manuscript, press, the removal of verse from its producer and
its reproducer, the voice, a removal by one, by two removes from its place of origin and its
destination” (CPr 245, my italics). A poem’s place of origin in this context refers to the poet
producing the verse by her breath and voice; the poem’s destination then is the eventual reader.
Poets, at least, must not feel resigned to standard print practices. In fact, Olson believed that
projective verse could be greatly aided by the then modern technology of the typewriter. With it,
crucially, poets could better utilize the space of the page to convey to readers how a poem should
be read. This entails where and for how long pauses should occur and where the reader should
breathe. The “irony” here, Olson tells us, is that “from the machine has come one gain not yet
sufficiently observed or used, but which leads directly on toward projective verse and its
consequences” (ibid.). He continues:
It is the advantage of the typewriter that, due to its rigidity and its space
precisions, it can, for a poet, indicate exactly the breath, the pauses, the
suspensions even of syllables, the juxtapositions even of parts of phrases,
which he intends. For the first time the poet has the stave and the bar a
musician has had. For the first time he can, without the convention of rime
and meter, record the listening he has done to his own speech and by that
one act indicate how he would want any reader, silently or otherwise, to
voice his work.” (CPr 245)
Note that Olson is not proclaiming that projective verse must be read aloud (though, on a personal
note I firmly believe poetry should be read aloud and admit to consistently disappointing myself
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in this regard.) Even a silent reading of a projective poem can be aided by its typography. The
main thrust of this passage is the equating of the poem’s typography to musical scoring.25
To be sure, equating poetry with music was not innovative on Olson’s part. In an essay
titled “How to Read,” published roughly twenty years prior to “Projective Verse,” Pound had
described ‘melopœia’ as a kind of poetry in which “words are charged, over and above their plain
meaning, with some musical property, which directs the bearing or trend of that meaning” (25).
The use of the term ‘charged’ seems to give words an electromagnetic property. This idea may
have influenced, in part, Olson’s language in the first principle, though I have no hard evidence to
support this claim. Later in the essay, Pound describes melopœia as “poetry on the borders of
music,” adding that “music is perhaps the bridge between consciousness and the unthinking
sentient or even insentient universe” (26). This latter notion appears to be an attempt to name that
which may “bridge” the subjective and objective worlds. I think Olson would read this as far too
humanist a perspective for the very fact it posits such a dichotomy, preferring his own objectism
instead. Nonetheless, Pound’s ideas on poetry and music would have been well known to Olson.
T.S. Eliot also spoke of the connection between music and poetry, most notably in a 1942 lecture
titled “The Music of Poetry.” Therein, Eliot claims that “[e]very revolution in poetry is apt to be,
and sometimes to announce itself to be, a return to common speech” (339). Though Olson never
mentions ‘common speech’ explicitly, much of his poetry is written in an everyday language often
associated with postmodern poetry, part of the latter’s response to what is viewed as the stilted
language of preceding poetries. Eliot would go on to suggest that “[t]he music of poetry…must
be a music latent in the common speech of its time. And that means also that it must be latent in

I am adopting the term ‘typography’ here to stand for the visual presentation of the poetic text, largely to avoid
confusion that may occur from using the term ‘form.’ Note however that in the previous chapter I included the
typography and visual layout of the poem in my definition of ‘form.’ For the definition of ‘form’ given in Ch. 3, see
pp. 75-76. For a discussion of form in “Projective Verse” more generally, see section 3.2.2, pp. 83-89.
25
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the common speech of the poet’s place” (340).26 This latter sentiment is one Olson shared, a point
we will return to later. It bears mention that Pound’s and Eliot’s theories on the intersection of
music and poetry did not exactly coincide. The point here is that the conversation about this
intersection was part of the discourse of American poetry of the first half of the twentieth century,
at the end of which Olson was composing “Projective Verse.” Hence, his equating poetry and
music should not surprise us.
In describing the advantages the typewriter can have for such a “scoring” of a poem, Olson
explicitly credits Pound and other Modernists for this innovation. He encourages his fellow poets
to implement the typographical advancements made by “the experiments of Cummings, Pound,
Williams, each of whom has, after his way, already used the machine [i.e., the typewriter] as a
scoring to his composing, as a script to its vocalization” (CPr 245). Olson hoped that with such
technological advantages at their disposal, projective poets could “bring into being an open verse
as formal as the closed” (ibid.). ‘Formal’ here does not mean the standardized stanza structure and
rhyme scheme of closed verse; rather, Olson is conveying that a more projective typography of the
words on the page could become common practice not only for poets, but also for publishers. One
result would be a readership both familiar with and fluent in projective scoring. The fluent reader
would thus be aware that where
“a contemporary poet leaves a space as long as the phrase before it, he
means that space to be held, by the breath, an equal length of time. If he
suspends a word or syllable at the end of a line (this was Cummings’
addition) he means that time to pass that it takes the eye—that hair of time
suspended—to pick up the next line. If he wishes a pause so light it hardly
separates the words, yet does not want a comma—which is an interruption
of the meaning rather than the sounding of the line—follow him when he
uses a symbol the typewriter has ready to hand:…” (CPr 245–46)

Eliot’s lecture was then published later in 1942. Wallace Stevens makes an almost identical point in his poem “Of
Modern Poetry,” published that same year, when he asserts that modern poetry “has to…learn the speech of the
place” (see Stevens 1990, 240).
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Thus, in a projective typography, white spaces are intended to guide the reader’s breath. Larger
white spaces between words and lines are meant to indicate the measure of the pause to be observed
between reading (silently or aloud) the words. In terms of the poem’s content, white space can
also be used to indicate shifts in syntax, tone, or topic—such as the example given above regarding
the original ordering of “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You.”27 Olson’s commentary that a comma
interrupts the meaning of a line as opposed to its sounding is interesting. One of the symbols he
is suggesting poets employ, though not explicitly so here, is the ‘/’ (forward slash), a common
symbol throughout his poetry where it often appears in the middle of a single line. Following the
colon in the passage above, Olson then cites the opening line of his poem “The Kingfisher” (c.
1949), which begins:28
What does not change / is the will to change
Hence, without delving into the meaning of the line, the forward slash here is indicating that a
slight pause should be observed between the two parts of the whole line. Other symbols Olson
employs in his poetry include elongated ellipses (i.e., more than three dots, though he also uses the
conventional three-dot ellipsis), and hyphens. I read his frequent use of open parentheses as
marking content and tonal shifts, rather than indications of pauses to the reader.29
Olson’s explicit acknowledgement of his Modernist predecessors here is important not only
for the fact that he presents the three guiding principles of projective verse largely as his own
innovation (save citing Creeley and Dahlberg in the second and third principles, respectively), but
also for the fact that it establishes projective verse as a further development of Modernist

27

See p. 20 above.
This line was also cited in a different context in a footnote in Ch. 2 (see p. 58 above). Note also that “The
Kingfishers” was composed the year prior to Olson’s composing “Projective Verse.” For me, this indicates that
Olson was developing his projective poetics before he wrote his manifesto.
29
The success of Olson’s typography, including his citing the first line of “The Kingfishers” as an example of how it
is meant to work, will be revisited in the next chapter.
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techniques, at least where typography is concerned. Hence Olson is implying that poetry did not
require improved typographical mechanics in 1950 to become projective. Rather, Olson is
stressing that poets can better record the intended sounds of their poetry by adopting typographical
strategies innovated by certain Modernists poets, Pound and Williams chief among them. He notes
that the essay’s
“emphasis on the typewriter as the personal and instantaneous recorder of
the poet’s work, is the already projective nature of verse as sons of Pound
and Williams are practicing it. Already they are composing as though verse
was to have the reading its writing involved, as though not the eye but the
ear was to be its measurer, as though the intervals of its composition could
be so carefully put down as to be precisely the intervals of its registration.”
(CPr 246)
It is how he continues this passage that is particularly striking. Olson suggests that using the
available typographical tools to more accurately present the intended oral and sonic shifts of a
poem has consequences beyond increasing the likelihood that one’s poetry will be read as intended
in the future. Training ourselves to type and read in such a way, that is, with more attention to the
oral and speech qualities of projective poetry, can have a profound feedback on our cognitive
capacity for orality. His final statement on the typewriter, the “means” for producing projective
poetry, in is:
“For the ear, which once had the burden of memory to quicken it (rime &
regular cadence were its aids and have merely lived on in print after the oral
necessities were ended) can now again, that the poet has his means, be the
threshold of projective verse.” (ibid., my italics)
Olson exhibits here an almost prescient understanding of orality studies, which he would
have had only a cursory knowledge of at this time of his career, a topic to which we will return. 30
This specific mention of orality here echoes sentiments from elsewhere in the essay. For example,
early in part II Olson introduces his new stance (objectism) by stating “the degree to which the

30

See p. 48 above.
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projective involves a stance toward reality outside a poem as well as a new stance towards the
reality of a poem itself…is a matter of content, the content of Homer or of Euripides or of Seami
as distinct from that which I might call the more ‘literary’ masters” (CPr 246-47, my italics).31
The common thread of the content Olson is referring to here is orality, though to be sure he lists
three different kinds of poets from three different eras. Homer is, of course, a paradigm of epic
orality. Euripides and “Seami” are both playwrights, which implies the oral performance of their
work.

This demonstrates Olson’s frequent re-categorization of figures writing in different

languages and historical periods, a key element in his pedagogy. 32 In this specific context, Olson
is arguing that by adopting the projective method—“the beginning and the end” of which “is
breath, voice in its largest sense”—the content a poet is producing will automatically change
accordingly, presumably to a more oral poetry (CPr 247).33 The responsibility ultimately lies with
the “composer.” Once the poet moves ahead working in projective verse, two changes are effected.
First, the “dimension” of the poet’s line is changed. This has multiple meanings. The projective
line works by a new standard of measure, formally and typographically. As such its dimension,
or extension in space across the page, will be visibly different from that of closed verse. Further,
the geometrical dimension poetry now occupies is that of the “projective act, which is the artist’s
act in the larger field of objects.” This, of course, is another expression of how objectism effects
and grounds projective verse. Olson asserts that the “projective act” itself “leads to dimensions
larger than the man.” The second change effected by adopting projective verse is psychological,
a fundamental change in how the poet “conceiv[es], of the matter he will turn to, of the scale in
which he imagines that matter’s use.” The geometrical, or dimensional shifts, thus imply a shift

31

Zeami Motokiyo was a fourteenth-fifteenth century Japanese playwright and actor. Olson refers to him as a poet
in a letter to Corman written over a decade later, in 1961 (see Editors’ Notes, CPr 427).
32
For more on Olson’s pedagogy see pp. 16-23 above.
33
This and following citations until noted.
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in scale. This language reinforces the physicality of projective verse, a physicality which has dual
components: the naturalist impulses of objectism, and the physiology of breath poetics. Olson
brings these elements together toward the end of the essay, introducing a challenge inherent in
adopting the projective methodology. The “problem” a poet will inevitably encounter when
“tak[ing] speech up in all its fullness”, is how
“to give his work his seriousness, a seriousness sufficient to cause the thing
he makes to try to take its place alongside the things of nature…But breath
is man’s qualification as animal. Sound is a dimension he has extended.
Language is one of his proudest acts. And when a poet rests in these as they
are in himself (in his physiology, if you like, but the life in him, for all that)
then he, if he chooses to speak from these roots, works in that area where
nature has given him size, projective size.” (CPr 247-48)
The return to a larger poetry entails that poets will be composing more drama and epics.
Both are, for Olson, oral poetries, drama at least when done correctly (or, projectively).34 They
are also both performance poetries. That Olson aims to reinvigorate ancient orality and attendant
forms of poetry is, to return us to the beginning of “Projective Verse,” something he states toward
the outset of the essay. The last point he makes in the preamble, immediately before enumerating
the guiding principles of projective verse, is that the stance projective verse requires “involves…a
change beyond, and larger than, the technical, and may, the way things look, lead to new poetics,
and to new concepts from which some sort of drama, say, or of epic, perhaps, may emerge” (CPr
239, my italics).

Olson takes issue with the dramas of T.S. Eliot, for example, problematic because they are “non-projective” (see
CPr 248).
34
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CHAPTER 5. THE LAW OF THE LINE: BREATH, TYPOGRAPHY AND
THE ORAL POSSIBILITIES OF PROJECTIVE VERSE

5.1

Introduction
The previous two chapters have focused on projective verse as ‘projectile’ and

‘percussive,’ more or less respectively. It remains to be seen how Olson intended projective verse
to be ‘prospective.’ The present chapter will examine this aspect of projective verse as it manifests
in Olson’s concept of history. I hope to demonstrate that for Olson, his concept of history was
deeply intertwined with his concept of orality. If we read Maximus as an oral epic, as I prefer to
read it, the dovetailing of these two concepts becomes that much clearer.
We will start by continuing our discussion of Olson’s oral poetics, concerning ourselves
here with more practical questions that have yet to be addressed. Does projective verse actually
work as the breath poetics Olson intended it to be? Does he effectively implement the typewriter
to score his poems? Given his desire to reinvigorate the oral-audial nature of poetry, how did
Olson’s own writing process work? To answer these questions, we will consider some criticism
which claims that Olson’s poetry, as presented in text, does not guide the reading his typographical
scoring intends. However, we will also consider Marcia R. and Philip Lieberman’s sonic analysis
of recordings of Olson and others reading his poetry, which contends that indeed Olson’s breath
poetics do hold in these recordings. To navigate these two opposed positions, I will incorporate
more recent scholarship in Homeric and orality studies. I will argue that given the fluidity of
orality and literacy, reading Maximus as an oral poem despite its textual presentation is not a
contradictory position to hold, especially when considering the relationship these two concepts
have in Olson’s thinking.
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5.2

Olson’s Breath Poetics: Are they Plausible?
Readers may remain unconvinced of the orality projective verse aims to reinvigorate. The

tension inherent in a textual presentation of oral poetry is reasonable cause for concern. Olson’s
appeals to the breath, speech and orality alone do not suffice for many readers. Anecdotally, I
have been asked many times how I reconcile these two seemingly contradictory elements of
projective verse. Further, critics often circle back to the emphasis on the typewriter in “Projective
Verse,” or flatly reject that the typography of Olson’s poems successfully indicates how it is to be
read, or, at least, intended to be read. Olson’s own concerns with the typography of his poems
would only support that skepticism.1
Take for example some excerpts from Olson’s letters to Donald Allen, who published
Olson’s poetry in the era-defining anthology The New American Poetry, 1945-1960 and other
volumes, in their collected correspondence Poet to Publisher (2003). Allen worked at Grove Press
for roughly sixteen years, from the end of his service as a translator for the U.S. military during
World War II until 1960 (at which time he left Grove and established the Grey Fox Press). During
his time at Grove, Allen was responsible in part for editing the Evergreen Review, a literary journal
which published many influential and international writers and artists of the postwar period,
including American poets Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, and Frank O’Hara. Allen was not
familiar with Olson’s work until 1956, when two other American poets, Robin Blaser and John
Wieners, read and shared some of Olson’s poems with him (Olson and Allen 7).2 Allen admits to
having been “quite impressed by Call Me Ishmael and the other Olson material [he’d] read,” which

To reiterate, in this discussion, ‘typography’ means the visual presentation of the poem, including the spacing,
font, and extension and indentation of poetic lines across the physical page. This fell under the term ‘form’ in Ch. 3,
in the discussion of the second principle of projective verse. I have adopted ‘typography’ here to align with Olson’s
emphasis on the importance of the typewriter for projective verse.
2
This and following citations until noted.
1
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inspired him to write to Olson in August of 1957 “to ask if he’d be interested in submitting a
volume of poems” to Grove. Earlier that year, Allen had started to sense a connection between
the poetries of Blaser, Ginsberg, O’Hara and Olson, among others. Reflecting on “a possible
movement” he “saw happening in American poetry,” Allen had been thinking about publishing an
anthology to collect this postwar American poetry in one edition. That still hypothetical anthology
would eventually become The New American Poetry. Ralph Maud, editor of Poet to Publisher,
which collects Olson’s letters to Allen between August 1957 and September 1969, writes that the
letters capture “the inside story of the publishing history of The New American Poetry” and other
Olson volumes Grove published (ibid. 9). Allen, Maud asserts, “had a crucial role” in Olson’s
career “commanding for Olson the wide audience that established his reputation” (ibid.). Reading
the letters, it is clear Olson has a reverence for Allen, and considers him a friend as much as a
professional ally. Olson’s letters give the impression that he thinks that Allen gets him, as it
were—that Allen understands the importance of the typography of his projective poems but also
that Allen understands his meticulous (and, frankly, obsessive) approach to finalizing his poems
and his conviction and interesting how they will look on the page. Below are two examples of
their correspondence, the second of which I cite at length. These examples demonstrate the level
of detail in Olson’s thoughts about the typography of his poems. The longer excerpt in particular
further demonstrates the energy of Olson’s personality, and how the projective style pervades all
of his writing, his letters being particularly good examples of this.
From a letter written 4 December 1957 (ibid. 19):
By the way – one thing the Mother poem does raise (as, I imagine
any of my long lines. The whole effects goofs, if they are
hooked (as they were say on the M poem, as printed in Ark)
so serious is this, that I question the wisdom of publishing
them if the gutters of any magazine won’t hold the long line.
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I myself happen to like small point type ( but whether, if the
page is set, it is possible to print a poem in the midst of
others with a smaller pt than the rest of the mag?????
The “Mother poem” refers to “As the Dead Prey Upon Us” (c. 1956), a meditation on the death of
Olson’s mother inspired by a dream, originally published in Ark II/Moby 1 (1956-1957).3 The
“gutters” Olson is referring to are the margins of the “magazine[s]” that may publishing some of
his verse, including the Evergreen Review issue (no. 4) which was the cause for this
correspondence (ibid. 17-18). At issue here is Olson’s concern that his longer lines of poetry will
not stretch out across the page as he intends them to, in effect creating a situation where single
lines of his poetry will be printed as two.
This would irk Olson for the rest of his career, as evidenced in his Selected Writings (1966).
The last two sections (IV and V) of the collection feature Olson’s poetry. A short note at the
beginning of section IV, dedicated to non-Maximus poems, reads:
The lines which hook-over should be read
as though they lay out right and flat to the
horizon or Eternity.
Note by Charles Olson
for this book, 1966.
Olson is instructing readers that lines which continue over (“hook-over”) to a subsequent
line which is then indented considerably over to the right of the page should be read without pause
as if it were one single line of type extending past the margin of the physical book. Take for
example the first line of section 4 of “Letter 3” (c. 1952-53) from Maximus (MP 13-16). In the
complete edition of Maximus it appears:

Isolated person in Gloucester, Massachusetts, I, Maximus, address you4

3
4

See CP 388-395. For the publications history of “As the Dead Prey Upon Us,” see CP 658.
MP 16.
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However, in Selected Writings, a book of much smaller physical dimensions, it appears thus:

Isolated person in Gloucester, Massachusetts, I, Maximus,
address you5
In this example, it would not seem that much of a pause would be created by forcing the reader to
shift her eyes just below the end of the “first line” to pick up its last two words on the next line.
Recall though that Olson’s projective typography insists that white space should indicate the
measure of a pause. Such a “hook-over” as we see above seems to be exactly what he was referring
to in “Projective Verse” when he claimed that where a poet “suspends a word or syllable at the
end of a line…he means that time to pass that it takes the eye—that hair of time suspended—to
pick up the next line” (CPr 245). 6 Of course, Olson’s hands were presumably tied by the
publisher’s (New Directions) design for this particular book. By way of comparison, where
Maximus measures at (W x H) 6

7/

8”

x 10 1/16”, Selected Writings measures at 5 ¼” x 8 ¼”.7 As

such, it cannot be argued that the above example from “Letter 3” contradicts his statements on
typography in “Projective Verse.”8 Of course, to suggest as much was not the intention here.
Rather, I want to point out that Olson was so deeply concerned about the typography of his poetry
that he, apparently, insisted on including a note of instruction to readers in Selected Writings. To
add some context, the above example from “Letter 3” is from the final section, which is only three
lines. The subsequent two lines to that cited above consist of two and four words, respectively.

5

SW 229.
For better context to Olson’s statement cited here, see pp. 133-134 above.
7
I note here that I took these measurements myself with a Stanley® 25’ tape measure, model no. 30-455 in yellow.
All measurements should be taken as approximate.
8
Though I do not have the measurements for Maximus / 1- 10 (1953), in which “Letter 3” was first published,
having seen it I would estimate it is as measuring slightly bigger than the complete Maximus, and certainly bigger
than Selected Writings. I cannot comment on the subsequent 1960 edition of volume 1 of Maximus, also titled The
Maximus Poems (New York: Jargon/Corinth, 1960), but I imagine it is also closer to the dimensions of the complete
edition.
6
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To avoid taking a larger excerpt of Maximus out of context, I will only add here that some of its
longer single lines when reproduced in Selected Writings have much more than two words
continued over the line break, and come in the middle of strophes of longer and shorter lines
presenting dense content. One can imagine how frustrating dealing with smaller page dimensions
must have been for Olson.
I offer one final, longer example from Olson’s 18 December 1957 letter to Allen to
conclude this demonstration:9
…And do what you choose about how to print the Lordly
Ones. I trust yr judgement (even tho I can’t claim any such advantage as Blake
Whit Dh and the Ginz! for they, no matter what, are in the old “line”—and my
own, for better or worse, teeters on those feather edges of all-out flat
open-field lengths, UN-broken). But I sure see the problem. Cld you maybe show
me proofs? In case something wld occur to me? Because the “paragraphing” gets
shot to hell when the lines hook over like that, 1 M or left or right pt 10 or
pt 2 (I suppose that latter is what I love!
By the way, what pt type is newsprint?
As of yr question abt the last 4 stanzas (what I call paragraphs. I see yr
point, I think. They can be treated as prose—so long as the beginning of each
is placed as I have it, that is, opening over there to the right, and with just
those words in that opening line of the para. OK? So that the last para “They
go. And the day” slides off just there to the right. Right?
(Do you ask this
because it will take care of of most of the problems of the long line—in 11 point?
[…]
NOTE NOTE: my god! maybe the answer on The Satyrs wld be to do throu? look.
Before I say more on it cld you tell me exactly how many letters your page line
from gutter to gutter does—is able—to contain; and then let me do a count-down
on every line in the poem as it stands/ thus make a “perfect copie” for the
printer?????? (That is, tell me how many of my machine’s point yr line wld take;
and I try to arrange it so effect is right in the mss as it will be in print.)

9

I have attempted to reproduce this here as closely as possible to how it appears in Poet to Publisher. This includes
the lines breaks, punctuation, spacing, spelling and the repeated ‘of’ just before the break. The ellipsis in square
brackets is my insertion, indicating that there is a short paragraph that has been omitted here.
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In this example, Olson is discussing his poem “The Lordly and Isolate Satyrs” (c. 1956), which
was published in the spring of 1958 in the Evergreen Review no. 4.10 He also makes references to
poets William Blake, Walt Whitman (an innovator and master of syllabically long lines of verse),
D.H. Lawrence, and Ginsberg, who have the “advantage” of being “in the old ‘line.’” That is,
Olson is claiming that the four aforementioned poets write lines of verse which are already limited
by print conventions, and thus they need not worry as much as Olson does about how they will
appear in print. As mentioned, Whitman has very long lines which appear to “hook-over” even in
his Complete Poems. It also strikes me as odd that Olson would label Ginsberg as a poet of the
old line. Ginsberg is generally regarded as one of the more innovative and influential poets of the
postwar period. I read these kinds of statements from Olson as his continual efforts to establish
his own innovations, but this comes across as obstinate. Nonetheless, the longer excerpt above
clearly shows how much thinking Olson was doing regarding the typography of his poetry
publications and the patience this would have exacted from his editors.
As Paul Christensen has observed, however, Olson often corrected his originally
typewritten compositions with handwritten revisions. In his book Call Him Ishmael, Christensen
includes images of drafts of “In Cold Hell, In Thicket” (c. 1950) and the aforementioned “I,
Maximus of Gloucester, to You” (c. 1950).11 Though Christensen does not make a note of this
fact, it is interesting that both poems were composed in the spring of 1950 at around the same time
Olson was composing the letters to Frances Boldereff and Robert Creeley that would eventually
become “Projective Verse,” published in the fall of 1950. Of “In Cold Hell, In Thicket,”
Christensen says the blending of a typewritten original with later handwritten corrections “show[s]

See CP 384-387. For the publications history of “The Lordly and Isolate Satyrs,” see CP 658.
See, “In Cold Hell, In Thicket, CP 155-160; and “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You, MP 5-8. For previous
discussion of the latter, see pp. 122-124 above.
10
11
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Olson’s careful revisions, especially his attention to placement of language on the page,” noting
that “[f]irst versions of poems were composed on the typewriter, followed by handwritten
concisions and recastings” (n.p.). While this is often the case, I can confirm based on personal
research that among Olson’s unpublished materials available in the Charles Olson Research
Collection there are numerous notes, notebooks, letters, lectures notes and complete papers which
were originally composed by hand. Further, this archive also includes many of his published
essays and poems which were originally composed by hand, and then typed later. Christensen
may be generalizing Olson’s preference to compose first on the typewriter to make the point that
Olson would often correct by hand, but the archival evidence indicates this was not a universal
practice for Olson. Nonetheless, Christensen’s insights are valuable. For example, regarding the
typescript of “I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You,” he argues that “[a]lthough Olson remarked that
the typewriter was a machine for exact scoring of the poet’s intentions, these revisions suggest that
he worked at typographical arrangement more freely with pen in hand” (n.p., my italics).12 That
Olson could intertwine breath poetics, the chirographic mechanics, and the technology of the
typewriter to produce what he envisioned as an oral composition is not contradictory, as evidenced
by the dictation practices of ancient, and primarily oral, cultures. We will return to this idea in the
next section, but for now I want to address the critical skepticism of Olson’s projective typography
and breath poetics.
Where critics are concerned, many reject the notion that Olson’s typography can properly
guide a reader’s breath patterns in the manner he intends his poetry to be read—even that poetry
which was published in a typography he approved. To take just two examples, both David Herd
and Daniel Katz express such sentiments in their respective contributions to Contemporary Olson.

The images of these typescripts and Christensen’s comments in the captions appear on unnumbered pages
between pp. 112 and 113 in Christensen 1979.
12
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Readers may recall that the latter is an anthology of critical essays on Olson published in 2015. I
note this here to highlight the fact that such rejections of the plausibility of projective typography
are not dated, but rather have been a consistent criticism of “Projective Verse” and continue to the
present.
On Herd’s reading, “Olson’s claim that the breath is the determinant of prosody can’t hold
good; one can’t in any meaningful sense square the spaces on the page with the passage or duration
of the poet’s breath” (Herd 2015c, 276).13 He goes on to argue that the role Olson assigns to the
breath in projective verse rather “underline[s]” the fact that poetry is a human act. As such, poetry
is imbued with “an acute sense of the finitude of the human form.” While Herd’s conclusion
regarding the presence of the finite “human form” pervading Olson’s (and by extension all) poetry
is insightful, there is evidence to support a counterargument that his premise is incorrect, as we
shall see.
Katz’s superb essay explores postmodern prosody and typography, juxtaposing Olson’s
projective verse to Jack Spicer’s concept of ‘dictation.’ Starting with the premise that projective
verse aims to “proximate” the poet’s “interiority – the natural rhythm of his breathing,” Katz
asserts that Spicer’s poetics “can be seen as just the opposite” (78). In ‘dictation,’ as opposed to
being “an Olsonian launching pad,” the poet is “‘something which is being transmitted into’ from
what Spicer calls the ‘Outside’, a space of radical otherness” (ibid.).14 I do not intend to comment
on Spicer’s poetics, or Katz’s explanation of them here. Given the research and strength of the
arguments in the essay, and what little I know of Spicer’s poetry, I trust that Katz’s portrayal of
Spicer is accurate. I do, however, think we can respond to his portrayal of Olson’s poetics to
suggest that projective verse and ‘dictation’ are not quite as different as Katz argues they are.

13
14

This and following citations until noted.
Internal citations are from Spicer 1998, 7.
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Recall that the projective poet is sending out a ‘projectile’ of sorts to the audience, a point
Katz acknowledges. The first principle of projective verse, “the kinetics of the thing,” states that
a poem comes from causal energies. These energies, when external to the poet, inhabit an energy
field, or, a field of objects. For Olson, this field of objects constitutes nature, or space. Olson
describes poetry as an energy-exchange: the poem comes from the causal energies in the object
field, and is then transmitted through the poet out to the audience. In this sense Olson would seem
to align with Spicer in that the poem comes from outside the poet. Of course, Olson would argue
that the causal energies of a poem can also come from “inside” a poet, for example in the case of
a poem inspired by a dream—a point we will return to momentarily. Nonetheless, based on
Olson’s philosophy of objectism, the “solidity” of the breath renders it, and the poem it is
transmitting, as objects themselves in the larger field of objects. Hence, both the external (nonhuman) objects and the poet’s breath, and the poem itself, exist equally as objects in nature. By
describing the projective poet as a mere “launching pad,” Katz’s diminishes, in my view, the poet’s
reception of the causal energies which inspire the poem, the role of the intellect in projective verse,
and the “percussive” quality of the breath—that is, the physical, external reality of the poet’s
breath.
If Katz is arguing, and indeed if Spicer’s position is, that poetry can only come from outside
the poet, this may be reasonable ground for contrasting the two poetics. Certainly Olson seems to
think that one possible causal energy of a poem (which, to reiterate, has multiple causal energies)
could be the emotional or psychological state of the poet, as evidenced by his many poems which
express, in part, biographical anecdotes, personal recollections, and his psychological states. I
would counter here, however, that these states are affected by the external world to a significant
degree, though as noted above I do not think Olson is a physicalist in this regard. On my reading,
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the primary distinction Katz draws between the two poets is that where Spicer posits the ‘Outside’
as “a space of radical otherness,” Olson does not consider the external world radically other (as
our discussion of objectism will have hopefully demonstrated). In fact, objectism is making the
case, perhaps not successfully for all readers, for the ontological similarity between the breath and
the natural world, which can be distinguished only as different in type, not different in kind. On
this latter score, Katz may be aligned with Andrew Ross here in reading Olson’s claim for the
“absolute difference” between the energies of poetry and those of the external world as suggesting
they are different in kind.15
After contrasting Olson’s and Spicer’s poetics generally, Katz juxtaposes the line breaks
in Spicer’s “Post-Script for Charles Olson,” a rather surly fifteen line poem which argues that
When you break a line nothing
Becomes better.16
Spicer adds that based on line breaks alone, Olson has not in fact innovated a “new/ Measure.”
Further, Spicer asserts that the poet (namely, Olson) should “[b]reak” his poems “[l]ike you would
cut a grapefruit.” The suggestion here is that poets ought to
…make each line
Cut itself. Like seaweed thrown
against the pier.
Katz asserts that Spicer’s “use of a line that stutters, interrupts, and interferes” is a sharp contrast
to Olson’s projective line, which Katz assumes has a syntactical coherence (Katz 83). That is,
Katz is reading the Olsonian line (when printed as a single line of typography) as a complete
syntactic unit. But as we shall see, this is not always the case. He then adds that “Spicer himself
indicates” that his own poetic lines “not only ‘locate stress’ within the sentence but slice it open,

15
16
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do violence to it. They subject the sentence to a dismemberment which is not compensated by the
building blocks of coherent and integral lines” (ibid.). Katz notes here that Spicer’s poetry “reveals
himself as the student of…Marianne Moore” (87n23). I do not intend to diminish the originality
of Spicer’s poetry, which I do find captivating and challenging in its own right, in part because of
his line breaks and the effect they have on his diction. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that Spicer was not necessarily pitting his own line break preferences as a counter-revolt to
projective verse. He is, in fact, continuing from a different lineage within twentieth century
American poetry. Olson’s case is similar if we keep in mind the credit he continually gives Pound
and Williams mainly, but also Cummings, for their use of typography to score the reading of a
poem. Thus, it may be simply that Spicer and Olson represent two different movements within
post-war poetry each of which extends from a different source. To be sure, this is indeed part of
Katz’s point. The main distinction Katz is drawing here in terms of the poets’ respective lines is
that Spicer’s breaks effect the semantics of the line by breaking up the complete syntactic unit (i.e.,
a sentence) intact; on the other hand, as mentioned above, Katz seems to be assuming that
projective verse is calling for a symmetry between the syntactic unit and the poetic line, whereby
projective lines will essentially be full sentence, though not necessarily formally in terms of
capitalization and punctuation.
Consider Katz’s analysis of the first seven lines of “The Kingfishers” for its adherence to
projective poetics. I reproduce the lines here for convenience, the first of which we saw in the
previous chapter:
What does not change / is the will to change
He woke, fully clothed, in his bed. He
remembered only one thing, the birds, how
when he came in, he had gone around the rooms
and got them back in their cage, the green one first,
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she with the bad leg, and then the blue,
the one they had hoped was a male17
Katz concludes that
“[i]f line follows breath, and breath-group follows syntactic unit, as it tends
to do in speech, then line should follow syntax, as those above most
pointedly do not. Olson affirms that ‘breath allows all the speech-force of
language back in’ and that in this way a poem has ‘by speech, solidity’ yet
the breaks in lines two and three above…militate against the sort of solidity
that one might imagine Olson to be invoking here Meanwhile, if Olson cites
the first line of the poem as an example of how the typewriter comes to the
poet’s aid if ‘he wishes a pause so light it hardly separates the words, yet
does not want a comma – which is an interruption of the meaning rather
than the sounding of the line’, the effect (willed or not) seems very close to
an internal version of the ‘semantic line break’ [Ron] Silliman identified
with Spicer.” (83)18
In this regard, Katz argues, Olson’s line breaks resemble Spicer’s as they break the
syntactical unit across lines to effect semantics. This I do not disagree with. It is with the assertion
that Olson’s breath poetics explicitly suggests that a printed line will match syntactic units that I
disagree. Katz is not alone in this regard. It is a common reading of “Projective Verse” that Olson
is demanding a) that a single printed line of poetry must reflect a syntactic unit, and b) that the
reader must read each printed line with one full exhalation, pausing to inhale at each line break.
This is simply not something which Olson expresses in the essay. Katz is correct that in speech
breath-groups and syntactic units typically align. However, his conclusion that Olson’s poetry
does not reflect was challenged some forty-four years before his essay was published.
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From CP 86. The second strophe is a single strophe of six lines, but the present formatting has broken across two
pages.
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For Silliman’s reading of Spicer’s lines see Silliman 1987, 164-165.
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5.3

The Analysis and Logic of Olson’s Breath Poetics in Lieberman and Lieberman
Does Olson’s obsession with the typography of his poetry, or his emphasis on the

typewriter as a tool for projective poetry necessarily negate the orality he wants to reinvigorate
with projective verse – a poetics of breath, speech and sound? I do not believe that it does. To
support this position, I will offer two different approaches to putting Olson’s breath poetics in
context. The first is to appeal directly to the research of Marcia R. and Philip Lieberman in an
obscure and all too rarely cited essay, published within a couple years of Olson’s death, in which
they analyze recordings of Olson, and another subject, reading his poems to demonstrate that his
breath poetics are reflected in his readings. The second is to offer a general, albeit cursory,
commentary on orality and literacy, generally.
Lieberman and Lieberman’s article “Olson’s Projective Verse and the Use of Breath
Control as a Structural Element,” sets out to determine whether or not Olson’s breath poetics are
ultimately manifested in his reading of his poetry. They point out that criticism of Olson’s breath
poetics “has not been taken unreasonably by some critics to mean that each line of a poem
constructed according to this theory must be delimited by a breath” (287). Their primary example
of such a ‘one typed line = one breath unit’ approach is George Bowering’s reading of projective
verse.
In his article “The New American Prosody,” Bowering makes the seemingly outrageous
claim that Olson was “bothered by a shortness of breath, especially as he becomes excited” (13)!
His argument is that this condition leads Olson to write shorter lines, syllabically speaking, which
he supports with eight lines culled from Olson’s poem “The Death of Europe” (c. 1954), all of
which are between three and six syllables.19 This particular poem does, in general, feature short

19

See CP, 308-316. The lines Bowering cites are the first eight lines of part I of the poem following an unnumbered
opening section (CP 309).
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lines, several as short as one word. This is not atypical for Olson, yet neither is a much longer line
as evidenced above by the line we considered from “Letter 3” which is twenty syllables long.
Choosing “The Death of Europe” clearly suits Bowering’s purpose, though he certainly could have
looked elsewhere for longer lines of Olson’s poetry. As his article was published in 1964, the
early volumes of Maximus would have been available to him, including what we have seen of
“Letter 3.” In fairness, Bowering does cite other of Olson’s poems to demonstrate his typography
(the use of symbols and spaces, etc.), but he stakes his claim to Olson’s “pathologic condition” of
“mild emphysema” (in the Liebermans’ witty rendition of his argument) on the aforementioned
eight lines taken from one Olson poem (Lieberman and Lieberman 287).20 As ridiculous and
poorly supported as Bowering’s argument is, it shows that Olson’s breath poetics have been
dismissed by critics since the height of Olson’s career until the present. Hence, I cited two
examples of rejections of Olson’s breath poetics above from Contemporary Olson, which was
published in 2015.
The Liebermans reject Bowering’s argument as a “mock-medical evaluation,” which is fair
as Bowering does not seem to have been qualified to make his assessment of Olson’s respiratory
system. More importantly, however, they challenge the interpretation that “Projective Verse” is
asserting a breath poetics which entails the equivalence between one typed line and one of a
reader’s breath units. They refer to Olson’s own critique that “the logic and syntax of language
constrain the role of the poet’s breathing in the formation of the line structure of the poem.” Hence,
in “Projective Verse,” Olson argues that “the LAW OF THE LINE, which projective verse creates,
must be hewn to, obeyed, and that the conventions which logic has forced on syntax must be
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broken open as quietly as must the too set feet of the old line” (CPr 244).21 Olson’s point, I take
it, is that the traditionally structured line of verse has to be challenged in a way that allows
projective lines of poetry to work against the single line of type of closed syntactic units, while
also allowing closed syntactic units to extend across multiple lines of type. Hence, Bowering’s
argument would leave readers hyperventilating their way through a nonsensical poem.
The Liebermans’ research is fascinating. As it would be difficult to reproduce their visual
data here, I will try to summarize the research as best I can, and offer them the final word by citing
their conclusion based on the data they observed at length. First, they were able to analyze
recordings of both Olson himself and George F. Butterick reading some of Olson’s poetry.
Butterick was incorporated into the project specifically whereas the recordings of Olson already
existed. Using “a multichannel FM recorder” allowed them to record Butterick’s “lung volume
signals” in addition to his voice (288). The lung volumes were then recorded by a plethysmograph,
“a device which furnishes a record of the volume of air in a speaker’s lungs as he breathes” (ibid.).
They then used these devices to record Butterick reading Olson’s poetry, and additionally “To
Autumn,” an ode by John Keats which was used as a “control reference,” in this case to calibrate
how the subject read and breathed through more “‘traditional’ verse” (289). Butterick’s reading
of the Keats poem demonstrates that his breath-groups (one inhalation or exhalation, not a cycle
of both) coincide with syntactical units, “sentences or sentence-like sequences” (291). These
syntactical units are sometimes a single line of type, but also extend over multiple lines, or even
break up two halves of a single line. Some form of more traditional punctuation always de-limits
the breath group, though punctuation does not always delimit the breath. That is, breath groups in
Butterick’s reading of Keats end with periods, question marks, commas and semicolons, but they
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also run through commas and semicolons occasionally. His reading provided the Liebermans with
enough data to conclude that where Keats’ poem was concerned, “[t]he reader essentially uses the
breath-group as a phonetic feature that groups words together into sentences,” hence giving the
breath-group a “logical function” similar to that which it has in prose readings (ibid.). That is, on
Butterick’s reading, the breath-group “does not mark out the line structure of the poem”—one line
of type does not equal one breath-group necessarily.
I must admit this aspect of their research did surprise me as I would have assumed that a
poem like “To Autumn” would almost command that readers read individual lines in single-breath
groups. I am happy to have some of my misconceptions about traditional verse altered in this
regard. Perhaps more astonishing is that this same conclusion holds for Olson’s poetry, both on
his and Butterick’s reading. Note that though the Liebermans did not themselves record Olson
with the benefit of the plethysmograph, the had access to recordings of Olson reading his poetry
in which he “held the microphone so close to his that it was possible to hear his breathing” (293).22
In comparing Olson’s and Butterick’s reading of the same poems (for example, “The Ring of”),
they discovered that though the two readings did not “mimic each other,” both readers: a) read
with breath-groups that extended across single lines of type, often multiple poetic lines, thus there
was no one typed line to one breath-group correspondence; b) sometimes use breath-groups to
“unite logically related words to form sentences,” and at other times use breath-groups to “delimit
lines even when the lines end at syntactically inappropriate points; and c) produce a “different
‘scanning’ of the same work at the respiratory level. Thus, though Olson’s line breaks do not
produce a universal, or symmetrical reading between himself and another subject, both readers use
breath-groups to create syntactically logical sequences across a varying number of lines or portions
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of lines.23 This variation adds a layer to the semantic level of the poem which, we can assume,
would not be produced by multiple readings of “To Autumn” or other more traditional verse. It
seems that projective verse is open in this way, as well: the varied readings will likely lend
themselves to varied interpretations of the semantics of the poems based on the fluidity of the
syntactical units of the poem as structured by breath-groups. In this sense, what Olson calls a line
of poetry is more akin to a “line of thought,” rather than, strictly speaking, a printed line of type.
The Liebermans conclude their article thus:
“…Olson claims in his essay on Projective Verse that he is taking account
of breathing and breath control as a structural prosodic element in his verse
form. This is borne out by our examination. Whereas a breath-group
always plays a syntactic role in traditional verse, Olson uses breath-groups
to delimit and emphasize lines in violation of grammatical constraints. He
also uses breath-groups as a device to establish rhythm; as the sequence of
short and long breath-groups changes in the course of a poem, the ‘voice’
of the poet is altered. The expenditure of breath also may play an emphatic
role in the poem. In no sense can Olson’s theory be characterized as a
simplistic sequence of breath lines that each delimit a single line. Nor does
the use of breath control appear to be a consequence of a pathologic
shortness of breath on Olson’s part. Olson, in fact, uses breath control as a
structural element in his Projective Verse.” (297)
It may be that I am predisposed to accepting it as fact. I have done no recordings and analysis of
my own, so I am in no position to comment on the repeatability of their findings (a necessary part
of establishing the facticity of this kind of research). However, even recording myself reading
Olson’s poems I find their results and observations tend to hold even across varied readings of the
same poems over a course of time. What is most surprising is that I have only ever come across
one Olson critic who references this work: James Merrill in his 1982 monograph on Olson. 24 It

“The Ring of” (c. 1951), CP 243. This is a relatively short poem, at thirty-one lines long. The lines vary in length
from two to eleven lines, and two to thirteen syllables.
24
See Merrill 1982, 52.
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seems a glaring oversight by far too many Olson critics considering the detail and depth of analysis
the Liebermans provide.

5.4

Orality and Literacy: The Plausibility of Olson’s Breath Poetics Revisited
To this point of the chapter we have considered Olson’s own obsession with typography

and the effect this could have, for better or for worse, on his readers. We have also seen critical
rejections of his breath poetics as being depicted accurately in his typography, or his lines of
poetry, where ‘line’ here effectively means a single typed line. Taken together, these would seem
to undermine Olson’s breath poetics and his “law of the line.” However, the sonic and linguistic
analysis of readings of Olson’s poems done by the Liebermans, research done over forty-five years
ago and yet basically overlooked by Olson critics since, shows that Olson’s “law of the line” holds.
Further, the Liebermans’ data analysis suggests that this law of the line makes possible a variety
of readings of Olson’s poems, an openness which only strengthens the semantic (and syntactic)
possibilities thereof.
To leave my argument relying solely on the Liebermans’ research, which as mentioned I
have not attempted to recreate, would be irresponsible to a degree. In fact, I do wonder if some
Olson critics have left out commentary on the Liebermans’ research for this very reason, that it
seems a stretch to borrow one researcher group’s conclusions to argue against a significant tide of
criticism that rejects the plausibility of Olson’s law of the line and its attendant typography. (Sadly,
I rather think that most Olson critics simply have not read the Liebermans’ work, but this is mere
speculation.) In order to not leave my arguments for the soundness of Olson’s law of the line
resting on this potentially precarious thread, then, I want to frame the plausibility of Olson’s
projective verse as an oral poetics in terms of orality and Homeric studies.
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The history of orality and Homeric studies, respectively, are worthy of more than one
dissertation. The field is thriving today, and its awareness of its own development and significant
works is admirable. I will focus our discussion by considering work from three scholars: Rosalind
Thomas, Walter Ong, and Ernst J. Bakker. My aim here is to establish that the orality-literacy
spectrum is fluid. The contrast between the two operates on feedback loops and mutual progress,
particularly toward the end of the Homeric era when the fixed, more or less, version of the Iliad
and the Odyssey were being written down. Further, cognitive-linguistic analysis of Homeric poetry
and the orality-literacy spectrum generally supports my argument that, though we receive it as a
text, Olson’s projective poetry, and Maximus in particular, can be viewed as an oral epic poem
without fear of contradiction.
Thomas’ Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece approaches the orality-literacy spectrum
through cultural and historical evidence from ancient Greece, focusing largely, though not
exclusively, on the classical period of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. I am indebted to Thomas,
in particular, for my understanding of the orality-literacy spectrum as fluid. Though she does not
highlight this term per se, her research essentially argues for and supports such a description. By
‘fluid’ here I mean that the contrast between oral culture and literate culture is a) not as absolute
of an historic shift as some scholars, and general readers, may think, b) the evidence in ancient
Greece indicates centuries of the simultaneity and exchange between orality and literacy even as
literacy was rapidly developing, and c) this fluidity continued through much of the medieval
period, and I would argue continues until today.
In Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, Thomas examines the fluid relationship between
orality and literacy in ancient Greece. Though she highlights the particularly Greek aspect of the
orality-literacy spectrum, this is not to say that we cannot extrapolate her research and apply it to
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that spectrum more generally. Nevertheless, I will try to represent her work appropriately by
remaining in the context she has chosen. She begins from the premise that we because we have
so much written material from the classical Greeks, writing that emerges with a sudden and
widespread presence, that we tend to assume the importance of writing for their culture. However,
Thomas argues that “[f]ar more was heard or spoken, rather than written and read, than we can
easily envisage” (3). Of course, this entails that the oral data we may want to reference to support
the importance and prevalence of orality in ancient Greece—one of the first cultures and historical
periods in which writing, as we understand it today, seems to have flourished—is largely
unavailable to us. This does not mean that we have no access to oral data, however, though it
exists directly or indirectly, though not paradoxically, as writing. Thomas carefully demonstrates
through the use of early written texts including legal documents, oral poetry, and even graffiti that
much of what was written was transmitted or performed orally, and was often orally composed or
conceived—the latter point being a topic of discussion below. She does caution, however, that our
modern understanding of orality “is often idealized, invested with the romantic and nostalgic ideas
connected with folklore, folk culture, and folk tradition, or the ‘noble savage’” (6-7). This kind of
romanticized view of orality is apparent in the work of Walter Ong, for example, whom Thomas
implies “emphasize[s] that oral societies are ‘warm’ personal societies, since all communication
of any kind has to be done face-to-face, and the alienating individualism of the reader is absent”
(7). This, another point we will revisit below, seems to be a viewpoint Olson held.
Thomas culturally contextualizes written texts of ancient Greece to demonstrate how these
texts were being read, used, and disseminated—the latter involving oral performance, even in the
dissemination of laws and decrees, as the audience was by and large incapable of reading and
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writing.25 By and large, writing in ancient Greece was used in service to the spoken word, though
not absolutely. Thomas again emphasizes the fluidity of orality-literacy when concluding that
“early writing seems to bear almost bewilderingly varied relationships to the spoken word or to
the context or object to which it is added” (62).26 Those objects to which writing was added include
bronze and gold plaques, wooden tablets, potsherds, and public graffiti on walls and gates, for
example (57f.). In relation to writing being committed to stone tablets in the archaic period of the
eighth and seventh centuries BCE, Thomas makes an intriguing point about oral poetry, in
particular. Thomas argues:
“Much if not all of the early writing put on stone was meant to represent
statements which were to be uttered aloud, usually in verse: so here writing
is the servant of the spoken word, a means of communicating what would
usually be sung or said. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that, while
poets began to write their poetry down in this period, the poetry remained
the main vehicle of transmission. Indeed poets continue to think of poetry
itself, and thus song, not the written word, as conveying immortality. The
late sixth-century poet Simonides implied with scorn that his poetry would
last far longer than a mere inscription…Writing here could only be thought
of as a mnemonic aid for what was to be communicated orally.” (62, my
italics)
The point here is that early writing was employed to represent oral utterances, primarily poetry.
Thus the invention of writing did not delimit orality. Rather, orality helped to improve writing
and inspired much of the earliest Greek examples of writing.
Thomas argues further that the “symbolic, religious, [and] visual” elements of early writing
“contribute to the function of the written text” (89). Early writing was layered with cultural
meaning, including some which was conveyed by the visual presentation of the writing, rendering
the text itself, as it were, much more than “the simple content of the writing alone” (ibid.). Thus,

I have intentionally avoided the use of the term ‘illiterate’ here as it has a certain function in Thomas’ book,
though to be sure it is not unlike how we may understand the term intuitively.
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according to Thomas, “[o]ral communication can be seen to influence the use of writing more
specifically” as writing developed in the archaic period. She provides us with what can be read as
a definition for the orality-literacy spectrum as fluid when she concludes that such examples of the
cultural meaning present beyond the mere letters of early writing demonstrates that it would be
“misleading…to separate the oral and the literate, to use ‘literate’ as if it
were self-explanatory, and to see literacy as antithetical to ‘orality.’ Oral
modes of proof, memorial and communication…did not cease with the
coming of writing, and actually influenced its adaptation….Oral methods
continue to be trusted, just as oral tradition was considered the perfectly
normal source for the past at least till the fourth century and to some extent
beyond.” (89, my italics)
She does, however, point out that “writing is not necessarily equivalent to speech, when we
consider the relation of orality to literacy” (56). This is an important point to remember when
arguing for Maximus as an oral epic presented in text, as it entails that we cannot view Olson’s
epic as speech per se, though we can view his typography as a scoring for its performance.
Ong’s widely read and referenced Orality and Literacy makes similar arguments.
Published a decade before Thomas’ Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, Ong’s book considers
orality and literacy in a broader context, both culturally and historically. Ong dedicates much of
the study to the psychodynamics of orality. As noted, his theory tends to romanticize oral cultures.
Nevertheless, his arguments for the psychodynamics of orality and the development of literacy
offer a slightly different picture than the one Thomas paints. Particularly interesting in relation to
Olson are Ong’s insights on the role of memory in oral cultures, and the effects of writing on
memory.
Before considering the connections I want to draw between Ong and Olson, we should
consider Orality and Literacy as a whole. In particular, this work can be used to extend our view
of the fluidity of the orality-literacy spectrum insofar as he dates the oral influence on writing, and
the assistance writing can give to oral performance as late as the medieval period. Thus, Thomas’
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argument that orality maintained its influence and cultural role beyond the fourth century would
appear to be correct, though she was most likely thinking in the context of ancient Greece.
Nonetheless, orality’s influence prevailed much longer than perhaps most people, including many
scholars, will admit. Consider, for instance, that during the medieval period and into early
modernity church services were oral performances delivered by a, presumably, literate priest to a
congregation that was, for the most part, incapable of reading and writing. Ong, enlisting the
research of Michael Clanchy, notes that “the use of literacy for practical administrative purposes
in eleventh- and twelfth-century England” demonstrates “how much orality could linger in the
presence of writing, even in an administrative milieu” (95).27 Here, Thomas’ research aligns with
Clanchy’s in stressing how orality in ancient Greece influenced writing, particularly in its
administrative functions. The administrative examples show that where writing could help fix
laws, its dissemination was still reliant on oral transmission, however. Beyond the administrative
functions of writing, there is a wealth of research on orality and literacy in the medieval period,
but to condense it to a point for the present discussion, much of it confirms the fluidity of oralityliteracy. Indeed, orality continues to have a great effect on literacy long after the advent of writing
and the demise of oral cultures, at least, though not absolutely, in the West.28
Part of the demise of oral cultures was the transformation of what Ong calls the noetic
functions of orality. Writing, as an external representation of speech, effected the ability of our
memory in that it provided an externalized, fixed form of thought which we can, theoretically at
least, refer back to infinitely without anxiety that the content will have changed. The latter cannot
be said for an oral culture, where from speaker to speaker, generation to generation, even day to
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day a particular narrative’s truth function can change simply due to the nature of human memory.
To improve the capacity of our memory to recall information that is as close to fixed as possible
certain techniques were developed and improved fixed epithets, and metric patterns in oral epic
poetry, for example, and later rhyme. How could a listener, listening to a teacher or public official
for example, ever possibly remember everything she heard in an oral culture where she did not
have the luxury of being able to take notes (chirographically, or by today’s standards,
electronically)? Ong asserts that “[t]he only answer is”:
“Think memorable thoughts. In a primary oral culture, to solve effectively
the problem of retaining and retrieving carefully articulated thought, you
have to do your thinking in mnemonic patterns, shaped for ready oral
recurrence. Your thought must come into being in heavily rhythmic,
balanced patterns, in repetitions or antitheses, in alliterations and
assonances, in epithetic and other formulary expressions, in standard
thematic settings…, in proverbs which are constantly heard by everyone so
that they come to mind readily and which themselves are patterned for
retention and ready recall, or in other mnemonic form. Serious thought is
intertwined with memory systems. Mnemonic needs determine even
syntax.” (34)29
Writing, ultimately diminishes the noetic functions of memory, and alters our cognitive
functions generally, in a literate culture by reifying spoken words and thoughts generated as
internal monologue into text. There is of course a tradition of post-structuralist thought that argues
that “thought is nested in speech, not in texts” (74). Here, text is meaningful as it points our
thoughts to an associated sound which is merely symbolized in text. Hence, what we read on the
page “are not real words but coded symbols whereby a properly informed human being can evoke
in his or her consciousness real words, in actual or imagined sound” (ibid.). Ong suggests that we
are made complacent “in thinking of words as signs” due to our “tendency…to reduce all sensation
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and indeed human experience to visual analogues” (75).30 He notes that this tendency may be
“incipient in oral cultures” though it becomes more apparent with increased chirographic practices
(ibid.). It culminates in contemporary culture’s obsession with type and electronic communication.
Consider that how most literacy cultures of the modern world today inspire us to think in text, even
down to the communications we send one another through our smart phones. How often do we
think to ourselves, “What should I text so-and-so?”, even conceiving the text visually in our minds
to be sure they remain within a limited number of characters before sending them. This is of
course, one very specific sense of writing.
More generally, Ong states that our modern understanding of the term ‘writing’ “in its
sharply focused sense” typically refers to the
“critical and unique breakthrough into new worlds of knowledge…achieved
within human consciousness not when simple semiotic marking was
devised but when a coded system of visible markings was invented whereby
a writer could determine the exact words that the reader would generate
from the text” (83).
The knowledge gained by being able to stabilize thought in a fixed text certainly opened up
pathways that oral cultures, reliant on the role of memory (fickle to say the least) as the warehouse
for information, had not necessarily envisioned in the earliest stages of writing. Ong points out
the “paradox” inherent here: it is the “deadness of the text, its removal from the living human
world, its rigid visual fixity” which gives it the potential to be read by an infinite number of people
in various contexts infinitely into the future (80). Early chirographic forms of writing were not
the ultimate despoiler of oral culture and its cognitive capacity for memory. That title, for Ong, is
best applied to writing as it appears in print, specifically. According to Ong:
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“Alphabet letterpress printing in which each letter was cast on a separate
piece of metal, or type, marked a psychological breakthrough of the first
order. It embedded the word itself deeply in the manufacturing process and
made it into a kind of commodity. The first assembly line, a technique of
manufacture which in a series of set steps produces identical complex
objects made up of replaceable parts, was not one which produced stoves or
shoes or weaponry but one which produced the printed book.…Despite the
assumption of many semiotic structuralists, it was print, not writing, that
effectively reified the word, and, with it, noetic activity.” (116-117)
Ong’s conclusions on the printed word strike me as particularly relevant in relation to
Olson as, based on my reading of “Projective Verse,” Olson seems to anticipate them so accurately.
Recall that Olson asserts that closed verse is a style of poetry “which print bred” (CPr 239).
Further, he seems to have been aware (though I cannot establish exactly which sources, if any,
would have influenced his thinking here) that memory is aided by certain techniques (for example,
rhyme), and that being able to lock these rhymes into print, so to speak, only perpetuated this style
of verse beyond its original efficacy in oral culture. As we saw I the previous chapter, Olson that
the one benefit of his breath poetics is that:
“…the ear, which once had the burden of memory to quicken it (rime &
regular cadence were its aids and have merely lived on in print after the oral
necessities were ended) can now again, that the poet has his means, be the
threshold of projective verse.” (CPr 246)
Finally, I will appeal to the work of Ernst J. Bakker before offering some concluding
remarks on Olson and orality. Bakker’s Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse, shifts
the argument that oral poetry is of a remote time and place relative to our own, and which exists
in the absence of writing and relies on metrical formula to become standardized in memorable
patterns to say, rather, that “poetry that is oral is in fact speech that is special” (viii).31 As such,
oral poetry is not “special” because it is oral (ibid.). Bakker argues that “poetic meter and formulas,
rather than removing Homeric poetry from the realm of the ordinary and the everyday, derive from

31

This and the following citation are from Gregory Nagy’s Foreword to the book.
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what is most natural in spoken discourse: the ‘chunks’ that make up the adding style” (2). Hence,
“meter and formulas entail the stylization of ordinary speech, rather than some inherently poetic
principle” upon which oral poetry is fashioned (ibid.). The most striking result of Bakker’s
approach to Homeric speech is that “meter emerges from discourse,” where we are to understand
‘discourse’ as our everyday spoken communication (184). That is, the stylized speech which we
call ‘poetic’ actually arises from everyday discourse rather than being language that is intentionally
stylized to distinguish it from everyday speech. As meter evolves it eventually “becomes so rigid
as to constitute a structure in itself, regulating the flow of speech” (ibid.).
Bakker’s work has had an important influence on the always developing field of Homeric
studies. Though his argument, as summarized above, is worth the time it takes to read his detailed
philological and cognitive-linguistic analysis, I want to extract one aspect of the book which I find
fascinating, and beneficial to the current proceedings. Early in the first chapter of the book, “The
Construction of Orality,” Bakker sets up an interesting framework for viewing the orality-literacy
spectrum. He asserts that
“[a] discourse that is conceptionally oral (such as a conversational narrative)
is often medially oral as well, but it is also possible for such a discourse to
be written. And a medially oral (phonic) discourse is often conceptionally
oral, but instead it may be fully literate as to its conception (as in the case
of an academic paper read out loud).” (8, italics in original)
The point here is that the medium through which we receive a particular communication is one
part of the transmission. The conceptual style through which the communicator composed the
communication is equally important. This, of course, is a position which it becomes clear Bakker
is predisposed to take given that he wants to demonstrate how oral epic poetry is a stylized form
of everyday speech which comes to be known by certain patterns and formula because it so
succinctly captures the styles of its natural discourse. Readers, especially those who experience
discomfort by any suggestion of authorial intention, may disagree that a text can be seen as oral

166
simply because the producer of the text claims she was thinking in the oral mode when composing
it. I am sympathetic to that objection. However, and perhaps this is merely my desire to establish
projective verse as an oral poetics, it does seem reasonable that a certain diction and rhythm
associated with speech can be transmitted through a written text, and vice versa. Consider the
number of times when listening to an academic paper we have heard someone say she will return
to a point “below,” a decidedly visual cue, when clearly the temporal signpost “later” would be
more appropriate for the circumstance.
Bakker’s description of our cognitive capacities for receiving and retaining oral
communication are also insightful. In describing consciousness and cognition in speech, Bakker
notes that
“[t]he intonation unit is the largest linguistic unit that is still available in its
entirety to consciousness, the typical sequence of speech sounds that is
within the grasp of the speaker’s, and listener’s, echoic memory: any stretch
of discourse that is longer will have to be processed as more the
segmentation of these basic chunks.” (48)32
The echoic memory denotes the ‘amount’ (my term) of speech we can retain as a single unit of
sound in our short-term memory.33 The “basic chunks” of discourse are both the building blocks
of longer sequences of discourse and the standard unit, as it were, which we can reasonably expect
a listening audience to retain in the short-term memory. Our echoic memory, then, is refreshed
“beginning every two or three seconds and often (though not always)
preceded by a pause which may last from a slight break up to several
seconds. These units are above all characterized by a coherent intonation
contour, that is, they are uttered as integral wholes and end with a pitch
contour that signals a sense of closure.”
This opens an interesting space in which to revisit the first line of “The Kingfishers”:
What does not change / is the will to change

32
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This and following citations until noted.
Bakker cites Chafe 1994 as the source for the term ‘intonation units’ and ‘echoic memory’ (cf. Bakker 48).
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Recall that the forward slash is Olson’s attempt to indicate and induce a slight pause in the reader.
In light of Bakker’s explanation of intonation units, we can now read the forward slash as
demarcating two such units which are more easily retained in our echoic memory. Granted, we
could read the line fast enough to be easily retainable, an aspect of the line which is also assisted
by its repetition of the word ‘change.’ My point here is rather that if Olson intends the forward
slash to slow our reading down, it would create two distinct intonation units, which would give
more weight to the sonic and semantic symmetry of the word ‘change.’ As a result, the line may
become more memorable for some readers, though this is something which I can only speculate.
To return to Bakker’s argument, for the linguistic researcher, and of course anyone engaged
in an oral-audial communication, intonation units, effectively equivalent to what we can retain in
our echoic memory, are marked by “their physical, empirically observable quality as units of
speech” (ibid.). Hence, we can detect such patterns in our contemporary discourse. The research
which Bakker is building his argument on here seems to suggest that human brain function has not
evolved much from the archaic period during which the Homeric epics were being standardized
into something like a fixed form, oral or written. This grounds, in part, Bakker’s argument that
basic intonation units are developed into metrical units.

He argues, “[t]he coincidence of

intonation with metrical units is a universal characteristic of performed poetry in oral traditions,
and in the study of Homer it seems justified to use the latter as evidence for the former” (50).
Bakker’s convincing case that the earliest poetry we have on record, namely oral poetries now
committed to text, grew out of speech rather than being a parallel form of speech that was always
distinguishable from discourse has interesting consequences, I believe, for projective verse.
We could argue from this position that projective verse, or any form of blank verse or
contemporary poetries which work outside of standardized metrics and rhymes schemes. That is,
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based on Bakker’s conclusions, it seems reasonable to project, as it were, that even the most open
verse—that which exhibits no ostensible qualities of relying on fixed formula of any kind—can
eventually evolve into the building blocks of a future oral poetry. Of course, it may be an inevitable
byproduct of human cognition that an open form poem, for example, based on everyday speech,
idiomatic phrasing and broken syntax, would gradually become more rigid and formulaic simply
to survive as a memorable form of speech. Though readers may not agree with my own conclusion
here or the applicability of Bakker’s theory to projective verse, I maintain that at the very least we
can, and should, read Olson’s poetry, particularly in Maximus, as conceptionally oral.
In conclusion, I find that critics are oddly exacting and literalist in their interpretation of
Olson’s breath poetics and the benefits of the typewriter in rendering his breath poetics into text.
First, it is neither the case that Olson is encouraging poets to hyperventilate by writing punchy,
short lines with little measurable white space in between; nor is he encouraging poets to reach for
Whitmanian syllabic excess in one typed line (though to be sure Olson has printed lines of poetry
which as we have seen can be quite long syllabically and in relation to their extension across the
page). The unfortunate consequence of this is that many critics and readers miss the ancient orality
operative in Olson’s poetics, which I would argue is the single most important element of his
“Projective Verse.”
My personal view is that Olson’s breath poetics hold together. As I understand it, each
‘line of thought’ (my phrase), rather than strictly speaking each single line of text, in a projective
poem is guided by the poet’s breath in composition. The Liebermans’ sonic analysis demonstrates
this, albeit through a very small sample of data. Where Olson leaves his theory short is that he
does not realize that the reader’s breath will create different readings, no less capable of matching
breath-groups to syntactic units. It seems Olson was holding on rather stubbornly to an idea of the
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poet’s intention during composition as the basis for law of the line. The possibilities that different
readers can achieve in creating varied alignments of breath-groups and syntactical units when
reading his poems only expands the open semantics of projective verse infinitely, perhaps in spite
of Olson’s own desires.

Given the fluidity of the orality-literacy spectrum, Olson’s own

understanding of the effect of orality on memory and later of print on orality (and poetry), and the
conceptionally oral nature which I believe best characterizes Maximus, I read Maximus as the first
recording of an epic poem which Olson envisions will become oral in the archaic sense one day.
As we have seen, his obsession with typography may discredit the plausibility of this reading, but
what cannot be rejected as implausible is the relation between breath and syntax which Olson’s
printed poems achieve.
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CHAPTER 6. “MUTHOLOGOS HAS LOST SUCH GROUND”:
ORALITY AND HISTORY IN THE MAXIMUS POEMS

“The trouble is, it is very difficult, to be both a poet and, an historian.”
—Olson, Mayan Letters, October 1953
6.1

Introduction
If it is possible to name one central concept in Olson’s poetry and thinking, a leading

candidate would be history. Though historical curiosity was often the impetus behind much of his
poetry, history was more than a material source for Olson. Sherman Paul has described Olson as
“a poet burdened by history” (9). Further, Olson’s concept of history was a fundamental part of
his poetics, the ‘prospective’ aspect of projective verse. Christopher Beach, for instance, asserts
that “[c]entral to Olson’s poetic practice is his notion of the poet as historian” (86). Hence, the
final chapter of this dissertation examines Olson’s concept of history in an effort to better
understand it and its presence in Olson’s poetry. In this chapter, we pick up the story of Olson’s
growth as a poet and teacher in 1953, while he was at Black Mountain teaching and writing many
of the early letters of The Maximus Poems. We will consider the major influences on Olson’s
concept of history as it developed in the later years of his time at Black Mountain, what Olson’s
‘history’ denotes in his lexicon, the role it played in his pedagogy, and how it manifests in
Maximus.
The major Greek figure in Olson’s developing concept of history during these years is
Herodotus. In effect, Herodotus becomes not only a source of inspiration for Olson’s concept of
history, but a model for Maximus itself. Further, as an explicit point of reference in Maximus, I
read Herodotus as being for Olson akin to what Virgil (Inferno, Purgatorio) and Beatrice
(Paradiso) were for Dante in his Divine Comedy—a guide through the poem.
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In the case of Maximus, of course, there is a geographic actuality to the epic, one which
adds another layer to the kindred spirit Olson felt between himself and Herodotus. Recall that in
Chapter 2, we saw that Olson’s concept of history was largely spatial in his early publications,
such as Call Me Ishmael and the poem “La Préface.” As the latter was a response to the horrors
of World War II, history therein took on a pointedly political dimension in addition to Olson’s
encouraging readers to “Put war away with time, come into space” (CP 46). As he undertakes the
Maximus project, this spatial aspect becomes more explicitly geographical in the sense that history
becomes tied a specific place: Gloucester, MA—though I point out here that various geographical
locations emerge as important to Maximus, particularly as the epic progresses into the second and
third volumes. Throughout Maximus, however, and in the early letters especially, Gloucester
remains the primary place of the epic.
It is important that we understand Olson’s concept of history as a complex concept with a
multiplicity of meanings, a point I have tried to stress in regard to my respective examinations of
Olson’s concepts of space, mythology, orality, objectism, and his poetics generally speaking.
History, I believe, is nonetheless a unique concept in Olson’s thinking. It incorporates so much of
the other concepts we have been considering thus far, and in a sense becomes the umbrella concept
under which all of them fall, at least in the years of his career which concern us in the present
chapter. In terms of his pedagogy, Olson might highlight a different aspect of his concept of
history depending on the lecture. In one letter to a student he even offers four different definitions
of the term ‘history,’ which are meant to address the different ways in which he thinks the term is
used both professionally and in commonly.1 Though we could look at the relation history has to
the concepts we have already explored, I will focus the discussion here to how closely intertwined

1

See, “History Tutorial” (CORC, 31.1581).
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Olson’s concepts of history and orality become during this phase of his career, largely in part due
to research he was doing on Herodotus.
Our examination of the sources which inform Olson’s developing concept of history and
will lead us to explore how this concept emerges in Maximus, specifically “Letter 23,” where I
will demonstrate that it is inherently coupled with his oral poetics. Olson believed that poets must
be historians, always discovering. We could make the case that for Olson, the notion that an
historian should be a poet is equally important. Of course, as the epigraph to this chapter makes
clear, Olson did not profess that the task of being both was ever going to be an easy one.

6.2

Olson’s Evolving Concept of Orality
Another oft-overlooked source for Olson’s intellectual development is the classicist J.A.K.

Thomson. Thomson’s study of Herodotus, The Art of the Logos, shaped Olson’s concept of history
during the last three years he would spend at Black Mountain, before the school closed in 1957.
Thomson’s most significant contribution to Olson’s concept of history was to provide him with
the term ‘istorin (ιστορίν)—which readers may recall Olson defines as “to find out for yourself”
(SVH 20; MP 249; cf. MP 104-105). The term, in effect, is synonymous with Olson’s concept of
history during this stage of his career, and to an extent for the remainder of life. Many critics have
analyzed Olson’s concept of history generally, his use of the term ‘istorin, how he employs it in
his poetry, and his affinity for Herodotus. Some critics will mention Thomson’s book as the source
for the term ‘istorin. What is missing from this criticism, mostly I believe because the concept has
received so much attention and is saturated with so much meaning in Olson thinking and poetry,
is how history was tied to orality in Olson thinking, and how Thomson is responsible for this
marriage of concepts.

173
The passages of Thomson’s The Art of the Logos which influence Olson most were
originally documented by George F. Butterick in his annotated A Guide to the Maximus Poems.
Butterick cites several passages from Thomson’s book which Olson had culled for poetic material. 2
Olson had marked the passages which Butterick cites in his own copy of The Art of the Logos
(CORC, c450). This is not to take away from Butterick’s research, but rather to accentuate the
point that Olson had been affected by the passages, particularly when considering that compared
to some of Olson’s other books, his copy of Thomson is relatively clean.3 Subsequent Olson
scholarship, however, too often relies simply on the Thomson citations in Butterick, and fails to
make any further connections between Olson and Herodotus (via Thomson).4 For example, of the
twenty-four chapters (including the introduction) of the recent critical anthology Contemporary
Olson, nine of them make reference to Herodotus and/or ‘istorin. Yet, there is only one reference
to Thomson therein. That reference does little to extend Butterick’s research, as it cites one of the
same passages from Thomson available in Butterick’s Guide in conjunction with the relevant lines
from “Letter 23.” To be sure, though the critics in Contemporary Olson provide us with a range
of Olson’s applications and their own interpretations of ‘istorin, the further connection between
this concept, Olson’s concept of orality, and how it shapes storytelling in Maximus is not fully
developed. In my opinion, this is not sufficiently developed in Olson criticism, generally speaking.
Olson read Thomson’s book no later than 1953. Ralph Maud reports that Olson’s “first
public use” of The Art of the Logos came in the “first session” of the Institute of the New Sciences
of Man. This Institute, a lecture series which Olson furiously and passionately scrambled together

2

See Butterick 1978, 145-47.
By way of contrast, Olson’s copy of Whitehead’s Process and Reality (CORC, c476) has very little free space left
in the margins. The books is over 400 pages.
4
I admit to readers that I intend to cite many of the same passages as Butterick cites, in part or in full. Butterick
tends to cite them for reference without offering much interpretation, as his annotated guide demanded of him.
3
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and envisioned as Black Mountain’s version of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Studies, was
held during February and March of 1953 (96-97). 5 In addition to ‘istorin, Olson was also
captivated by Thomson’s explanation of the terms ‘muthos’ and ‘logos,’ and what they meant in
the archaic context. As we shall see, Olson would combine these latter two concepts to form the
neologism muthologos. According to Thomson:
“Logos did not originally mean ‘word’ or ‘reason,’ or anything but merely
‘what is said.’ This meaning it never lost, although in its long strange
history it acquired many others…For some reason Homer avoids Logos,
preferring Muthos; but Muthos with him means ‘what is said’ in speech or
story exactly like Logos in its primary sense. This is true of all Ionians. A
traditional narrative…is for them either Logos or Muthos, it does not matter
which. The question of truth or falsehood did not arise. This is worth
remembering when we speak of Greek mythology.” (17, my italics)6
Thomson goes on to explain that it is in Pindar we first see a distinction between Logos as
a true story, and Muthos as a false one.7 This stems from Pindar’s assessment of certain Homeric
stories which through their charm can “blind” the audience to their falsity (ibid. 18).8 Pindar’s
distinction then remains intact for most of subsequent antiquity when distinguishing between a
true and a false story was the matter at hand. Plato for instance, Thomson explains, does not
distinguish Muthos and Logos when using the terms in their ordinary sense, but follows Pindar’s
use of Muthos “only when the need arises to discriminate between the false Story and the true”
(19).9 The distinction in terms, then, seems to indicate a technical use, something in the way of
ancient literary (or perhaps, orality) criticism. There are further distinctions in the kind of story to

5

For more details of the Institute, cf. Clark 2000, 233-234. Olson invited Carl Jung to give lectures on mythology,
but the invitation was rejected (previously mentioned on p. 66 above). Jung sent a proxy, Marie Louise von Franz
(Clark 2000, 233). Olson also invited Carl O. Sauer, the cultural geographer, but again the invite was not accepted.
6
I have italicized here what Olson has underlined in his copy of Thomson.
7
In keeping with Thomson’s spelling I will capitalize the terms in the discussion of his treatise. Thereafter, I will
not capitalize the terms. Throughout this discussion of Thomson I will follow his stylizations of other terms, as
well.
8
Cf. Pindar, Olympians, I.45f.
9
This and the following citations until noted.
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which the term Logos refers. What we call a Fable, the Ionians called an Ainos, indicating it was
a special kind of Logos deserving of its own name. Though writing in the Ionic dialect, Herodotus
himself calls Aesop a Logopoios (ibid.).10 Attic writers generally call a Fable a Logos, but also
sometimes use Muthos. A residue of the synonymy of Muthos and Logos remained well after
Herodotus, as evidenced by Aristotle referring to him as “the Muthologos.” 11

Thomson

summarizes: “What it all comes to is this, that for the audiences which hearkened to the Stories a
Muthos was a Logos, and a Logos a Muthos. They were two names for the same thing.”
In Thomson’s book, the previous passage includes an endnote. This is no random or trivial
fact, as that endnote would have a crucial and lasting influence on Olson.12 It is in this footnote
that Thomson explains that “in Herodotus himself…λόγος cannot mean…‘purpose’” (237n13).13
According to Thomson, Herodotus’ use of “οἱ λόγιοι” (hoi logioi) in the first sections of The
Histories, means “‘those skilled in the λόγοι’—not ‘historians.’” Further, “‘istorin in [Herodotus]
appears to mean ‘finding out for oneself,’ instead of depending on hearsay. The word had already
been used by the philosophers. But while these are looking for truth, Herodotus is looking for
evidence” (my italics, save ‘istorin). Consider the opening phrase of the Histories, which is
effectively part of a preamble paragraph: Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε…
(Herodótou Halikarnesséos historíns apódexis héde…). A standard translation by Aubrey de
Sélincourt reads: “Herodotus of Halicarnassus here displays his inquiry…” (Herodotus 3, my
italics).14 And this the beginning of the very next paragraph, which begins the story Herodotus has
just introduced proper: Περσέων μέν νυν οἱ λόγιοι… (Perséon mén vuv hoi lógioi…). Perhaps not

10

Cf. Histories, II.134.
Cf. Aristotle, The Generation of Animals, III.5 (755 b6). Olson marks in his copy of Thomson the end of a
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This and following citations until noted.
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Cf. Histories, VII.96. Olson has marked this passage in his copy of Thomson.
14
See bibliography for full details.
11

176
surprisingly, given Thomson’s implication of a modern bias which assumes that Logos refers to
truth, de Sélincourt’s translation reads, “Learned Persians…” (ibid.). This again is a fairly standard
translation as A.D. Godley translates this phrase as, “The Persian learned men say….”15 Based on
what Thomson has revealed in his endnote, however, a better translation would be something to
the effect, “The Persians who are skilled in the logioi,” or more to the point, “The Persians who
have relayed the following stories (which I accept as undisputedly true).” My perhaps ineloquent
attempts at translation here aside, we can see how the philological connection Thomson is making
creates a deep connection in Olson’s thinking and poetics between a) ‘istorin as a self-guided
process of discovery, and b) oral storytelling (muthologos) as a way of preserving and
disseminating cultural and historical information.
This does not mean, however, that muthologos is necessarily fictional in our contemporary
understanding of the term. As Thomson explains:
“Nothing matters to the Story Teller but the story.…It is assumed by the
Story Teller and his audience that the story is true; destroy that assumption
and you destroy his method. Herodotus is perfectly well aware of this. He
is critical enough…in his comments on a Logos. But in telling the Logos
itself criticism is suspended, the atmosphere of belief is carefully and
beautifully preserved. It is this which makes the real difference between
him and Thucydides, who saw that his business was to destroy the
Muthodes, the mythic element in history, the Logoi, because they cared
nothing for accuracy. It was the business of Herodotus to save them” (2324)
This will have resonated immediately with Olson, whom as we saw in Chapter 2 was also reading
at this time Carl Jung and Károly Kerényi’s Essays on a Science of Mythology, which cited
Malinowski’s definition of myth. Malinowski’s definition also asserts that in a mythological
culture, myth was understood as an expression of reality rather than as a fictional narrative.16

Godley’s translation is available at www.perseus.tufts.edu,where the full Greek and English texts of the Histories
is available with notes.
16
See p. 66 above.
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The final thread in the fabric Olson seems to be building at this stage of his career between
history, myth, reality and storytelling is its oral component. Thomson makes clear early in his
treatise that “[t]he Logos was by nature oral; to write it down was to check its growth, and in a
sense to destroy its character” (14). In an interesting textual connection, Olson marks this passage
in his copy of Thomson by underlining the word oral, and adding next to it in the margin:
mouth:
mythoLogos
Olson came across this etymological connection in another major influence on his concept of
mythology during this period, Jane Ellen Harrison. Harrison’s Themis explores myth and ritual in
ancient Greek religion. Olson’s copy of it (CORC, c179) is marked extensively, from cover to
cover including extensive notes on the inside covers. According to Harrison, “[a] mythos to the
Greek was primarily just a thing spoken, uttered by the mouth” (328). Harrison connects the
English word mouth with muthos, noting that they share the root mū, which she defines “to make
an audible sound by opening or closing the lips” (328n1). Interestingly, Olson himself admits in
a 1956 lecture that he had only just come across this passage, which fellow American poet and
Black Mountain colleague Robert Duncan had pointed out to him (Charters 86).17 Clearly, then,
Olson added this etymology as marginalia in his copy of Thomson at least three years after he had
originally read it. That Olson was reading Thomson again, it would seem, at this later date is not
surprising considering how much he cites Thomson, though not always with attribution, in his
lectures titled The Special View of History (published as such 1956). During those lectures, Olson
gave extended treatment to Herodotus, the concepts of history and historiography, and explains
his term ‘istorin.

17

Despite what may have been practical reasons for Olson’s returning to

This fact was mentioned in a different context in Ch. 2. See pg. 47 above.
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Thomson’s treatise, that fact that he was engaging with it in this way, creating intertextual links
with other books in his library, connecting their marginalia, demonstrates the significance that this
nexus of concepts (history, myth, orality) had during this stage of his career.
Before considering how ‘istorin and muthologos appear in the first volume of Maximus, I
want to offer some general remarks about Olson’s concept of orality, in particular, and consider
briefly another, much later source which would influence Olson’s concept of orality. Olson’s
concept of orality is, generally speaking, a romanticized view of orality. I mentioned in Chapter
4 the tension I read between a) Olson’s insistence on the continuity of the process of poetic
composition, and b) his consistently asserting several fundamental historical discontinuities. 18
Olson’s ontological conviction in the continuous process that is the development of the cosmos
would only become that much deeper by the time he was to read Alfred North Whitehead’s Process
and Reality in the mid-1950s. Yet oddly, Olson’s romanticized view of orality, including the
discontinuity he perceived between oral and literate cultures, seems to have been solidified by his
reading of Eric A. Havelock’s Preface to Plato—or more to the point, his misreading Havelock’s
foundational study.
Olson would not read Havelock until at least 1963, when Preface to Plato was published.19
He was introduced to the book by two of his students at SUNY Buffalo, Charles Boer and Charles
Doria, both of whom Maud notes had “enviable classic training” (1996, 167). Olson would publish
a review on the book in the Niagara Frontier Review (1964), and a one-page follow up to his
review in the same journal the following year.20 Olson’s thesis, as it were, of his review proper is
essentially a recapitulation of his view in “Human Universe” that the classical Greeks have ushered
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See p. 118 above.
Havelock had published prior to this, but it does not appear that Olson read anything other than his Preface to
Plato (cf. Maud 1996).
20
See CPr 355-358, and 359, respectively.
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in modernity, and that we modern humans are still floating in its wake. He summarizes Havelock’s
argument thus:
“That the time now for some time has been post-Aristotelian and that there
was pre-Aristotelian condition of discourse, has now to include Plato and
Socrates and to see the set of them as proposing to change society,
conceivably the most conspicuous attempt to do so prior to the present, and
we don’t even know what it does mean to change society comparably to
how they did engage to do it, so much of our own discourse is in fact theirs.
Thus social change in the present is boringly social and unequally
revolutionary to theirs.” (CPr 357)
Of course, Olson already grouped the three “great Greeks” together in “Human Universe” (CPr
156), so presumably here he is acknowledging that Havelock is pushing the epistemological turn
further back from Aristotle to Socrates—a view that would have corroborated Olson’s own, which
he had held since Call Me Ishmael. There is also a provocative yet incredibly difficult to read
handwritten unpublished essay on Havelock in the Charles Olson Research Collection, titled “2 nd
Notes on Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato,” which covers most of twelve sheets of typewriter
paper in red and blue ink (12 February 1964: CORC, 30.1544). Despite this engagement with
Havelock’s work not occurring until the early 1960s, many critics portray Havelock’s influence
on Olson as having effected even the earliest Maximus poems. Don Byrd, for example, in his
introductory chapter outlining “the terms” of Olson’s poetics in his Charles Olson’s Maximus,
cites a passage from Havelock which he suggests has influenced both “Letter 23” (c. 1953, 1958)
and an early non-Maximus poem, “The Praises” (c. 1949).21 However, Maud’s documentation of
Olson’s library, and the composition and publication dates of Olson’s review and notes, make it
clear that Havelock would have been a relatively late influence on Olson’s concept of orality.
Maud does speculate that Olson may have been familiar with at least one of influential Homeric
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scholar Milman Parry’s articles as early as the late 1940s (313-314n6).22 Parry would become a
standard interlocutor, either for or against, essentially all subsequent Homeric and orality studies,
including those of Havelock and Ong. The point here is that in the case of Havelock, yet again
Olson critics far too frequently frame his work in terms of Havelock’s research when they consider
Olson’s poetry of the period we are concerned with in this dissertation. What surely would have
captivated Olson is Havelock’s portrayal of the shift from oral culture to literate culture as
effectively absolute, literature marking the end of orality. Olson, like so many readers of
Havelock, was enthralled by this idea, and no doubt felt empowered by it to the extent that he
seems to have held the idea himself prior to reading Havelock, either on his own or as influenced
by other sources. Nonetheless, Olson, like so many of Havelock’s readers, overlooks the fact that
the second half of Preface to Plato, is titled “The Necessity of Plato.” It is in this latter half of
Havelock’s treatise that argues rather clearly that epistemological and cultural advancements
required the capacity to make abstractions and the attendant grammatical evolutions which Plato’s
project crystallized.

6.3

Maximus as muthologos: A Reading of “Letter 23”
“Letter 23” (c. 1953, 1958) is one of many poems in the first volume of Maximus which

tells the pre-history of Gloucester, dating back to the founding of the Dorchester Company on
Cape Ann in 1623.23 Much of the historical content in this poem was taken from Frances RoseTroup’s John White, the Patriarch of Dorchester and the Founder of Massachusetts, 1575-1648

The article is Parry’s “Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-making,” available in as Ch. 6 in Parry 1971.
For details about its composition, see Butterick 1978, 141. According to Butterick an early version of the poem
was written around 13 September 1953, as Olson made mention of it in a letter written to Robert Creeley on that
date. Olson’s own copy of The Maximus Poems (New York: Jargon/Corinth, 1960) included a note which dates
“Letter 23” as having been composed in 1958. It is unclear if any content from the 1953 version made it into the
1958 version. I list both dates above to provide context.
22
23
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(Butterick 1978, 141).24 Here again we see Olson’s energy for tracking down and absorbing into
his poetry what is most likely an obscure text to contemporary readers. I have no shame in
admitting that I had no knowledge of Rose-Troup’s biography of John White before encountering
Olson. In this sense, Olson’s prospective poetics is one of extension, by which I mean readers of
Olson imbibe so much of his research by extension, provided they are willing to do some digging
for themselves. I take it that Olson intends this kind of knowledge dissemination to spread,
certainly from his own poems, but also from those written by poets he was teaching at Black
Mountain, and poet-historians generally. Importantly for the present discussion, “Letter 23” also
weaves in various layers of Olson’s musings on how a poet can employ an historical method based
on fact-finding and discovery which also allows the poet to tell a story—in this case, the story of
Gloucester’s economic foundations.
Critics have read “Letter 23” as paralleling “Letter 10” (c. 1953), a poem which announces
itself as being
on John White / on cod, ling, and poor-john
The latter part of the line (printed as a single line of text) is a reference to types of dried fish which
were brought into Dorchester from Newfoundland (Butterick 1978, 72).25 This sets up Maximus’
argument in “Letter 10” that the main concern of the early settlement was the fishing economy
rather than religious freedom.26 Hence, on his view, Gloucester was initially a fishing town, and
not necessarily a bastion for puritanism. Recall that in “Letter 3,” we see this economic point from
the other side of the looking-glass, as it were, when Maximus laments that in present day
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See bibliography for full details of Rose-Troup 1930.
Butterick cites Morison 1930 here.
26
“Letter 10”, MP 49-51. Note that the earliest draft of “Letter 23” would have been written within five months or
so of “Letter 10.”
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Gloucester “the ships, even the wharves” are now “absentee-owned” (MP 14).27 Ostensibly, both
“Letter 10” and “Letter 23” present certain historical persons, John White included, who helped
found the Dorchester Company’s settlement on Cape Ann and provide details of the colony’s early
years. Further, both letters serve as a starting point for the poems which follow, locating the epic
in the pre-Gloucester settlement so that Maximus can drive forward toward the present with the
history of the place in tow. To be sure, the two letters present many different details and persons,
and those which align more closely are presented from different perspectives, in different rhythms,
and with the momentum of different trains of thought. That is, they proceed along different
projective vectors though they share some of the same content, particularly in regard to their topics
or subject matter.
Despite the fact that “Letter 23” comes more than fifty pages later in the first volume of
Maximus, it would be inaccurate to describe it as a revision of “Letter 10.” Sherman Paul describes
“Letter 23” as “a new beginning, or a resumption of the historical inquiry begun in ‘Letter 10’”
(162). Though Paul’s reading of Olson is generally very insightful, I do disagree with his choice
of words here. To call it a “new beginning” suggests, to me at least, that Olson felt the need to
approach the historical inquiry of the pre-Gloucester economy and Gloucester’s subsequent
economic development from a new perspective because he felt the first attempt had failed. I think
of “Letter 23” rather as a poem traveling on a different trajectory, yet projecting from a similar
milieu which, and which, for a moment, runs parallel to “Letter 10.” Granted, my explanation my
lack clarity or eloquence itself. The point here is that Paul’s description of “Letter 23” as a new
beginning in relation to “Letter 10” misses the mark for me. It seems rather a different beginning
from a location very near from where “Letter 10” started off, and though it comes later in the text,

27

See p. 70 above.
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the possibility in Maximus is always that later poems could have begun prior to or at the same time
as earlier letters—both literally in terms of their composition, and figuratively in the space of the
epic. This, in a sense, is the structural parataxis of Maximus. I would argue that many of the
poems in Maximus are best read in this fashion, as parallel possibilities or projective vectors
emanating from a common locus. I am confident Paul would agree, and in fact I am indebted to
his reading of Maximus for providing an interpretive framework which supports my own
interpretation here. Hence, my quibble with his semantics here is merely that. His gloss on “Letter
23” and the subsequent nine poems (which Paul refers to as “Letters 23-32”) both helps to
contextualize this sequence and reiterates the concept of ‘istorin urging it along.28 Paul asserts that
these ten poems or so
give this installment its marked historical character not only because they
provide the historical center of The Maximus Poems, the fullest, extended
treatment of the founding of Gloucester, but because the poet’s activity in
these poems…is conspicuously that of a historian finding out for himself,
discovering and pondering the evidence, and restoring the fullness of a
crucial event (‘the littlest is the same as the very big, if you look at it’).”
(162-163)29
Byrd’s interpretation here is more semantically accurate, in my opinion, and also closer to
the spatial nature of Maximus which Olson is so committed to projecting. He reads “Letter 23” as
“re-engaging the question…posed in ‘Letter 10’” (99).30 I prefer this language as it conjures the
idea, for me, of the multidimensional map that Maximus constructs of Gloucester. It also
spatializes the epic rather than temporalizes it, as say an interpretation of certain poems being “new
beginnings” does. Again, present readers may be equally uneasy with my own semantics here, a
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I am not sure of the version of Maximus Paul was using, but I have not seen a version with letters 24-32, nor does
Butterick 1978 give any details for poems subsequent to “Letter 23” as being originally titled in this number
sequence. The “Letters” to which Paul is referring, however, effectively make up part III of the The Maximus
Poems (New York: Jargon/Corinth, 1960).
29
The internal citation is from Olson’s Bibliography on America for Ed Dorn. See CPr 297-310.
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This and following citations until noted.

184
state I certainly do not aim to induce. My hope is to convey the ways in which different poems in
Maximus, regardless of their place in the textual sequence, connect various trajectories which have
previously, and often abruptly, been halted. (At least, this seems to hold as an internal logic for
volumes 1 and 2.) Byrd makes what I take to be a similar point when he asserts that two sets of
poems, “Letter 10” through “Letter 22,” and “Letter 23” through “April Today Main Street,” “are
in effect parallel rather than sequential.”31 This again offers a helpful insight to the set of poems
into which “Letter 23” does quite clearly seem to be re-orienting the reader. This attempt to reorient the reader can have the opposite effect, however. Byrd suggests that the idea that these sets
ought to be read as parallel when they a) appear sequentially, and b) have distinct content and
forms (despite their aforementioned similar subject matter) is an example of the often disorienting
effect that Maximus can have on readers. His explanation of this effect speaks to an issue which
runs throughout Maximus (beyond the two letters under consideration, or the two sets of poems he
compares), especially the poems in which Olson investigates Gloucester’s early history. Byrd
cautions:
“The reader of the Maximus must continually remind himself that, while
language is by its nature linear (in the simple sense that one word follows
another), everything in the Maximus happens simultaneously….It is useful,
of course, to follow out certain patterns which occur in the poem, as our
attentions tend also to be linear, but the whole of the poem is implicit from
the beginning, and the progress, if it can be called such, is toward fuller
revelation of the form which inevitably occurs where a purely physical
geography, a human history, of, say five or six millennia, and an absolutely
specific human organism impinge upon one another…”
Both pragmatically and phenomenologically speaking, insofar as the act of reading Maximus is
concerned, Byrd’s point seems correct for the most part. I do, however, think it becomes more
difficult to maintain this point the further a reader goes in to Maximus. For instance, the third

These two ‘sets’ of poems as I have referred to them above, to avoid the conflicting with Byrd’s point that they
are not, in fact “sequences,” comprise MP 49-102, and 103-165, respectively.
31
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volume presents a much more reflective Olson, one who has, by and large, taken command of the
poetic voice rather than projecting it through Maximus. Of course, the emergence of Olson’s own
voice as becoming dominant over Maximus as a projected persona can be read as early as the latter
stages of volume one.
Nevertheless, it is in “Letter 23” that Maximus first explicitly engages with Herodotus. An
implicit reference to Herodotus appears two poems prior to “Letter 23,” in the final section of
“Maximus, at Tyre and at Boston” (c. 1953), Olson ends the poem with these two lines (MP 99):32
that we are only
as we find out we are
This would seem to be a restating of ‘istorin as ‘finding out for ourselves.’ Clearly Herodotus is
on Olson’s mind in the spring of 1953 when he is composing this section of Maximus, having just
encountered Thomson during his preparation for the Institute of the New Sciences of Man. It is in
“Letter 23” that Olson introduces the term muthologos and takes up Thomson’s discussion of the
two terms it comprises. I read “Letter 23” as consisting of seven sections, though the poem does
not contain distinct numbered sections (marked with Arabic numerals) or parts (marked with
roman numerals) per se, as many of the poems in Maximus do. Further, though some of the
sections (on my reading) are distinguished by an open line, two of the transitions from one section
to the next occur within a line of type, both with the aid of punctuation. The following discussion
distinguishes the seven sections of the poem with their line numbers (ll.), one per numbered
subsection of this chapter, for the reader’s convenience. I have distinguished between Maximus’
voice and Olson’s voice. I believe that Olson intends the beginning and end of this poem to be
projected through Maximus. This reading highlights the interjection of Olson’s own voice in the
middle of the poem. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I am sympathetic and receptive to the

32

“Maximus, at Tyre and at Boston,” MP 97-99.
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fact that some readers who are predisposed to dismiss that Olson could possibly project his poetry
through ‘Maximus’ may reject this reading out of hand. Nonetheless, I point this out to clarify
some of my description of “Letter 23” below. I also note here that “line” below refers to a single
line of typography.

6.3.1 Maximus states facts of the early history of Gloucester (ll. 1-11)33
This first section of the poem begins with a full left indentation. The next ten lines are
formatted into what looks like initially three columns (ll. 2-4) with the last segment of line 2, and
lines 3 and 4 in full comprising a column which runs vertically down closer to the center of the
page. This is followed by two columns (ll. 5-11), with all but the first line indented to align with
the third column established in ll. 2-4. This formatting creates shorter lines, in terms of the number
of words per line. It also gives the appearance of a ledger recording quantitative facts, though to
be sure not all of the information presented in these columns is quantitative. As Olson often
borrowed from actual archival legers he found, this particular formatting seems to have been
inspired by such a source. His source here, however, is the prose of Rose-Troup’s aforementioned
biography of John White.
“Letter 23” begins with the declaration
The facts are:
What proceeds is a recounting of the “1st season
facts include: the ship and its mass, “the Fellowship

1623/4” of the settlement at Cape Ann. The
35 tons” (which we later find out departed

from Weymouth, England); and the primary persons, “Edward Cribbe as master,” and John Tilly
and Thomas Gardner,

33

See “Letter 23,” MP 103-105. All following citations are from these pages unless noted.
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The two of them
“bosses”, for a year
There were apparently fourteen men originally aboard the Fellowship who were left at Cape Ann,
essentially to cultivate the land (under Gardner’s oversight) and to exploit the fishing economy
(under Tilly’s oversight). This first section of the poem is a fairly straightforward summary of
these facts, though without context the reader may find it difficult to register what Maximus is
recounting here. Assuming the reader has read through Maximus sequentially up to this point, of
course, it will be clear that the history of pre-Gloucester is the main concern.

6.3.2 Maximus reflects on his own “surprise” at these facts (ll. 12-21)
There is an open line between the first and second sections, with the second section being
full left aligned and written in a more traditional looking prose paragraph style. This suggests to
me that Maximus is taking a step back, as it were, to offer an assessment of not only the historical
facts presented in the first section, but also an assessment of the trajectory of the poem itself thus
far. This sort of meta-commentary on the poem at hand is not uncommon in Maximus, as I read
it.
The shifting of the text to a full left alignment also reflects a tonal shift. Here, Maximus
seemingly draws the reader into his research, his process of ‘istorin. He introduces a second ship,
the Charitie, the cause of “first surprise”: that “all the evidence is” that the contingent aboard the
latter ship who had set out from Plymouth (including John Lyford, Edward Winslow, and “the
Plymouth Co’s patent to Cape Ann” aboard) landed in Plymouth before the Fellowship made its
way to Massachusetts. It is unclear why this is a surprise—no chronological or navigational reason
is given. The reader may assume from earlier poems that Maximus’ surprise stems from the fact
that he was previously under the impression that the Dorchester Company (aboard the Fellowship),
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had in fact arrived first. What is of critical importance in this section is that “the next season, /
when the Plymouth men returned”, they discovered that a company from the “Westcountry” had
taken over their “fishing stage”. This resulted in Miles Standish being “sent for, to fight about
[…] it”.34 After an open line, Maximus seemingly wants to continue his critical assessment of the
situation when he begins the next stanza with, “What we have here—”. The third section then
begins after the em dash. This type of interrupted narrative is common in Herodotus, who often
leaves stories unfinished, or digresses at length to share facts of a different culture or event. The
latter applies here, as Maximus returns to his story of the early days of Gloucester at the end of the
poem. What is particularly interesting here is that the subject matter of the next section shifts so
significantly.

6.3.3 An inclusion from Olson’s biography (ll. 21-24)
This third section is marked by the em dash noted above. Typographically, it continues in
the same prose paragraph style in which section two is presented. Olson’s voice now emerges,
recalling a conversation he had with historian Frederick Merk, whom Olson took a course with
while a graduate student at Harvard (Butterick 1978, 144):
—and literally in my own front yard, as I sd to Merk,
asking him what delving, into “fishermans ffield” recent historians…
not telling him it was a poem I was interested in, aware I’d scare him
off, muthologos has lost such ground since Pindar
The conversation being referenced is from a letter Olson had written to Merk on 10 September
1953, around the time of his initial composition of the poem (ibid.). Olson is drawing an immediate

The ellipsis here is my own addition, and indicates a page break. Hence, the word “it” which ends the sentence
under consideration above appears as the only word in the first line of the next page.
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189
geographical connection between himself and the entire epic here, as we learn here that the
previously discussed “fishing stage” in section 2 of the poem, or “fishermans ffield” as it is referred
to here, was “literally in [Olson’s] front yard.” I assume this is a reference to the location of his
house at 28 Fort Square, which I can verify based on my own ‘istorin, as it were, is very close to
warehouses associated with various aspects of the fishing industry. Olson may also be speaking
more generally here, saying that the part of town in which his mother lives, and where he spends
his summers, is where the initial fishing stage was.
In his real life letter, Olson also asked Merk what contemporary historians were “delving”
into regarding this aspect of Gloucester’s history. After an ellipsis (end of ll. 22), Olson admits he
was not completely up front with Merk in terms of why he is inquiring about this. Olson elected
not to tell Merk he was gathering information for a poem about the history of early Gloucester as
he was conscious of the fact he might “scare him / off.” Olson’s reason for believing complete
honesty might scare off Merk? He insists, “muthologos has lost such ground since Pindar.” Recall
that Thomson attributes the distinguishing between ‘muthos’ and ‘logos’ to Pindar. Beyond the
clear allusion to Thomson, Olson’s point here is twofold. First, he is admitting the personal tension
he has felt between himself and both the academy and the fishing industry for much of his adult
life. Olson’s distaste for academia was discussed in both the Introduction and Chapter 2, but I
note here that Olson is telling readers that he is convinced, presumably due to having been down
this road before, that an historian will feel less compelled to share his knowledge with him if the
historian thinks that knowledge will be bastardized or mistreated in an aesthetic venture such as a
poem. Secondly, Olson is pushing the poetics of Maximus back to a time before Pindar, before
the distinction between ‘muthos’ and ‘logos,’ to a time when both terms meant simply to tell a
story and when stories were accepted prima facie as fact. That Olson’s voice presents this
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particular historical fact is important. Typically Olson allows Maximus’ voice to set the historical
parameters of the epic because it, as the projection of an historical yet timeless perspective, will
carry more weight as an authority on history in the space of Maximus. However, Olson emerges
in this instance to set the poetic parameters of Maximus as an epic which is grounded in an archaic
sense of the terms ‘muthos’ and ‘logos.’ Maximus is thus an exercise in muthologos.
The repetition of “him” at the beginning of lines 22 and 23 (“asking him,” “not telling
him”) and again at the end of line 23 (“aware I’d scare him”) creates what Simon Sling has called
a ‘non-serial anaphora’ in his examination of Herodotus’ oral strategies. Sling describes the nonserial anaphora employed by Herodotus as “a constellation akin to anaphora” in which “two
successive, paratactically juxtaposed clauses are used to refer to the same state of affairs” (60). He
adds that “[i]n oral language, anaphora is a typical chunking strategy, which speakers can adopt
in order to arrange their thoughts as they are formulating them” (ibid., my italics). 35 To be sure,
the typical anaphora (exact repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of a line) is a technique
which Olson employs throughout his poetry. Paul notes that in Olson’s poetry, “anaphora
contributes to percussive effect” (25). This accentuates the oral poetics driving his composition.
Nonetheless, the non-serial anaphora in this section of “Letter 23” give it a rhythm and syncopation
which the previous two sections, as more akin to bookkeeping or prose (respectively) in their
presentation, do not have. After naming Pindar as one of the many foes in Maximus, an open line
then distinguishes what I consider the fourth section of the poem, and one of the most pivotal
moments of the project as a whole.
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Chunking is a technique associated with intonation units. Chunks are effectively what we can retain in our echoic
memory. For more on this see pp. 166-167 above.
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6.3.4 Olson poeticizes the distancing of ‘muthos’/‘logos’ (ll. 25-36)
The next twelve lines depict a critical juncture in Greek (and subsequent Western) history,
one which had a great epistemological effect. This is, of course, a common theme in Olson’s prose
and poetry. To emphasize the importance of these lines in the poem, and the shift in voice and
subject matter, this section is indented a full inch to the right. It consists of twelve shorter lines,
which, though not formal by any means, have a rather lyrical. The shorter lines and indentation
give this section of the poem the appearance of cascading down a more central portion of the page.
This typography reflects the fact that this section is pushing Olson toward one of his own most
important revelations in the poem, which we will return to when considering the next section.
In this section, Olson confronts Pindar and his criticism of “Homer’s sweet-versing.”
According to him:
The odish man sd: “Poesy
steals away men’s judgement
by her muthoi”
He then cites the following, similarly themed criticism of ‘muthos,’ also from Pindar:
“and a blind heart
is most men’s portions”. Plato
Ending this latter line with Plato gives the impression that also might be attributing the citation to
him. It is in fact Pindar’s statement, but the analog Olson is making here is that Plato, complacent
in Pindar’s discrimination of the two terms, only widened the distance between the ‘muthos’ and
its truth function in a mythological culture. Hence, Olson then indicts Plato for having
“allowed this divisive
thought to stand, agreeing

that muthos
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is false. Logos
isn’t—was facts. Thus
Thucydides”36
As Butterick revealed in his Guide, this is a recasting of Thomson, the material in this section
coming from pages 18-19 of The Art of the Logos, some of which was cited above. Butterick cites
a much longer excerpt of Thomson in which the latter cites Pindar as having referred to the “sweetversing Homer,” asserting that “[p]oesy steals away the judgements of mankind by her Muthoi,
and a blind heart is most men’s portions” (Thomson 18-19; cf. Butterick 1978, 145-146). Though
he does not attribute any of this to Thomson, which in fairness would be a clunky insertion in the
poem, Olson is demonstrating the influence that Thomson, as much as Herodotus, was having on
his thinking at the time. Thomson can be credited with strengthening Olson’s conviction that myth
was perceived as reality—was itself reality—in archaic culture, a notion Olson seems to have held
since at least the mid-1940s.
The seemingly off-hand remark about Thucydides at the end of this section arises from
Olson’s belief that Herodotus was a genuine practicing history, whereas Thucydides was a passive
recorder of conjecture and hearsay. In the later Maximus poem, “A Later Note on Letter # 15” (c.
1962), in which Olson uses the term “‘istorin,” Olson makes this distinction more explicitly when
he contrasts Herodotus’ “concept of history…which was a verb, to find out for yourself” to
Thucidides, or
the latest finest tape-recorder, or any form of record on the spot37
After an open line Olson implies that “Thucidides,” whom he intentionally belittles by misspelling
his name here, would be right at home in the technology of Olson’s ear when he continues:

The last four lines of this excerpt of “Letter 23” are one strophe. Formatting here divides them across the page
break.
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– live television or what – is a lie
I am not certain of the emergence of this position in Olson’s thinking, but it is a consistent theme
for him.

In a review of Aubrey de Sélincourt’s translations of Herodotus’ Histories and

Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War titled “It Was. But It Ain’t.,” Olson asserts that Thucydides
style of history is “just what he says any other history is, not the equal of his eye-witness” (CPr
342). Herodotus, on the other hand, has one important “advantage”:
“he says the voice is greater than the eye. If you shout—if you tell your
story—he listens to you. He doesn’t give you that nod and finger which
destroys you, wagging, and saying, look, you ain’t there. He says, you say
so? OK, I believe you. Truth is what is said, not, what is seen. Your own
report is good enough for him.” (ibid.)
This does of course call into question Olson’s understanding of Thomson’s crucial footnote which,
to reiterate, states that for Herodotus ‘istorin was “‘finding out for oneself,’ instead of depending
on hearsay” (237n13, my italics). I am inclined to wonder exactly what Thomson himself meant
given that most of the Histories seems to involve Herodotus relaying what he has heard from other
sources. It is widely accepted that Herodotus travelled to a significant extent, so perhaps in this
sense his finding out for himself involved travelling to places to hear what was to be said on a
particular topic. Nevertheless, regardless of Olson’s dismissal of Thucydides, his review of de
Sélincourt’s translations offer evidence that he believed deeply in the inherent truth of the human
voice, and knowledge that was orally transmitted and disseminated.

6.3.5 Olson reflects on the previous section (ll. 37-39)
The typography now shifts back to a full left alignment. Here, Olson distances himself
from the classical Greeks who divided the ‘muthos’ and the ‘logos’. He says:
I would be an historian as Herodotus was, looking
for oneself for the evidence of
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what is said :38
This is the first explicit mention of Herodotus in Maximus, clearly an allusion to Thomson’s
definition of ‘istorin. This also acts as a revelation of the concept of history operative throughout
the project. I read the shift back to a full left alignment as signaling that the poem is gradually
transitioning back into Maximus’ voice. It also helps to set the previous (fourth) section apart,
giving it the added visual emphasis of being the central moment of the poem in three senses: 1) it
is, in effect, the middle section of the poem; 2) it occupies a more centralized portion of the page
typographically; 3) it is Olson’s rejection of this division of the ‘muthos’ and the ‘logos,’ or at
least the rejection of the ‘muthos’ as truth, which drives this poem. In section 5, then, Olson
reveals what his preferred approach to, and concept of, history is: self-guided discovery. This is
evidence here by his use of obscure historical texts to ground the facticity of Maximus’ portion of
“Letter 23.”

6.3.6 Maximus returns to telling the story of Gloucester’s early history (ll. 39-42)
In the penultimate section, Maximus returns to sharing “the facts,” offering what is
essentially one complete sentence. The colon at the end of section 5 is a typographical cue marking
a slight pause should be observed by the reader, as we know, and in this instance demarcating the
two sections topically. This mirrors the em dash which demarcated sections 2 and 3. As such,
Olson uses punctuation to set apart the middle three sections of the poem, which are in his own
voice (as I read it) rather than using line breaks. That is, both sections 3 and 6 start in the middle
of a typed line. The colon at the end of section 5 also indicates that what follows is itself “the
evidence of / what is said.” Further, it offers an excellent example of how a breath-group
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incorporates multiple lines of type to create a single syntactic unit, though it is not punctuated as
a complete sentence. This section is, in full:
: Altham says
Winslow
was at Cape Ann in April,
162439
We have thus returned to the historical period which was under consideration at the outset of the
poem. In this regard, “Letter 23” exhibits the same kind of nested narrative structure which
Herodotus employs throughout the Histories.

6.3.7 Maximus offers a critical assessment of the history he is telling us (ll. 43-51)
Following an open line, the final section of the poem is then a return to Maximus’ critical
assessment of Gloucester’s economic foundations. It again, as in section 2, has a typography
reminiscent of prose, with longer lines aligned fully left. I read the typography of sections 1, 2,
and 7 as a tacit attempt to mimic the typical data presentation (1) and prose structure (2, 7) that
Olson would have affiliated with more acceptable academic histories, the kind which might be
written by historians that he thinks would be scared off by a pesky poet inquiring about certain
things to obtain fodder for a poem about history.
Maximus’ assessment of the pre-Gloucester economy actually tells a story more
fundamental to American socioeconomic history. It is no mere story of competing fishing
industries. As he puts it:
What we have in this field in these scraps among these fishermen,
and the Plymouth men, is more than the fight of one colony
Per Butterick 1978: Olson found this information in Rose-Troup, p. 70, where, according to Butterick, “the fact is
used as evidence to establish the date of the sailing of the Charitie” (147). Emmanuel (or possibly Samuel) Altham
“was captain of the pinnacle Little James which carried settlers to Plymouth” (148).
39
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with another40
It is, rather, “the whole engagement against (1) mercantilism […] and (2) against nascent
capitalism.” 41 This nascent capitalism was one which still valued, and was valuable to, the
“individual adventurer and the worker on the share.” Modern capitalism, as represented by
present-day Gloucester, is a failing complex of
sliding statism, ownership
getting in to, the community as, Chambers of Commerce, or theocracy;
or City Manager
The theme of owners who are ‘not from here’ driving the economy of Gloucester, or any
place for that matter, continues to resonate here. These sentiments echo those we saw at
the conclusion of Chapter 1, where we saw Olson’s lament at “the ships, even the wharves”
being “absentee-owned” (“Letter 3,” MP 14).

6.4

Conclusion
“Letter 23,” in its final composition, represents the culmination of the first decade of

Charles Olson’s literary career, broadly speaking. It marks a central moment in The Maximus
Poems, one which can be read, even out of sequence, as a sort of framing of at least the first volume
of the three-volume epic. In “Letter 23,” Olson’s concept of history as ‘istorin, which means in
his lexicon ‘to find out for yourself,’ is applied to the early economic history of the Gloucester. It
reads as a nested narrative, much like the kind of stories Herodotus tells in his Histories, with tonal
and topical shifts that take the reader from: the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1923-1924; into the
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mid-twentieth century where Olson shares some of correspondence with an academic historian,
and his own musings about history, poetry, and muthologos; back into the early economic
development of Gloucester and how it represents a larger socioeconomic development of the
Unites States.
Beyond the nested narrative of “Letter 23,” Olson implements parataxis and ‘non-serial’
anaphora, particularly in the middle sections, to give the poem a rhythm and aphoristic quality
which makes it memorable, for me at least, more memorable in relation to the more prose-like
sections of the poem. This is not to say those sections are not poetic. Rather, I want to stress that
like all good oral poets, Olson had a sense of when and how to vary his verse in such a way that it
would highlight the moments that he wants to be retained by the audience. Taken as a microcosm
for Maximus, and to a degree Olson entire oeuvre of poetry, “Letter 23” not only reveals some of
the most important intellectual sources for Olson at this stage of his career (Herodotus, J.A.K.
Thomson), it also demonstrates the oral poetics underlying his projective verse.
Olson would continue to think through the concept of ‘istorin during the mid-1950s, the
final years of Black Mountain College. In his 1956 lectures series published as The Special View
of History, Olson would explain to his audience what the term meant, from where he had gotten it
(to an extent), and how he expected poets to espouse the concepts themselves for their own poetic
process. He told his audience:
Like it or not, see it or not, history is the function of any one of us.
It is in this sense that, today, one has to regard history not at all as (1)
events of the past, (2) as a ‘fate’…or (3) that we are making it, that horrible
fallacy of the present which spews itself out of all radios newspapers
magazines mouth, as though it was a damn fire-spitting dragon.
[…]
(Only thus, by the way,
can one say mortal—not as a ‘lifetime,’ not as flesh going toward death and
resurrection, but as history: that you live. An active. The dynamic is, not
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the energy exploded, wasted, used, whatever is done with it. But that it is
there, to be used.” (SVH, 17)
We see here that Olson’s concept of history is being explicitly explained as history of action in
which history is a natural function of humans. This is not, however, all that far removed from his
statements in “Projective Verse” encouraging readers to stay in the present, to stay active in their
discovery process, to utilize current discoveries and research to inform their poetry, and to utilize
the energy of the natural world to produce poetry. This was an idea to which Olson consistently
returned from at least the time of his poetic manifesto. In an essay titled, “The Present is Prologue”
(1952), he announced what he thought of as the uniqueness of his concept of history:
“My shift is that I take it the present is prologue, not the past. The instant,
therefore. Is its own interpretation, as a dream is, and any action—a poem,
for example. Down with causation (except, see below). And yrself: you, as
the only reader and mover of the instant. You, the cause. No drag allowed,
on either. Get on with it.” (CPr 205, my italics)
The connection of history and poetry in Olson’s thinking is also apparent in this passage.
Further, Olson is making the case that a poem is itself an action—both in the sense that it is history,
and that it has the power to transform history. From its early appearance as a spatial concept in
Call Me Ishmael and the poem “La Préface,” history was for Olson both something that burdened
him and something which he felt humans had the power to radically transform especially as it
relates to our epistemological methods, our ways of acquiring, disseminating, and preserving
knowledge. Part of the latter process was, for Olson, necessarily oral and mythological if any
significant refashioning of a new ‘human universe’ was to be achieved. I think that as Olson’s
career progressed beyond the period we have concerned ourselves with here, the burden he felt to
be a poet-historian became stronger, and his vision of how he personally could try to radically
transform human thinking.
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Readers no doubt will raise objections to the portrayal of Olson’s oral poetics. I do not
deny the fact that I think a poem such as Maximus can mark a new kind of orality, one which can
only be realized in the present. To this extent, I do not profess that this dissertation has pushed the
process along in any significant direction. I do, however, believe that a new orality remains always
on the horizon, a new epistemology by which we subvert “all that irritable reaching after fact and
reason” in favor of a “new poetics, and to new concepts from which some sort of…epic, perhaps,
may emerge” (CPr, 120, 239). I do not feel strongly that I will see this transformation. Readers
may disagree that I have reasonably grounded its possibility in Olson’s concepts of mythology,
history and orality. If I have fallen short of the mark, I make one final appeal by way of Olson’s
“A Later Note on Letter # 15.” I cannot make up my mind if I am comforted or distressed by this
thought, however. As Olson tells us:
The poetics of such a situation
are yet to be found out
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